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AUGUSTINE'S DOCTRINE OF KNOWLEDGE AND AUTHORITY.

Augustine marks almost as great an epoch in the history of philosophy as in the history of theology. It was with him that the immediate assurance of consciousness first took its place as the source and warrant of truth. No doubt there had been a long preparation for the revolution which was wrought by his announcement of the principle of "self-assured subjectivity", as Windelband calls it, and his establishment of it in "the controlling central position of philosophic thought". But the whole preceding development will not account for the act of genius by which he actually shifted the basis of philosophy, and in so doing became "the true teacher of the middle ages", no doubt, but above and beyond that "one of the founders of modern thought".¹ He may himself be said to have come out of Plato, or Plotinus; but in even a truer sense out of him came Descartes and his successors.² When he urged men to cease seeking truth without them, and to turn within, since the home of truth

¹ Windelband, *A History of Philosophy*, E. T., pp. 276, 264, 270.

² Leder, *Augustins Erkenntnistheorie*, p. 76: "If we must see in Plotinus the father of Augustine's Platonism, we may yet recognize it as an especially original service of the Church-Father, that he established over against all scepticism the first point of all certitude in self-consciousness. He found in Plotinus no guidance for this: rather by an act of genius he anticipated in it the line of thought which Descartes (1640) made in his *Meditationes* the starting point of his expositions."

is inside of man, he already placed them upon the firm footing which Descartes sought with his *cogito ergo sum*.³

If Augustine can be said to have had a philosophical master before he fell under the influence of the Neoplatonists, that master must be discerned in Cicero. And from Cicero he derived rather a burning zeal in the pursuit of truth than a definite body of philosophical tenets or even a philosophical point of view. It is a mistake to think of him as ever surrendering himself to the scepticism of the New Academy. He does indeed tell us that, in his disillusionment with Manichaeism and his increasing despair of attaining the truth, the notion sprang up within him that the so-called Academics might after all prove the best philosophers, contending as they did that everything hangs in doubt and truth cannot be comprehended by men.⁴ It is not strange that at such moments his thoughts surged in great waves towards their teachings.⁵ But he tells us also that he could not commit himself to them; not only because he was repelled by their heathenism,⁶ but also because he was shocked by their scepticism.⁷ His difficulty at the time lay, in fact, in another quarter. He found no obstacle in the attainment of certitude: but nothing but apodeictic certitude satisfied him. He entertained no doubt, for example, that seven and three

³ *De vera religione*, 39: Noli foras ire, in te ipsum redi, in interiore homine habitat veritas.

⁴ *Conff.* v. 10. 19.

⁵ *De utilitate credendi*, viii. 20: Saepe mihi videbatur [verum] non posse inveniri, magnique fluctus cogitationum mearum in Academicorum suffragium ferebantur. He proceeds to say that so often as he was thus tempted, he reacted on considering the vivacity, sagacity, perspicacity of the human mind; he could not believe this mind so much incapable of truth as ignorant as yet of the right way of going about its discovery: thus he was led to meditate on the problem of authority. *De beata vita*, I. 4: at ubi discussos eos [Manichaeos] evasi maximo trajecto isto mari diu gubernacula mea repugnantia omnibus ventis in mediis fluctibus Academici tenuerunt.

⁶ *Conff.* v. 14. 20: "I utterly refused to commit the healing of my soul to these philosophers, because they knew not the saving name of Christ."

⁷ *Conff.* vi. 4. 6: "I was not so insane as to fancy that not even this"—mathematical truth—"could be comprehended."

make ten; what he demanded was the same kind and degree of certainty he had here, for everything else. In other words, he would not commit himself to any truth for which he did not have ready at hand complete demonstration.

Augustine's point of departure was therefore the precise contradictory of that of the Academics. They asserted that we can never get beyond suspense because we lack all criterion of truth. The best we can do is to say that this or that looks like truth; that it is *verisimile* or *probabile*: we can never affirm that it is truth, *verum*; though, of course, we can as little affirm that it is not truth. Lacking all *signum* we are left in utter and hopeless uncertainty. Augustine, on the contrary, in the apodeictic certainty of, say, mathematical formulas, was in possession of a sure criterion on the basis of which he could confidently assert truth. His difficulty was that he wished to apply this *signum* mechanically to every sphere of truth alike, and could content himself with no other kind of certitude. He was tempted to declare that nothing resting on less cogent grounds is known, or can be known, at all. What he needed yet was to learn that so far from the possession of apodeictic certitude for some things throwing into the shadow of doubt all for which it cannot be adduced, it provides a basis for valid assurance with respect to them too. On the basis of this *signum* we may obtain in every sphere at least the *verisimile*, the *probabile*—a sufficient approach to truth to serve all practical purposes; or rather truth itself though not truth in its purity, free from all admixture of error. In other words, in every department of investigation there is attainable real and clear, if somewhat roughly measured, knowledge. What we currently call a yard of muslin, for example, though shown by the application of a micrometer not to be an exact yard, is yet by the self-same test just as truly shown to be a yard for all the practical ends for which muslin is used. The possession of a criterion gives validity to the *verisimile*; for who can declare that anything is like the truth unless he has the truth itself in mind with which to compare it and by which to judge it?

It was by a line of reasoning something like this that Augustine overthrew the Academics when, in his retirement at Cassiciacum, in the interval between his conversion and his baptism, he undertook to lay the foundations of a positive Christian philosophy. It is absurd to talk of a *verisimile*, he urged, unless the standard, the *verum*, is in our possession. And not only is this standard, this *verum*, certainly in the possession of every man and instinctively employed by him; but no one can by any means rid himself of it. Do what we will, we cannot help knowing that the world is either one or not one;⁸ that three times three are nine;⁹ and the like; that is to say the principles which underlie, say for example, logic and mathematics. And in knowing these things, we know them not only to be true, but to be eternally and immutably true, quite independently of our thinking minds,—so that they would be equally true if no human minds had ever existed, and would remain true though the whole human race should perish.¹⁰ With this indefectible certainty of necessary truth the mind unavoidably knows, therefore, the laws of the true, the beautiful and the good,¹¹ according to which, as its criterion, it judges all of the true, beautiful and good which is brought into observation in the experience of life. Nor can doubt be thrown upon these things by calling in question the reality of the very mind itself by which they are known, and therefore the validity of its convictions. Rather, the reality of the mind is given in the very act of knowledge: for what is not cannot act. Say even that this act is an act of doubt. If the mind did not exist, it could not even doubt.¹² The act of doubt itself becomes, thus, the credential of certitude. It is impossible even to doubt unless we are, and remember, and understand, and will, and think,

⁸ *Cont. Acad.* iii. 10. 23.

⁹ *Cont. Acad.* iii. 11. 25.

¹⁰ *Cont. Acad.* iii. 11. 25: *necesse est, vel genere humano sterbente, sit verum.* Cf. *De lib. arbitr.* ii. 9. 21; *De Trinitate*, ix. 6.

¹¹ *De lib. arbitr.* ii. 8, 9, 10, 15, 16: *De Trinitate* ix. 6; viii. 3; xiv. 15.

¹² *De lib. arbitr.* ii. 3, 7.

and know, and judge: so that he that doubts must not and cannot doubt of these things, seeing that even if he doubts he does them.¹³ Even he who says 'I do not know', thereby evinces not only that he exists and that he knows that he exists, but also that he knows what knowing is and that he knows that he knows it.¹⁴ It is impossible to be ignorant that we are; and as this is certain, many other things are certain along with it, and the confident denial of this is only another way of demonstrating it.

What Augustine is doing in this reasoning, it will be observed, is withdrawing attention from the external world and focussing it upon the inner consciousness. There, there alone, he asserts, can truth be found. Those who seek it without, never attain to it;¹⁵ it is in the inner man that it makes its home, and it can be discovered, therefore, only by those who look within.¹⁶ His polemic is turned upon that Sensationalism in philosophy which had long reigned supreme in the schools, and the dominion of which he was the first to break. In this polemic, he considered himself to be building upon the New Academy, whose mordant criticism of knowledge he persuaded himself was only the negative side of a defence of an essential Platonism which they kept, in its positive side, meanwhile in reserve. In this judgment of fact he was certainly mistaken; the Academy had itself fallen into the prevalent Sensationalism and was itself, therefore, as truly as the Epicurean and Stoic schools of the time the object of his confutation.¹⁷ But to the Sensationalistic maxim that 'there is nothing in the intellect which was not beforehand in the senses', by whomsoever taught and in whatsoever forms, he opposes the direct contradiction that truth is to be sought, in the first instance, in the intellect alone. As Robert Browning phrases it, "to

¹³ *De Trinitate*, x. 10. 14.

¹⁴ *De Trinitate*, x. 1. 3.

¹⁵ *De vera religione*, 49: . . . veritas, ad quam nullo modo perveniunt qui foris eam quaerunt.

¹⁶ *De vera religione*, 39: noli foras ire, in te ipsum redi, in interiore homine habitat veritas. Cf. *Retract.* i. 8.

¹⁷ Cf. Leder, *Augustins Erkenntnistheorie*, p. 35.

know rather consists in opening out a way whence the imprisoned splendor may escape, than in effecting entry for a light supposed to be without". In other words, Augustine came forward as a flaming Rationalist in the philosophical sense of that term; in the sense, that is, in which it describes those thinkers who hold that the "reason" is the fundamental source of knowledge; and, in opposition alike to Sensationalism and Empiricism which teach respectively that our knowledge is derived exclusively from sensation or experience (that is, sensation and reflection), contend rather that it is the "reason", acting under laws of its own, which supplies the forms of thought without which no knowledge can be obtained either by sensation or by experience.

— Arnobius, his fellow African of a hundred years before, on the basis of the popular Stoicism was as flaming a Sensationalist as Augustine was a Rationalist, and it is interesting to contrast the strong expressions which the two give, each to his own point of view. Arnobius calls to the aid of his exposition the imaginary case of a man secluded from infancy to maturity in a dark cavern, guarded from every possible commerce with the external world. Such an one, he contends, would remain mentally empty; and, if confronted, not with some complicated problem, but with even the simple twice two are four, "would stand like a stock or the Marpesian rock, as the saying is, dumb and speechless", understanding nothing.¹⁸ In staring contrast with Arnobius, Augustine sometimes speaks as if contact with the external world and the intrusion of sensible images into the mind were a positive hindrance to the acquisition of knowledge; and as if the mind would do its essential work better if it could do it free from what, in that case, would be conceived as the distractions of sense; as if, in a word, something like the condition in which Laura Bridgman or Helen Keller were found were the most favorable for the development of human intelligence. This exaggeration, however, is no part of his system; and its occasional sug-

¹⁸ Arnobius, *Adv. Gent.* ii. 20 (American ed. of *Ante-Nicene Library*, VI. 442).

gestion serves only to throw into a high light the strength and seriousness of his Rationalism.

This Rationalism, however, it may be observed, is never pressed to the extreme of conceiving the reason as the creator of its own object. That is to say, it never passes into the Idealism which in more modern times has lain so frequently in its pathway. To Augustine the world of observation was far from being merely a "psychological phenomenon". Indeed, not only does he recognize the objectivity of the world of sense, but, with all the vigor of his contention that we must look within for truth, he insists equally on the objectivity of even the intelligible world. Man no more creates the world of ideas he perceives within him, that the world of sense he perceives without him. In his assertion that the objects of sensible and intellectual perception alike have indubitable objectivity lies, indeed, one of the main features of Augustine's philosophy.¹⁹ Perhaps we may best catch his general idea, in the distinction he made between the two modes of knowledge—sense perception and intellection—corresponding to the two worlds, sensible and intelligible—if we represent him as thinking of the human soul as existing in a double environment, with both of which it is connected by appropriate organs of perception. On the one hand, it is connected with the sensible world by the external senses; on the other hand, with the intelligible world by the *sensus intimus* which is the intellect.²⁰ Au-

¹⁹ Cf. Nourrison, *La phil.*, Vol. II, p. 295: "To affirm the certitude of consciousness is, for him, to affirm in the same act the certitude of the external world. . . . It is well to take note of the sagacity with which he distinguishes the phenomenon from the being and thus exonerates the senses from the errors which are commonly attributed to them. Organs and witnesses of what passes, and not of what does not pass, of the phenomenal and not the real, they are not the judges of truth—*judicium veritatis non esse in sensibus*. It is the intellect that knows or the intellect that deceives itself. Its knowledge is certitude. No Scotchman of our day could express it better."

²⁰ *Cont. Acad.* iii. 17. 37: Platonem sensisse duos esse mundos, unum intelligibilem, in quo ipsa veritas habitaret, istum autem sensibilem, quem manifestum esse nos visu tactuque sentire. Itaque illum verum, hunc verisimilem.

gustine's notion is, essentially, that the soul, by these two modes of contact with its double environment, is enabled to read off the facts of each. His mode of statement commonly takes the form that as the sensible world impresses itself upon us through the external senses, so the intelligible world impresses itself upon us through the intellect: but we must not press the passivity of the soul to its several impressions which might seem to be implied in this mode of statement. If, now, these two worlds, the sensible and the intelligible, stood contradictorily over against each other, the soul of man lying between them and invaded by impressions from each, would be in parlous case. Such, however, is not Augustine's conception. The sensible world is not thought of by him as itself independent of the intelligible. It not only has its source in the intelligible world, but derives its whole support and direction from it; and reflects, after its own fashion, its content. It can not be perceived, therefore, save, so to speak, from the angle of the intelligible world; and in order that it may be understood, the soul must bring to its perception the principles derived from the intelligible world. In a word, the soul is caparisoned for the perception and understanding of the sensible world only by prior perception and understanding of the intelligible world. That is to say, the soul brings over from the intelligible world the forms of thought under which alone the sensible world can be received by it into a mental embrace.

This is, of course, a very developed form of Intuitionism. According to the Stoics—those Sensationalists *a outrance*—the human mind is in the first instance a *tabula rasa*, on which outer things impress themselves (*τύπωσις*). But even the Stoics could speak of truths of nature. In their most materialistic development they could find a place in their system for general ideas common to all men (*κοινὰ ἔννοιαι*, *communes notiones*), which they not only recognized as real, but valued as the best constituents of human knowledge. As men have practically the same environment, they explained, the sum of the impressions made by

surrounding nature upon each, is practically the same as the sum of the impressions made upon all. Hence peculiar confidence should be put in the ideas common to all men: they are the general teachings of nature, that nature life in conformity with which is the wise man's mark. "Natural ideas" are not foreign, then, to the Stoic system; but when the Stoics spoke of these ideas as "natural", they did not at all mean that they constitute a part of the nature with which man is endowed. Man was not supposed to bring them into life with him, but distinctly to acquire them in the process of living: they are impressed by nature on his soul. The transition is easy, however, from the conception of a body of ideas natural to man in this sense, to a conception of a body of ideas belonging to his nature as such, or, in other words, innate. Along with his reason, it is now said, every man possesses by nature, that is, by his constitution as man, a body of ideas: they belong to his nature as a rational being. In making this step we have definitely passed over from Sensationalism to Rationalism, and have so far approached Augustine's conception. But we have not yet reached it. The doctrine of innate ideas, strictly construed in that form, is Deistic. These ideas are ours because they have been from the beginning once for all impressed upon our nature by our Maker, who has made us thus and not otherwise,—namely so that by the action of our intellect we become aware of the principles thus made a part of our very structure. Augustine, however, was as little Deistic as Sensationalistic in his thinking, and necessarily advanced a step further to a truly Theistic Intuitionism. These ideas, he teaches, are natural to man in the sense that they inhere in his nature as such, and are not impressed on him by external nature; and they are innate in the sense that they belong to his nature from the beginning of his being. But he cannot conceive them merely as impressed on the mind, or rather built into its structure, once for all at its creation. He thinks rather of the soul as constantly dependent on God, who is no more its Creator than its Up-

holder and Director; and of its intrinsic ideas as, therefore, continuously impressed on it by God. Thus its light is God alone; and the soul, in intellection, bears the same constant relation to God the Illuminator as in ethical action it bears to God the Sanctifier. God, he is never weary of saying, in his own adaptation of a Platonic formula, is at once the Author of all being, the Light of all knowledge, and the Fountain of all good; the God of creation, of truth, of grace: or, otherwise put, the *causa subsistendi*, the *ratio intelligendi* and the *ordo vivendi*. His ontology of "innate ideas", accordingly, is that they are the immediate product in the soul of God the Illuminator, always present with the soul as its sole and indispensable Light, in which alone it perceives truth.

No doubt there is a Neoplatonic factor in this construction, and possibly also the modes of expression employed may betray a reminiscence of Stoic *τύπωσις* — with the source of the impression elevated, however, from nature to nature's God. But we must beware of pushing it out of its theistic sobriety into the regions of an essentially pantheistic mode of thought, whether developed or only implicated. Nothing could be farther from Augustine's meaning than that God, as the Universal Reason and Sole Intelligence, comes to the knowledge of the truth in us, and we in and by Him, so that our knowledge simply coalesces with His. His doctrine of creation, by which the creature is set as an objective somewhat, with powers of its own, over against God the Creator, placed him at a whole diameter's distance from the pantheistic tendencies of Plotinus, otherwise so much his master.²¹ But neither does the "ontologism" of William of Paris and Malebranche, Fenelon and Bossuet precisely reproduce his meaning. Augustine does not teach that we contemplate immediately the Divine Being, and in Him the intelligible world, that *pleroma* of eternal and im-

²¹ Cf. Nourrison, *op cit.* II. 301. 334; Grandgeorge, *St. Augustine et le Néoplatonisme*, p. 111; Portalié in Vacant-Mangenot, *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, I. 2330. *Per contra*, however, Ritschl, Loesche, etc.

mutable truths which constitutes the world of divine Ideas.²² It would be much nearer his meaning to say that we see God in the eternal truths which by our *sensus intimus* we contemplate, than that we see them in Him. Undoubtedly he teaches that the soul has an immediate knowledge of God; and, in a sense, he does identify with God the intelligible world into contact with which the soul is brought by its *sensus intimus*. We should not be far from his meaning, however, if, reverting to a mode of representation we have already employed, we should say that the soul, set in its double environment, the sensible world on the one hand and the intelligible world on the other, as it knows the sensible world directly through the senses, so knows God in the intelligible world directly through the intellect. But God is not identified with the intelligible world, as it appears in the soul of man, except as its immediate author. He is in the soul of man not *substantialiter* but only *effective*; and it is precisely in this that the difficulty of the conception lies. If we may be permitted to employ theological conceptions here, we may say that Augustine's ontology of the intuition by which man attains intelligible truth, embraced especially two factors: the doctrine of the image of God, and the doctrine of dependence on God. To put it briefly, man's power of attaining truth depends, in his view, first of all upon the fact that God has made man like Himself, Whose intellect is the home of the intelligible world, the contents of which may, therefore, be reflected in the human soul; and then, secondly, that God, having so made man, has not left him, deistically, to himself, but continually reflects into his soul the contents of His own eternal and immutable mind—which are precisely those eternal and immutable truths which constitute the intelligible world. The soul is therefore in unbroken communion with God, and in the body of intelligible truths reflected into it from God, sees God. The nerve of this view, it will be observed, is the theistic conception of the constant dependence of the crea-

²² Cf. Portalié as cited, p. 2335; and Storz, *Philosophie d. hl. Aug.*, p. 65 sq.

ture on God. This stands midway between the deistic conception, on the one side, that has no need of God except for the primal originating of the creature, and supposes that after that the creature's own powers suffice for all its acts; and the pantheistic view, on the other side, which substitutes the divine action for the creature's action and, having no need of a creature at all, transforms it into a mere simulacrum without reality of being or action. In the theistic view, there is postulated the creature as the product of a real creation, by which is produced a real thing with real activities of its own; and alongside of this, the real dependence of this creature for the persistence and use of all its activities on the constant action of God. Applying this conception to the problem of intellection, Augustine conceives the soul as at once active and acted upon, but as active only because acted upon. It is only in the light of God, the sun of the soul, that the soul is illuminated to see light.

There was nothing novel in the ascription of all human knowledge to the illumination of God. It was not only Numenius who declared all knowledge to be but the kindling of a little light from the great light which lightens the world.²³ Platonist and Stoic alike offered a metaphysical and epistemological basis for such a representation. According to the one, knowledge is recollection; and Cicero had explained this—or explained it away—as meaning that right knowledge is implanted in the soul by God at its creation, and is, therefore, inherent in it; while Plotinus' language on the subject is scarcely distinguishable from Augustine's.²⁴ According to the other, the human *logos* is but a fraction of the universal *Logos* and reproduces in its thought His normative mind. In the mere matter of forms of statement, therefore, Augustine had harbingering enough. It was, nevertheless, quite a new spirit which informed his declarations, the spirit of a pure theism, derived, not from his philosophical predecessors, but from those Scriptures

²³ Eusebius, *Praep. Evang.* xi. 18. 8.

²⁴ Cf. *De civitate Dei*, x. 2.

which themselves also told him of the true light that lighteth every man who cometh into the world.²⁵ It was the personal God, therefore, whom he spoke of as the "Sun of the soul, by whose illumination alone can intelligible verities be perceived",²⁶ the "Light of the truth", by which alone is knowledge of the truth awakened in the soul,²⁷ or—changing the figure only—the inner Monitor and Master of the soul.²⁸ It was the personal Logos that he had in mind, through whose immanent working all things that exist exist, all things that live live, all things that understand understand. Surely if it be true even of the body that in Him we live and move and have our being,²⁹ it must much more be true of the mind, which, having been made in His likeness, lives and moves and has its being in Him in some more excellent, but of course not visible but intelligible way.³⁰ "Our illumination", he says, "is participation in that Word, that is to say, in His life, which is the light of men."³¹

We perceive that the outcome of this conception is that the condition of all knowledge is Revelation. Accordingly, our action in seeking knowledge is represented as essentially a consultation of God; God's action in giving us knowledge as essentially a transference of truth to us by a divine imprinting of it on the soul. That mental act which we call understanding, Augustine explains,³² is performed in two ways: either by the mind or reason within itself, as when we understand that the intellect itself exists; or on occasion of a suggestion from the senses, as when we understand that matter exists: in the first of which two kinds of acts we understand through ourselves, that is, by consulting God³³ concerning that which is within us;

²⁵ Cf. *Tract. in Joan.* II. 7; *Epist.* 120. 4; *De pecc. merit.* I. 25, 37, 48.

²⁶ *Solill.* I. 8.

²⁷ *De pecc. merit.* i. 25. 37.

²⁸ *De magistro.*

²⁹ *Epist.* 120. 4; *De Trinitate*, xiv. 12.

³⁰ *De Trinitate*, xiv. 12.

³¹ *De Genes. ad litt.* iv. 2.

³² *Epist.* xiii (to Nebridius), 4.

³³ *Deum consulendo.*

while in the second we understand by consulting God regarding that of which intimation is given us by the body and the senses. That is to say, in brief, knowledge of the sensible and of the intelligible alike is God-given, and in both instances is to be obtained only by referring to His teaching. He adds, in another place,³⁴ that this God who is so consulted, and who, being so consulted, teaches us, is none other than Christ, who dwells in the inner man,—that is to say, “the incommutable Virtue of God, and His eternal Wisdom, which every rational soul, indeed, consults, though to each there is given only in proportion to his receptive capacity as determined by his own bad or good will”. The divine act of giving, Augustine presents by predilection under the figure of an impressing as by a seal or stamp, upon the soul. In what may be thought, perhaps, the classical passage on this subject,³⁵ he raises the question whence men obtain their knowledge of God and of the moral law. Not from memory, he answers, whether of their former existence in Adam or of any other state. Whence, then? Can we suppose that they can read off these immutable laws from their own mutable natures; these righteous laws from their own unrighteous hearts? “Where, then, do these rules stand written, whence even the unrighteous may recognize what is righteous; whence he that has not may learn what he ought to have? Where can they stand written save in the book of that Light which is called the Truth, whence every righteous law is transcribed, and transferred into the heart of the man who works righteousness, not by a process of transportation, but by a process of imprinting, as the device from a ring while it passes over into the wax, yet does not leave the ring.” What the soul receives, therefore, is not the ring itself with its device; certainly not the device in the ring; but the device as impressed upon it from the ring, and the ring only in and through the device. The care which is taken here to represent the process as a trans-

³⁴ *De magistro*, II.

³⁵ *De Trinitate*, xiv. 15. 21.

ference of the laws without transfusion of the substance may be said to be the characteristic feature of this passage, as it is of the entire teaching of Augustine on the topic. The figure itself is in repeated use by him, and always with the same implication. Nowhere does he permit the reader to suppose either that God in His substance invades the soul, or that the soul sees in God the ideas which constitute the intelligible world: although he insists steadily that these ideas are the ideas that are in God and that he who sees them, therefore, so far sees God—but in a glass darkly. In a word, he preserves the distinctness of the human soul at the same time that he discovers in the intelligible world open to the soul a point of contact with God; and in the soul's perception of the intelligibles a perception at the same time of God, whose existence thus becomes to the soul as intuitively certain as is its own.

The effect of such an ascription of all human knowledge to a revelation from God, is naturally greatly to increase the assurance with which truth is embraced. The ultimate ground of our certitude becomes our confidence in God. In the last analysis, God is our surety for the validity of our knowledge; and that, not merely remotely, as the author of our faculties of knowing, but also immediately as the author of our every act of knowing, and of the truth which is known. We must guard, indeed, against supposing that, in Augustine's view, the human mind is passive in the acquisition of knowledge, or that the acquisition of knowledge is unconditioned by the nature or state of the acquiring soul. We have already had occasion to quote passages in which the contrary is asserted, but we must now emphasise it with some energy. We have been contemplating thus far only Augustine's ontology of knowledge: that we may be sure that we understand him aright we need to attend also to his expositions of its mode. The fundamental principle which rules his thought here may be brought into relation with his favorite figure, if we bear in mind that an impression from a seal is conditioned not only by the device

on the seal from which the transference is made, but also by the nature and state of the wax into which it is made—which “takes” the impression, as we say. Suppose, for example, that the wax is not of a quality, or is not in a condition, to take or to retain with exactness or with clearness the device which is impressed upon it? Augustine accordingly insists that, although “every rational mind consults the eternal wisdom”, that is to say, by virtue of its very rationality is a recipient of impressions from the divine world of ideas, and thus has the acquisition of truth opened to it, or even, rather, thrust upon it: yet this truth is “actually laid open to it (‘unfolded to it,’ *panditur*) in each case, only so far as it is able to lay hold of it (‘receive it’, ‘take it’, *capere*) by reason of (*propter*) its own will, whether evil or good”.³⁶ In the interests of this point of view, Augustine made, in effect, a distinction between ideas, conceptions and perceptions. The ideas, which are reflections from the divine mind are always shining into the souls of men, unchangeable in the midst of men’s multiform changes, whether these changes are due to their natural development from infancy to maturity, and on to old age, or to any other accident of life. But the perception of these ideas by the differing souls of men, or by the same soul in its varying stages or states, and, much more, the conceptions built up upon the foundation of these perceptions by the differing souls, or by the same soul in its varying states—obviously these are very different matters. In these things the soul itself comes into play, and

³⁶ *De magistro*, II; cf. also *De Trinitate*, xiv. 15. 21, *ad finem*; *In Psalmos* iv. 8, *med. et fin.* Knowledge, therefore, with Augustine, is conditioned by the will; though we must be careful not to take the term ‘will’ in too narrow a sense—as if it always must mean in Augustine the faculty of determination. It is, rather, quite frequently the whole voluntary nature; and what Augustine is really teaching is that the ethical state of the soul conditions knowledge. See the whole subject discussed from different points of view by W. Kahl, *Die Lehre vom Primat des Willens bei Augustinus, Duns Scotus und Descartes*, 1886, and O. Zänker, *Der Primat des Willens vor dem Intellekt bei Augustin*, 1907. The literature of the subject is cited by these writers.

the result will differ as soul differs from soul, or the soul in one of its states differs from itself in another of its states. If the condition of all knowledge, then, is revelation, and therefore all knowledge is in its source divine; yet it is equally true that the qualification of all knowledge is rooted in the human nature that knows, and in the specific state of the human being whose particular knowledge it is. It is in this fact that the varying degrees of purity in which knowledge is acquired by men find their explanation. rw.

The underlying conception here is the very fruitful one that knowledge is not a function of the intellect merely but involves the whole man. There is nothing on which Augustine more strenuously insists; as indeed there is nothing upon which from his psychological or ethical point of view it became him more strenuously to insist. His psychological insight was too clear, and his analysis too profound, for him to lose sight of the simplicity of the soul and its consequent engagement as a whole in all its acts; and the demands of his ethical nature were too clamant and his religious sense too lively to permit him to forget for an instant the determining effect upon every movement of the soul of the influences proceeding from them. Accordingly he does not content himself with declaring that no one can hope to see the truth without giving to philosophy his whole self.³⁷ Applying this conception in detail, he insists that God accords the truth only to those who seek it *pie, caste et diligenter*,³⁸ and urges therefore to a strenuous and devout pursuit of it, because it is only those who so seek whom God aids,³⁹ and the vision of the truth belongs only to those who live well, pray well and labor well.⁴⁰ The conception includes more than a contention that for the actual framing of knowledge there is required no less than the action of

³⁷ *Contr. Acad.* ii. 3. 8: ipsum verum non videbis, nisi in philosophia totus intraveris.

³⁸ *De quant. animae*, xiv. 24.

³⁹ *De vera religione*, x. 20: intende igitur diligenter et pie, quantum potes; tales enim adjuvat Deus.

⁴⁰ *De ordine*, ii. 19, 51.

God reflecting truth into the soul, an action of the soul's own in embracing this truth, and prior to that a preparation of the soul for embracing it. It seems to be further implied that the several orders of truth need different kinds or at least degrees of preparation for their reception. In proportion as we rise in the scale of knowledge, in that proportion embracing the truth becomes difficult and the preparation of the soul arduous. To attain the knowledge of God, which stands at the apex of achievement, demands therefore a very special purgation. Drawing near to Him does not mean journeying through space, for He is everywhere; it means entering into that purity and virtue in which He dwells.⁴¹ "O God," he prays, "whom no one finds who is not fully purged."⁴² The influence of his Neoplatonic teachers is here very apparent, and is further manifested in a tendency to represent the purgation of the soul for the higher knowledge as consisting largely in its emancipation from sense. With him as with them knowledge of the truth is constantly spoken of as hanging essentially upon the escape of the soul from entanglement with the sensible.⁴³ This, as we have seen, is a corollary of his Rationalism and was perhaps inevitable with his training. But these expressions which might be almost exactly matched in Plotinus, have in Augustine nevertheless an indefinitely deeper implication than in his Neoplatonic predecessors. With him the purely intellectualistic bearing which they have with them, has

⁴¹ *De doetr. Christ.* i. 10. 10: "The soul must be purified that it may have power to perceive that light and to rest in it when it is perceived"; this purification is journeying to God, for it is not by change of place that we draw near to Him who is everywhere, but by becoming pure and virtuous. Cf. *De Trinitate*, iv. 18. 24: Sinful men need cleansing to be fitted to see eternal things; *De agone Christiano*, xiii. 14: A vicious life cannot see that pure and sincere and changeless life.

⁴² *Solill.* i. 3.

⁴³ *Contr. Acad.* ii. 2: "It is philosophy which now that I have attained the leisure for which I have longed, nourishes me and comforts me. It is she who has delivered me finally from the superstitions into which I had fallen. For it is she that teaches me and teaches me truly, not to give my affections to what is perceived by the bodily eyes, to what strikes the senses, but rather to turn from it with contempt."

noticeably given way to a profoundly ethical one. Though he may still say that "the filth of the soul" "from which filth the more one is cleansed, the more readily he sees the truth", is shortly "the love of anything whatever except God and the soul";⁴⁴ and though, therefore, he may still relatively depreciate all knowledge other than that of God and the soul; yet after all, as he uses these terms, it is of something far more profound than the relative intellectual rank of the several objects of knowledge that he is thinking.

The implications of this general conception carried Augustine very far. Three of the corollaries which flow from it seem especially worthy of attention here. The first of these is that, the human soul being finite, it cannot hope to attain to absolutely perfect knowledge. The second is that, the human soul being subject to development, it can hope to attain to anything like adequate knowledge only by a slow process, and by means of aid from without. The third is that, the human soul in its present condition being sinful, there is a clog upon it in its aspiration to knowledge which it can never in its own strength overcome. In order that we may apprehend Augustine's thought we must therefore attend to his doctrine of mystery as lying at the heart of all our knowledge; to his doctrine of authority as the necessary pedagogue to knowledge; and to his doctrine of revelation as the palliative, and of grace as the cure, of the noetic effects of sin.

In his assertion of the certitude of human knowledge, Augustine is far from asserting that the human soul can know everything; or that it can know anything with that perfection of knowledge with which the infinite mind knows all things. It is impossible for the finite intelligence to comprehend in its mental embrace all that is the object of knowledge: it is as impossible for it to penetrate to the bottom of any object of knowledge which it embraces. For it, mystery not only surrounds the circle of knowledge illuminated by its intelligence, with a vast realm of impenetrable

⁴⁴ *De utilitate credendi*, 34.

darkness; mystery equally underlies all that it knows as an unfathomable abyss which it cannot plumb. We know, then, and can know, only in part: only part of what there is to know, and what we do know only in part. This is true of all our knowledge alike, whether of sensible things or of intelligible things, whether of the world without us or of the world within us, or—in the highest measure,—of the world above us, culminating in God, the mystery that surrounds whom dismays the intellect and compels us to exclaim that no knowledge can be had of Him beyond the knowledge of how ignorant we are of Him.⁴⁵ Of our very souls themselves, the very selves which know and which are known most intimately of all things, we know next to nothing. Augustine exhorts his somewhat bumptious young correspondent who fancied, apparently, that he knew all that was to be known of the soul, “to understand what he did not understand, lest he should understand nothing at all.”⁴⁶ For who knows either how the soul comes into existence, or (that impenetrable mystery), how it is related to the body? So far is Augustine from supposing, therefore, that the soul is clothed in omniscience, or that it can know unto perfection any single object of its knowledge, that he rather teaches that all our knowledge rests on mystery and runs up into mystery. What we know we know; and our certitude of that may be complete. But what we do not know surges all about us, an ocean of illimitable extent, and sinks beneath our very knowledge, a bottomless depth. We penetrate with our knowing but a very little way into the knowable before we lose ourselves in profundities which baffle all our inquiry.

The limitation which is placed upon our knowledge by our very nature as finite beings is greatly aggravated by the circumstance that we are not only finite but immature beings. We do not come into existence in the maturity of our powers; indeed, we remain throughout life, or we would better

⁴⁵ *De ordine* ii. 18. 47: *cujus (Dei) nulla scientia est in anima, nisi scire quomodo eum nesciat.* Cf. *De doctr. Christ.* i. 6. 6.

⁴⁶ *De anima et ejus origine*, iv. 11. 15.

say throughout eternity, creatures whose very characteristic is change, or, to put it at its best, ever progressing growth. At no given point in this development, of course, are we all that even we shall become. For the attainment, then, in our immaturity, of such knowledge as belongs to us as finite beings, there is obvious need of help from without. In other words, there is place for authority, and its correlate, faith. This is an ordinance of nature. Those who are first infants, then children, and only through the several stages of gradual ripening attain the maturity of their powers, will need at every step of their growth the guidance of those who are more mature than they, that they may accept on their authority, by faith, what they are not yet in a position to ascertain for themselves, by reason. And, as it is inevitable even among mature men, that some should outrun others in the attainment of knowledge; and especially that some should become particularly knowing in this or that sphere of knowledge, to which they have given unusual attention, or for which they have enjoyed uncommon facilities; there will always remain for creatures subject to change and developing progressively in their powers, not only a legitimate but a necessary place for authority on the one hand and for faith on the other. Not, of course, as if faith should, or could, supplant reason, or be set in opposition to reason. On the one hand, a right faith is always a reasonable faith; that is to say, it is accorded only to an authority which commends itself to reason as a sound authority, which it would be unreasonable not to trust. On the other hand, faith is in its idea not so much a substitute for reason as a preparation for reason; and the effort of the wise man should be to transmute his faith into knowledge, that is to say as his powers become more and more capable of the performance and opportunity offers, gradually to replace belief by sight. But in any event for such creatures as we are, our walk must largely be guided by faith, and it is only through faith that we can hope to attain to knowledge.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ For this doctrine in its highest application, cf. e. g. *De Trinitate* xv. 27. 49: "But if they think they ought to deny that these things are,

Now add the factor of sin,—sin, which enters the soul of man, already, one would think, sufficiently handicapped in attaining truth by its finiteness and its immaturity, and refracts and deflects the rays of truth reflected into it from the divine source, so rendering the right perception of the truth impossible. The finiteness of the soul only so far limits it in the attainment of truth, that, being finite, it cannot know all truth nor all that is true of what it truly knows: what it does know is truth, and so far as it is known this truth is truly known. The immaturity of the soul passes gradually away as its powers develop, and therefore imposes only a temporary check upon the attainment of truth,—determines that attainment to be a process of gradual advance instead of an instantaneous achievement. Neither the soul's finiteness, nor its mutability, accordingly, need more than warn us of the limitations of our powers and induce in us a becoming humility and patience. But the invasion of the soul by sin is a different matter. Here is a power which acts destructively upon the soul's native powers of apprehending truth, blinds the eyes of the mind, distorts its vision, fills it with illusions, so that it sees awry; and a power which so far from passing away with time and growth, batters by what it feeds on and increases in its baleful influence until it overwhelms the soul with falsehood. No merely incomplete, or as yet uncompleted, knowledge accordingly results; but just no knowledge at all, or even anti-knowledge, positive error, vanity and lies; and thus a condition is created which assuredly calls not for humility and patience, but for despair.

The question obtrudes itself whether such a doctrine does not render nugatory all of Augustine's carefully built up theory of the acquisition of knowledge. Granted that nor-

because they, with their blind minds, cannot discern them, then those who are blind from their birth, also, ought to deny that there is a sun. The light shines in darkness, and if the darkness comprehend it not, let them first be illuminated by the gift of God, that they may be believers: and let them begin to be light in comparison with unbelievers; and when this foundation has been laid, let them look up and see what they believe, that at some time they may be able to see."

mal man may look within and find there impressed upon his very being the forms of thought by which God thinks, in the light of which he may see truth and know it to be divinely certain because certainly divine. Man as we know him is not normal man. Afflicted by the disease of sin which darkens the light that shines into him from God, clouding his vision of truth and deflecting all the activities of his mind,—who will give him true knowledge? Surely, whatever may be true of abstract man, sinful man, which is the only man we know, is on this teaching condemned to eternal nescience. Must not Augustine, on his own showing, in the case of actual man, take his place, then, among the Sceptics? It certainly is important for the understanding of Augustine's doctrine of knowledge to observe how he meets this obvious criticism.

Of the form in which the criticism itself is often urged, we may find a very instructive example in the formulation of it by Mr. John Owen, who, as an outcome of the very line of reasoning which we have suggested, formally classes Augustine not only among the Sceptics, but among the Sceptics of the worst order. Simple Scepticism, he tells us, affects the basis of knowledge only; Augustine's variety of Scepticism undermines the foundations not only of truth but also of morals. For, according to Augustine, he continues,—

“By the disobedience of its ancestor the majority of the whole human race has become totally incapacitated for knowing or doing what is right and good. The faculties of every man, both of soul and body, have become perverted and misleading. It is needless to dwell on the theological aspects of this momentous doctrine; our present concern is with its philosophical bearings. We here see, as I have already suggested, the Augustinian theology in intimate relationship with Skepticism. With one voice the Greek Skeptics had declared the senses to be untrustworthy, the reason to be perverted, all the natural powers of man to be insufficient to attain knowledge, and precisely the same conclusions were arrived at by Augustine with the portentous extension of the incapacity to all right and good action. The

latter fact renders, in my opinion, Augustine's theological Skepticism much more mischievous than any amount of mere speculative theoretical unbelief could possibly have been. . . . That man with all his efforts is unable to attain truth may conceivably be an unavoidable necessity of the only possible *modus operandi* of his faculties, and therefore the fact may not in the least detract from the beneficence of his Creator; but the moment we make his creation and fall, and perhaps his consequent eternal misery, indissoluble parts of the original intention of Omnipotence concerning him, that moment God is shorn of his attribute of goodness, man becomes the hapless victim of a caprice as unreasonable as it is irresistible, and the creation, so far as the majority of human beings is concerned, is a stupendous act of despotism and cruelty."⁴⁸

We have required to quote so much of Mr. Owen's remarks in order to place his representation fully before us; and we require to say this much to exonerate ourselves from the suspicion of having quoted so much merely in order that we might stultify Mr. Owen's profession of concerning himself solely with the philosophical bearings of Augustine's doctrine of original sin. In point of fact he concerns himself with little except its theological aspects. After having barely remarked that it has philosophical bearings, he lapses at once into an assault on the doctrine on the ground that it contradicts the beneficence of God and indeed transmutes the good God into a cruel demon. We must refuse to be led off from our proper subject by this impertinent display of the *odium theologicum*; and we take note here accordingly merely of Mr. Owen's philosophical criticism that Augustine's doctrine of original sin brings him into intimate relations with Greek Skepticism.

Apparently what Mr. Owen's means to suggest is that Augustine reached "precisely the same conclusions" with the Greek Sceptics, and differed from them only in the grounds upon which he based these conclusions. They contended that human faculties are, as such, incapable of ascertaining truth; he, that human faculties have been so injured

⁴⁸ John Owen, *Evenings with the Sceptics*, vol. II. p. 196.

by sin as to have become incapable of ascertaining truth. That there is a sense in which this representation is perfectly just, is obvious. Augustine did hold that the native depravity of man has nœtic as well as thelematic and ethical effects: and that sinful man, as such, is therefore precluded by his sinfulness from that perception of truth which can be only *pie et caste* attained. To him it was therefore axiomatic that the natural man is incapable of attaining to true knowledge, at least in its highest reaches,—those reaches in which the deflection of sin would be most apparent. But in his hatred of Augustine doctrine of original sin, Mr. Owen has failed to observe that Augustine did not leave matters at that point. Where he differs by a whole diameter from the Sceptics is that he knows a remedy for the dreadful condition in which human nature finds itself. When the Sceptics declared that it belongs to human nature as such to be incapable of knowledge, there was an end of the matter. The condition of man is hopeless: he actually lacks faculty for knowing. Augustine's contention, on the contrary, is that it is knowledge, not nescience, which belongs to human nature as such. And if he finds human nature in a state in which it cannot fulfil its destiny of knowing, he knows how it may be recovered to itself and to the capacity for knowledge which properly belongs to it. In other words, the sinful condition of human nature is viewed by Augustine as abnormal; and all the results of this sinfulness as abnormalities which may be and are to be overcome. That Mr. Owen says nothing at this point of the provisions for overcoming these abnormalities cannot be set down to the credit of his account of Augustine's teaching.

At another point of Mr. Owen's discussion, no doubt, there does occur some suggestion of these provisions, though certainly a very insufficient one. He remarks⁴⁹ that "from the earliest history of Christianity the Skeptical argument had been employed, for evidential purposes, as an *à priori* justification of Divine Revelation both in its ethical and

⁴⁹ *Op. cit.* p. 190.

intellectual acceptance." And he supports this by remarking further that "by the early Christian Fathers the confessions of ignorance, limitation, &c., on the part of Greek Skeptics were put forward to show the necessity of super-human knowledge." Even this suggestion is introduced, however, not to palliate but to accentuate Augustine's fault,—not to point so much to the remedy which he offered for the nœtic effects of sin, as to the excess of his "depreciation of human nature." Augustine had so low an opinion "of the intellectual imbecility of humanity", it seems, that he readily accepted the dogma "of the natural depravity of man" "as a complete solution of what would otherwise have been an enigma" to him. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to perceive that the postulation of a divine revelation comes in upon the conception of the sin-born "imbecility of humanity" as a mitigation of its otherwise hopeless condition. The proclamation of the provision of a divine revelation, if on the one hand it implies a need for it, on the other hand asserts a remedy for that need. Nor does the assertion of divine revelation cover the whole provision which Augustine offers for the removal of the natural incapacities of sinful man. He did not confine himself to pointing out a mitigation for the symptom; he sought and found also a remedy for the disease. If the nœtic effects of sin might be neutralized by divine revelation, sin itself might be removed by divine grace. It is certainly grossly unfair to Augustine's teaching as to man's condition to focus attention upon the disease under which he holds that man suffers, and withdraw it entirely from the remedy which he asserts has been provided for this disease.

We must not, then, be misled into supposing Augustine to teach, even by remote implication, that man is hopelessly sunk in nescience or even in sin. Perfectly true as this is of his teaching of the condition of man considered in himself alone and so far as his own powers are concerned, it is considerably less than half the truth of Augustine's teaching of the condition of man. It means, no doubt, that Augus-

tine, as he looked upon the virtues of the heathen as little more than *splendida vitia*, so looked upon the philosophy of the heathen as very much a farrago of nonsense. What a multitude of philosophers there have been, he exclaimed, in effect, and almost more opinions than philosophers! Who can find any two of them who perfectly agree? Varro enumerates not less than two hundred and eighty-eight possible sects. It would be easier to find a needle in a haystack than truth among these professional purveyors of truth.⁵⁰ But then Augustine knew something better than heathen thought to which to direct one in search of truth, as he knew something better than heathen ethics to which to direct one in search of holiness. His great word was Revelation; and behind and above and all through Revelation, there was the greater word still, Grace. No doubt this means that he transferred dependence for truth, as for holiness, from man to God. He did distrust human nature as he found it. He did consider it in its own strength incapable of any good thing, and equally of any right thought. He did cast men back for all good on God's grace, for all truth on God's teaching. So far writers like Mr. Owen are quite right. Augustine did believe in the ingrained depravity of man in his present manifestation on earth; he did believe that this depravity renders him morally incapable and intellectually imbecile, if this somewhat exaggerated language pleases us. But he believed also in the goodness of God; and he believed that this good God has intervened with His grace to cure man's moral inability, and with His revelation to rescue man from his intellectual imbecility.

Nor was this doctrine of Revelation and Grace as remedies for man's sinful incapacities and condition a mechanical intrusion of an alien idea into Augustine's general conception. It rather stands in the most direct analogy alike with his whole conception of man's relation to God and with his particular view of man's natural needs and the natural provision for their satisfaction. Even had man not been

⁵⁰ See the *City of God*, xviii. 41.

sinful, Augustine would never have allowed that he was in a position of himself, apart from God, to do any good or to attain any truth. That would have seemed to him a crass Deism, of which he would have been incapable. Even sinless man would have been to him absolutely dependent on God, the Author of all being, the Light of all knowledge, the Source of all good. We have seen him openly teaching that man as man can see light only in the Light; that all truth is the reflection into the soul of the truth that is in God; in a word, that the condition of all knowledge for dependent creatures is revelation, in the wider sense of that word. When now he teaches that revelation in a narrower sense and a more objective form, is the condition of all right knowledge of higher things for sinful man,—a revelation which is an integral part of a scheme of grace for the recovery of sinful man, not only from the effects of his sin but from his sin itself,—he is speaking in close analogy with his fundamental theistic conception of the universe. He is but throwing sinful man back afresh on the God on whom men in all states and conditions are absolutely dependent.

Similarly, the provision which Augustine makes, in revelation, to meet the sin-bred inability of men to attain right knowledge, is only an extension in a right line of the provision he discovered for meeting man's natural weakness growing out of his finiteness, and especially out of his only gradually attained maturity. In that case, we remember, he pointed to authority as the remedy for as yet ineffective reason. The child is naturally dependent on the authority of its elders, who offer to its faith the truth which its reason is as yet incapable of discovering or authenticating for itself. In every sphere of life we remain dependent on the authority of those who are in this or that or the other department of knowledge better instructed than we; and he who will be taught nothing, but insists on following his reason alone, is soon at the end of living in this world. Revelation plays precisely the same rôle for the mind darkened by sin. The heavenly Father intervenes to meet the needs of sin-blinded

souls by offering to their faith, on the authority of God, the truth which they are as sinners incapable of ascertaining for themselves. This is the essence of Augustine's doctrine of revelation. Of course the condition of man as sinner determines as well the nature of the truths he needs to know as the manner in which alone he can come to the knowledge of them: the whole content of revelation is determined by the needs of those to whom it is made. But that may be left to one side here. What we are at present especially concerned with is that the need of revelation and the provision of revelation for sinful man stand in perfect analogy with the need and provision of instruction for, say, the immature child. The principle which governs in both cases is, not that reason is superceded by something better, but that, in default of reason due to special circumstances, provision is taken to supply the lack of reason, until reason may come to its rights. The lame man is supplied with a crutch until his lameness is healed. Here we have in brief Augustine's whole doctrine of revelation.

Clear and reasonable, however, as is Augustine's doctrine of revelation as the remedy for man's sin-bred disability to know aright, it seems to be very difficult for some writers to believe that it could have been a reality to him. It is not rare, therefore, to hear it intimated that he passed all his days under the torture of gnawing doubt, and flung himself upon the authority of the church as some sort of palliation of his wearing despair. His permanent state of mind regarding Christianity, we are told, is much that which is exhibited in a certain class of Romish controversial literature, in which after every other support for human trust has been sedulously removed we are ultimately invited to take refuge in the authority of the Church as the sole haven of peace. This representation is given expression, as well as elsewhere, in some remarks of Professor Adolf Harnack's, when he comes, in his *History of Dogma*, to deal with Augustine's attitude to the authority of the Church.⁵¹ Here we are told

⁵¹ English translation, vol. V. p. 79.

that Augustine had become convinced, in his conflict with himself, "of the badness of human nature," and had been left by Manichæism "in complete doubt as to the foundations and truth of the Christian faith." And then:—

"His confidence in the rationality of Christian truth had been shaken to the very depths, and it was never restored. In other words, as an individual thinker he never gained the subjective certitude that Christian truth (and as such everything contained in the two Testaments had to be regarded) was clear, consistent and demonstrable. When he threw himself into the arms of the Catholic Church, he was perfectly conscious that he needed its authority not to sink in scepticism or nihilism."

Dr. Harnack is too good a scholar to enunciate a historical judgment utterly without elements of truth. There are elements of truth of great importance even in this judgment, far from the mark as is the application which is made of them; and there are even points of great interest in the use which Dr. Harnack makes of these elements of truth. It is certainly true that in his experience with the Manichæans Augustine learned to distrust unaided reason as the source of religious truth; and discovered that there is a legitimate place for authority in religion. The Manichæans had promised him a purely rational religion; he found on testing it that what they gave him was a mass of irrationalities; and on feeling out for himself he discovered that unaided reason was inadequate to the task of meeting all the needs of man. There is truth, therefore, in saying that he once for all discarded reason as the sole instrument for the acquisition of truth in the religious sphere, and cast himself on instruction as the single hope of the soul in its longing after truth. But the sense in which this is true of Augustine is indefinitely different from the sense it takes upon itself in Dr. Harnack's representation. Beneath Dr. Harnack's representation there lies Dr. Harnack's own conception not only of the place of authority in religion, but of the nature of the Christian religion and its relation to authority, and of the nature of the particular source of author-

ity to which he conceives that Augustine fled in his need, and of the rationality of Augustine's act in taking refuge with it. His whole statement, therefore, leaves the impression that Augustine in despair of reason renounced rationality, and gave himself over to an unreasoned authority for guidance; and never again recovered, we will not say objective rationality in his religious views, but even subjective confidence. The very interesting defence of authority in religion—from the historical point of view at least, if not from the intrinsic—with which Dr. Harnack closes his discussion⁵² does nothing to modify this impression. It remains the gist of his exposition that Augustine took refuge in authority, because he despaired of reason, and therefore his attitude towards Christianity remained throughout life that of an irrationalist.

Nothing, however, could be less true than this of Augustine's real attitude. His appeal to authority was in his own mind not a desertion of reason but an advance towards reason. He sought truth through authority only because it became clear to him that this was the rational road to truth. It was thus not as an irrationalist, but as a rationalist, that he made his appeal to authority. His breach with Manichæism and his gradual establishment in Christian truth, in other words, was on this side of it merely the discovery that the Christian religion is not a natural religion and is therefore not either excogitable or immediately demonstrable by reason working solely on natural grounds; but is rather a revealed religion and therefore requires in the first instance to be told to us. It is thus in the last analysis, supernaturalism as versus naturalism that he turns to;⁵³ and this is far from the same thing as irrationality as versus rationality—except, indeed, on the silent assumption that the supernatural is an absurdity, an assumption which was

⁵² Pp. 82-83.

⁵³ *De utilitate credendi*, 29: "Therefore this so vast difficulty, since our inquiry is about religion, God alone can remedy: nor, indeed, unless we believe both that He is, and that He helps men's minds, ought we even to inquire of the true religion itself."

decidedly not Augustine's. In the sixth book of the *Confessions* he recounts to us the several steps by which he rose from the pure naturalism which had hitherto held him to this Christian supernaturalism. His disillusionment with Manichæism did not at once deliver him from his naturalistic point of view. He had found the tenets of the Manichæans irrational. But his rejection of them as such, did not at once entail the adoption of another set of tenets as rational. His sad experience with them operated rather to make him chary of committing himself to any other body of conclusions whatever. He remained in principle a naturalist *à outrance*. He demanded the apodeictic certainty of mathematical demonstration for conviction; that is to say, he still depended for the discovery of truth upon immediate rational demonstration alone. This alone seemed to him adequate evidence upon which one could safely venture. All this time, says he, he was restraining his heart from believing anything, and thus in avoiding the precipice was strangling his soul: what he was demanding was that he should be made as certain of things unseen as that seven and three make ten.⁵⁴ He goes on to remark that a cure for his distress lay open before him in faith (*credendo*), had he chosen to take that road, since thus the sight of his mind might have been purged for vision of the truth. But as yet he could not enter that path. It was not long, however, before it began to invite his feet, slowly but surely. He could not avoid perceiving after a while that it is the path of nature. He reflected upon the host of things which he accepted on testimony. He reminded himself that in it lay the foundation of all history: and that life itself would soon come to a standstill if we refused to act on the credit of others. He meditated further upon the strength of the conviction which testimony produces when its validity and adequacy are beyond question. As the great place which faith fills in common life thus became more and more clear to him, he could not escape the query why it should not serve a similar end

⁵⁴ *Confessiones*, vi. 4. 6.

in higher things. The principle of faith and its correlate authority, having once been recognized, it became indeed only a question of time before it should take its proper place in these higher concerns also. And, then, it was only a question of fact whether there existed in the world any adequate authority to guide men into the truth. Thus, says he, the Lord drew him on little by little, with a hand of infinite gentleness and mercy, and composing his heart gradually convinced him that in the Scriptures He had given to men an authority to which their faith is due, and through which they may attain by faith that knowledge of divine things to which they are as yet unable to rise through reason. "And also," he adds, "since we are too weak to search out the truth by mere (*liquida*) reason, and therefore need the authority of Holy Scriptures, I began to believe God never would have given such surpassing authority to those Scriptures throughout the whole world except that He wished to be believed through them and to be sought by their means."⁵⁵ There is depicted for us in this vital narrative, no despairing act of renunciation in which Augustine offered up his intellect a sacrifice upon the altar of faith, and sought peace from insatiable doubt in an arbitrary authority to which by an effort of sheer will he submits. What we see is a gradual advance under the leading of reason itself to a rational theory of authority in religion, on the basis of which rational certitude may be enjoyed in the midst of the weakness of this life.

What has been thus incidentally brought before us, it will be perceived, is Augustine's doctrine of faith and reason. The relations of faith and reason, as thus outlined, remained to him always a matter of sincere and reasoned conviction. We may read them so stated in the books *Against the Academics* and in the books *On the Predestination of the Saints* alike. It will be enough for our purpose, however, to observe how he deals with the matter in two or three treatises which are devoted expressly to elucidating certain

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* c. 8.

aspects of it. Take for example the treatises *On the Profit of Believing* (391) and *On Faith in Things Not Seen* (400), which were written not very far apart in time and in very similar circumstances. In both of these treatises he begins by setting himself sharply in opposition to the Sensationalists, "who fancy," says he,⁵⁶ "that there is nothing else than what they perceive by those five well-known reporters of the body," and "essay to measure the unsearchable resources of truth" by "the deceitful rule" of the "impressions (*plagas*) and images they have received from these"; whom, in a word, "folly has so made subject to their carnal eyes that whatsoever they see not through them they think they are not to believe."⁵⁷ From this starting-point, in both alike, however, the advance is made at once to the defence of faith as a valid form of conviction, with respect not only to things not perceived by the bodily senses, but also to those lying beyond the reach of the intellect itself.⁵⁸ And in both alike the stress of the argument is laid upon the naturalness of faith and its indispensableness in the common life of men.⁵⁹ Why should that act of faith which lies at the very basis of human intercourse be excluded from the sphere of religion,—especially in the case of one, say, of weak intelligence? Must a man have no religion because he is incapable of excogitating one for himself?⁶⁰ Certainly we must not confound faith with credulity: nobody asks that Christ should be believed in without due evidence that he is worthy of being believed in.⁶¹ But, on the other hand, it is just as certain that we shall not attain to any real religion without faith. Say you are determined to have a religion which you can demonstrate. The very search for it presupposes a precedent faith that there is a God and that he cares for us; for surely no one will seek God, or inquire

⁵⁶ *De utilitate credendi*, I.

⁵⁷ *De fide rerum quae non vid.* I.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* 2 sq.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* 4; *De util. cred.* 23.

⁶⁰ *De util. cred.* 24.

⁶¹ *De fide rer. q. non vid.* 5: cf. *De utilitate credendi*, 22sq., and 25, where the necessary distinctions are drawn.

how we should serve Him, without so much to go on.⁶² And where and how will you seek? Perchance you will inquire the way of those who are wise? Who are the wise? How will you determine who are wise in such things? In the manifold disagreements of pretenders to wisdom, it will require a wise man to select the really wise. We are caught in a fatal circle here; we must needs be wise beforehand in order to discriminate wisdom.⁶³ There is but one outlet; and that outlet is, shortly, revelation. For revelation is a thing which can be validated by appropriate evidence even to those who have not yet attained wisdom; and which, when once trusted on its appropriate grounds, gradually leads us into that wisdom which before was unobtainable. Thus, to man unable to see the truth, a justified authority steps in to fit him to see it; and it is authority alone which can bring such wisdom.⁶⁴ This is the reason the Lord has chosen this method of dealing with us. Bringing us a medicine destined to heal our corrupted condition, "he procured authority by miraculous works, acquired faith by authority, drew together numbers by faith, gained antiquity by numbers, confirmed religion by antiquity: so that not only the supremely inept novelty of heresy in its deceitful working, but even the inveterate error of heathenism in its violent antagonism can never root up this religion in any way whatever."⁶⁵ Here we have Augustine's golden chain. Miracles, authority, faith, numbers, antiquity, an absolutely established religion: that is the sequence, travelling along which men arrive at a secure conviction which nothing can shake.

We may hear him argue the question with even more specific application to the Christian religion in a notable letter which he wrote about 410 to an eminent courtier and scholar.⁶⁶ "The minds of men," he tells us here, "are

⁶² *De utilitate credendi*, 29.

⁶³ *Ibid.* 28.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.* 34.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.* 32 *ad fin.*

⁶⁶ *Epist.* 118 (to Dioscorus), 5. 32-33.

blinded by the pollutions of sin and the lust of the flesh"; they are therefore lost in the mazes of discussion and are unable to discover the truth of things by reason. Therefore, that men may have the truth, Christ came—the Truth Itself, in union with a man,—to instruct them in truth. Thus men are given the truth through faith, in order that "by instruction in salutary truth they may escape from their perplexities into the atmosphere of pure and simple truth." That is to say, we are introduced to truth by Christ's authority, so that, thus receiving it by faith, we may then be able to defend it by reason. "The perfection of method in training disciples," we read, "is, that those who are weak should be encouraged to enter the citadel of authority, in order that, when they have been safely placed there, the conflict necessary for their defence may be maintained by the most strenuous use of reason." "Thus," he adds, "the whole supremacy of authority and light of reason for regenerating and reforming the human race has been made to reside in the one saving Name, and in His one Church." For Christ has "both secured the Church in the citadel of authority. . . . and supplied it with the abundant armor of equally invincible reason." The former He has done by means of the "highly celebrated ecumenical councils, and the Apostolic sees themselves";—which is as much as to say, apparently, that the authority of the Church finds expression through these organs. And the latter He has done "by means of a few men of pious learning and unfeigned spirituality";—that is to say, apparently, these are the organs through which the inherent rationality of Church teaching evinces itself. The entire sense seems, then, to be that what is taught by the Church on authority, through the appropriate organs of authority, is equally defended by the Church by reason, through the appropriate organs of reason. The Church as the pillar and ground of the truth commends it to faith; the Church, giving a reason for the faith that is in it, defends it to reason. The Doctor,⁶⁷ in other words, is as truly a

⁶⁷ On the "Doctor" in the early church, see Smith and Cheatham, *Dict. of Christ. Antiquities*, 1876, vol. I. p. 570a; and Harnack, in his

manifestation of the Church's inherent life as the Bishop himself: reasoning is as inamissibly her function as authoritative definition. Here is certainly an elevation of authority, properly grounded, as a source of conviction; an elevation of faith, properly placed, as a mode of conviction. But here is no depreciation of demonstration and reason to make way for authority and faith. On the contrary, the two are placed side by side, as joint methods and organs for attaining truth; and the contention is merely that to each its own sphere belongs into which the other cannot intrude.

It has seemed most convenient to present in the first instance Augustine's entire doctrine of faith and reason in concrete form, and in its application to the main problem to which he applied it. But having in this way caught a glimpse of it as a whole and in its ultimate bearings, it seems desirable to pause and to glance in some detail at the main elements which enter into it.

Let us first look at the doctrine in its most general aspects. The fact of primary importance to note here is that with Augustine faith and reason are never conceived as antagonists, contradictories, but always as coadjutants, coöperating to a common end. The thing sought is truth: what Augustine has discovered is that there are two modes of mental action by which truth may be laid hold of. It may be grasped by faith, or it may be grasped by reason. "No one doubts," he tells us, "that we are impelled to the acquisition of knowledge by a double impulse,—of authority and of reason."⁶⁸ And, though we may be so constituted as eagerly to desire "to apprehend what is true not only by faith but by the understanding";⁶⁹ and may, therefore, give to reason the primacy in rank, yet we are bound to acknowledge for faith a priority in time.⁷⁰ Granted that faith may seem to be a mode of conviction more suitable for the ignor-

larger edition of the *Didaché*, 1884, pp. 131 sq; and in his *Expansion of Christianity*, E. T. vol. I. pp. 444 sq.

⁶⁸ *Contr. Acad.* iii. 20. 43, *ad fin.*; cf. *De ordine* ii. 9. 26, *ad init.*

⁶⁹ *Contr. Acad.* i. c.

⁷⁰ *De ordine*, i. c.

ant multitude than for the instructed few; yet there is no one who does not begin by being ignorant, and there are many things great and good which we could never attain were the door not opened to us by faith.⁷¹ Life is too short to attempt to solve every question for ourselves, even of those which are capable of being solved. We must be content to accept many things on faith and leave difficulties to be dealt with afterwards, or never to be dealt with.⁷² And surely it is the height of folly, because of insoluble difficulties, to "permit to escape from our hands things which are altogether certain."⁷³ What is it but pride—which is the destruction of all true knowledge—that leads us to demand that we shall, as we say, "understand everything"?

Not, of course, as if faith should be lightly or irrationally accorded. If there is a sense in which faith precedes reason, there is equally a sense in which reason precedes faith. That mental act which we call faith is one possible only to rational creatures;⁷⁴ and of course we act as rational creatures in performing it. "If, then, "Augustine argues, "it is rational that, with respect to some great concerns which we find ourselves unable to comprehend, faith should precede reason; there can be no question but that the amount of reason which leads us to accord this faith, whatever that amount may be, is itself anterior to faith."⁷⁵ Faith is by no means blind: it has eyes of its own with which, before it completes itself in giving that assent which, when added to thinking, constitutes it believing,⁷⁶ it must needs see both that to which it assents, and that on the ground of which it assents

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² *Epist.* 170 (to Deogratias; A. D. 408 or 406) c. 38: sunt enim innumerabiles [quaestiones] quae non sunt finiendae ante fidem, ne finiatur vita sine fide.

⁷³ *De musica*, vi. 5. 8.

⁷⁴ *Epist.* 120 (to Consentius): etiam credere non possumus, nisi rationales animas haberemus.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ *De praedest. sancti*, 2: "Believing is nothing else than cum assensione cogitare"; *Enchirid.* 20: "But if assent is taken away, faith too falls; for sine assensione nihil creditur".

to it. As we cannot believe without knowing what it is to which we accord our faith, so we cannot believe without perceiving good grounds for according our faith. "No one believes anything unless he has before thought it worthy of belief."⁷⁷ Reason, therefore, can never be "wholly lacking to faith, because it belongs to it to consider to whom faith should be given."⁷⁸ This function of reason, by which it considers to what men or writings it is right to accord faith is then precedent to faith; though faith is precedent to reason in the sense that, an adequate ground of credit having been established by reason, conviction must at once form itself without waiting for comprehension to become perfect.

Our knowledge thus embraces two classes of things; things seen and things believed. The difference between them is this: "with respect to things we have seen or see, we are our own witnesses; but with respect to those which we believe, we are moved to faith by other witnesses."⁷⁹ The distinction which Augustine erects between faith and reason, that is to say, is briefly that faith is distinctively that conviction of truth which is founded on testimony as over against that conviction which is founded on sight.⁸⁰ All the corollaries which flow from this distinction were present to his mind. He is found, for example, pointing out that all so-called knowledge itself rests on faith, so that in the deepest sense an act of faith precedes all knowledge. And on the other hand—and it is this point which is of most present interest to us—that all faith presupposes reason, and is so far from an irrational act that an unreasonable faith, a faith not founded in a reasonable authority demanding credit on reasonable grounds, is no faith at all, but mere "credulity", while what is thus unwarrantedly believed is

⁷⁷ *De praedest. sancti.* ii. 5.

⁷⁸ *De vera religione*, xxiv. 45, also 46.

⁷⁹ *Epist.* 147. 3. 8.

⁸⁰ *Epist.* 147. 3. 7; *Eighty-Three Questions*, Quaest. 54. In *Retract.* i. 104. 3 he allows that in such distinctions he is employing the word 'knowledge' in a strict rather than a popular sense: in common speech we say 'we know' even what rests on testimony.

mere "opinion."⁸¹ As distinguished from knowledge on the one hand and credulity on the other, faith is that act of assent which is founded on adequate testimony; and the form of conviction which is so called may be free from all doubt whatsoever.⁸² So far is faith thus from being a cloak for inextinguishable doubt, that doubt is inconsistent with it and is excluded just in proportion to the firmness of the grounding of faith, or, we may better say, just in proportion as faith fulfils its own idea. Its distinction from knowledge does not turn on the strength of the conviction it describes, but on the ground of this conviction. We know by sight; we believe on testimony.

We turn now to the application of this abstract doctrine of faith to the problem of the Christian religion. In this instance the testimony on which faith rests,—on the basis of which that conviction we call faith is formed—Augustine supposed to be the testimony of God Himself. The grounds on which he accepted as such what he took to be a revelation from God may be assailed as insufficient; and the channels through which he considered that what he took to be a revelation from God asserts its authority over us, may be subject to criticism. But we can scarcely refuse to recognize the formal cogency of his reasoning. If it can be established that God, condescending to our weakness, has given us a revelation, then, undoubtedly, that revelation becomes an adequate authority upon which our faith may securely rest; and, as rational beings, we must accept as true what it commends to us as such, even though our reason flags in its attempts even to comprehend it, and utterly fails to supply an immediate rational demonstration of its truth. Here, above everywhere else, faith obviously must precede reason, and prepare the way for reason. It is here accordingly that Augustine's insistence on the priority of faith to reason culminates. It is with this application in mind that he repeats

⁸¹ *De utilitate credendi*, II; *De mendac.* 3.

⁸² *De mendac.* 3: ille qui credit, sensit se ignorare quod credit; quamvis de re quae se ignorare novit, omnino non dubitet; sic enim firme credit. Qui autem opinatur, putat se scire, quod nescit.

most assiduously that "before we understand, it behooves us to believe";⁸³ that "faith is the starting-point of knowledge";⁸⁴ that we "believe that we may know, not know that we may believe."⁸⁵ Least of all, in this highest application of faith, does he mean that this faith does not itself rest upon reason, in the sense that it is accorded to an authority which is not justified to reason on valid grounds.⁸⁶ What he means is rather that the particular truths commended to us on the authority of a revelation from God, validated as such by appropriate evidence, are to be accepted as truths on that authority, prior to the action of our reason upon them either by way of an attempt fully to comprehend them, or by way of an attempt to justify them severally to our logical reason; and that this act of faith is in the nature of the case a preparation for these efforts of reason. The order of nature is, in other words, first the validation of a revelation as such on its appropriate grounds; secondly, the acceptance by faith of the contents of this revelation on the sole ground of its authority; and thirdly, the comprehension by the intellect of the contents of the revelation and the justification of them severally to reason so far as that may prove to be possible to us. This order of procedure Augustine defends against the Manichæans—who were the philosophic naturalists in vogue at the time—from every conceivable point of view, and with endlessly varied arguments. The gist of the whole, however, is simply that when a revelation has been validated as such, we owe to the truths commended to us by it immediate credit, on the sole authority of the revelation itself, and neither need nor are entitled to wait until each of these truths is separately validated to us on the grounds of reason before we give our assent to it. In a word, the rational ground on which we accept each truth is the proof that the authority by which it is commended to us is adequate, and not a particular verdict of reason immedi-

⁸³ *De Trinitate* viii. 5-8.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.* ix. 1. 1.

⁸⁵ *Tract. in Joann.* xi. 9.

⁸⁶ *E. g., Epist.* 120. 1. 3 (as quoted above).

ately passed upon each several truth. The particular verdict of reason on each several truth must wait on the act of faith by which we honor the general verdict of reason on the validity of the authority; and it may wait endlessly without invalidating or weakening the strength of conviction which we accord to the deliverances of a revelation which has been really validated to us as such.

We may revert, of course, to the prior question, whether the assumed revelation on the authority of which faith is yielded has been soundly validated as such to reason. It is at this point that criticism of Augustine's system of faith becomes possible; and it is at this point that such criticism becomes sharp. We are told that Augustine accepted an alleged revelation on insufficient evidence; and that it is this fact which justifies the suspicion that his acceptance of it and the subjection of his reason to its authority were acts of violence done to his intellect in despair of ever attaining a solid basis in reason for religious conviction. It is quite possible to confuse in such a concrete judgment a number of suggestions, which we should discriminate if we are to form an estimate of the value of the criticism offered. We shall need to ask, for example, if what it is intended to suggest is that the evidence in existence for the reality of the revelation which Augustine accepted as a true revelation from God is insufficient to validate it; or only that the evidence which was actually before Augustine's mind and on which he personally depended in reaching his decision was insufficient. In the latter case we shall need to ask further if what is meant is that the evidence actually before Augustine's mind would be insufficient to convince us—seems to us in itself insufficient to command credit; or that it was actually insufficient to convince Augustine, so that, despite his protestations of conviction, he remained in reality unconvinced and at heart an actual sceptic all his days. It is the last of these propositions, it will be remembered, that Dr. Harnack affirms; although he does not keep it as rigorously separate from the others as would seem desirable. It is surely one

thing to say that Augustine is open to criticism for giving credit to the Evidences of Christianity and recognizing the revelatory character of the Christian system; and quite another thing to say that Augustine is open to criticism for the particular conception he entertained of the Christian evidences,—the selection he makes of the special items of evidence upon which he personally relies for the validation of the Christian system as a revealed religion; and still quite another thing to suggest that Augustine is open to criticism for his inaccessibility to the evidences of the Christian system as a revelation from God, and for remaining therefore all his life a doubter of the intellect, finding only a precarious peace for his distracted soul in an act of submission to an external authority arbitrarily yielded to in defiance of insatiable scepticism.

It can scarcely be expected that the whole body of the Christian evidences should be subjected to a new critical examination merely because a writer not himself able to look upon them as supplying a satisfactory proof of the Divine origin of the Christian religion, blames Augustine for placing upon them a value beyond that which he is himself able to accord. We must be prepared to find those who resist the force of this evidence themselves, despising those who yield to it as superstitious, or even accusing them of intellectual dishonesty. It surely is enough at this point simply to recognize that this not unnatural tendency of the naturalistic mind is not without its influence upon the proneness in some quarters to speak of Augustine as making a sacrifice of his intellect in throwing himself upon authority in matters of religion. One thing is perfectly clear: if Augustine made such a sacrifice he was himself completely unconscious of doing so. He nowhere betrays the state of mind which is here attributed to him. He speaks always in terms of the most complete conviction of the truth of the Christian religion, and rests himself with entire confidence upon the evidences which appealed to him. To go behind his obviously sincere asseverations of security of mind and

heart, because we are conscious that, in his place, we should have felt less secure, is to push the biographer's (and critic's) privilege of "imputing himself to his victim" to an unwarrantable extreme. Whatever we may feel Augustine ought to have done; whatever we may feel we, in his place, should have done; it certainly is a matter of historical fact that Augustine confidently accepted the Christian revelation as a genuine revelation, and found for his faith in it abundant justification. No fact in his mental history is more patent, or call it flagrant if you will. When in the closing words of his first Christian composition,⁸⁷ in the very act of consecrating himself to a life-long search of truth, he declares that "he certainly would never more give up the authority of Christ, because no stronger could be found," he speaks out of an unmistakably sincere conviction. And the note thus struck so far from fading away swells steadily to the end. Clearly the restless heart had found at last its rest: and rest is the characteristic of his Christian life. A sceptic, intellectual or moral, may be found in any man rather than in Augustine. He who in his despair as, in the crumbling of his former beliefs, he almost gave up hope of ever attaining assurance, yet could not fall in with the Academics because he still knew some things to be indisputably true, and only began to wonder whether the right way to truth was known to man—certainly could not lose his confidence after he had discovered the Way and established himself in it.

It remains a matter of interest of course to determine the nature of the grounds on which Augustine was convinced, or sought to convince others, of the truth of the Christian religion. To do so with any fulness would be, however, to write a section of the history of Apologetics, and would find its importance in that connection. We need not go so far afield in seeking to apprehend Augustine's doctrine of authority in religion. What is of primary importance here

⁸⁷ *Cont. Acad.* iii. 20. 43. It was the common sentiment of the men of the time: Paulinus of Nola says: *Plurima quaesivi, per singula quaeque cucurri, Sed nihil inveni melius quam credere Christo.*

is merely to ascertain in a simple manner his conception of the sources, nature and seat of this authority and the mode of its validation to men. In the next number of this REVIEW we shall seek to do this with as much completeness as is requisite for our purpose.

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WAS PAUL THE FOUNDER OF CHRISTIANITY?

The centre of interest in New Testament criticism has shifted for the moment from the Gospels to the Epistles—from Jesus to Paul. An influential school of younger writers in Germany has confidently asserted that Paul and not Jesus Himself was the real founder of Christianity, meaning the Christianity of the churches and the creeds. To the ordinary Bible reader this statement will appear so paradoxical as scarcely to merit serious attention, while to the student more or less acquainted with the course of New Testament criticism the attempt to prove an antithesis between the teaching of Paul and that of the Twelve will seem like a wilful, if heroic, attempt to reoccupy an untenable position. The new view, however, is set forth in no tentative fashion. Its leading advocates, men like Wernle, Weinel and Wrede,* are scholars of repute and writers of unusual literary skill, and their strategic method in taking the case out of the hands of the theologians and appealing to the judgment of the intelligent laity has placed the advocates of traditional opinion rather on the defensive. The fight is now on in dead earnest, we are told, and if the cause is lost it will be due to its inherent weakness, and not to lack of ability in its leaders. An examination of the recent efforts at historical construction will at least bring us into contact with several bold and original thinkers, and cannot be without positive gains in shedding light upon the life and work of Paul and the history of the early church.

The following quotations from recent writers, who, though differing widely in other respects, yet agree in their opposition to Pauline Christianity, will serve to show the essence of the new contention :

* This was already in type before we learned with regret of the death, on Nov. 23, 1906, of the brilliant scholar and critic Dr. W. Wrede, professor in the University of Breslau. The article has been left unchanged.

But for Paul, said Nietzsche (*Morgenröte*, 1892), "Christianity would not exist; we should hardly have heard of a small Jewish sect whose teacher died on the cross". Paul was "the first Christian, the inventor of Christianity. Before him there were only a few Jewish sectaries."

"The introduction of Christianity into the history of the world", says Wernle (*Beginnings of Christianity*, 1903, Vol. I. p. 159), "is entirely the work of Paul. He is not the founder of the new religion, and he did not wish to be accounted such. . . . But it was he who brought Christianity out of Palestine and transplanted it among the Greeks. . . . It was bound to undergo a radical transformation. . . . The new start is one of such importance that we must distinguish the pre-Pauline from the post-Pauline Christianity; or, what amounts to the same thing, the Palestinian sect and the world religion."

Weinel (*St. Paul, the Man and His Work*, 1906, pp. 5, 11) in answer to the question, "Who has the greater claim to be called the founder of the world-religion, Jesus or Paul?" says, "'Paul', if by Christianity we understand belief in dogmas as to the person of Christ and his propitiatory death." He asks "Is the Christianity which Paul preached, and which still lives to-day in Church and dogma, another religion than the gospel which Jesus preached?" Paul is repeatedly called "the founder of the Church".

The conclusion of Wrede's monograph, *Paulus* (in *Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher*, 1905), is that "Paul must be regarded as the second founder of Christianity." Not through the gospel of Jesus but through Paul and his companions can we account for the great teachers, "Tertullian, Origen, Athanasius, Augustin, Anselm of Canterbury, Luther, Calvin, Zinzendorf." "This second founder of the Christian religion has without doubt as compared with the first exerted on the whole the stronger—not the better—influence."

Dr. Kohler, in the *Jewish Encyclopedia* (art. "Saul of Tarsus") speaks of Paul as "the actual founder of the Christian Church as opposed to Judaism."

All the writers above quoted agree that Paul was the founder of Christianity as a universal religion. To him belongs the credit, or discredit, of founding the Christian

Church, which with its creeds and institutions has lived on through the centuries till to-day.

To say that Paul was the founder of the world-religion is obviously to deny that Jesus was its founder. However pure and exalted the type of religion which He exemplified and taught, He did not teach His religion as the only supply for a universal need; He did not form any definite plans for world-conquest, or organize a church with a universal mission. The conception of a religion which should meet the needs of all men, and lay upon its adherents the obligation of a continual propaganda, and break down all barriers of race, caste and nationality, has been called the greatest thought which ever entered the human mind. If such a conception belonged not to Jesus but to Paul, it is to Paul that we must accord the crown of intellectual supremacy. Both Wernle and Weinel, it is true, concede a universal element in the teaching of Jesus. Referring to the passage, "Many shall come from the east and the west, etc.", Wernle says (I. p. 70), "How this admission of the Gentiles shall be brought about Jesus leaves to His God. He just gives the promise without giving His disciples any command to go forth as missionaries." And Weinel remarks: "Jesus would of course have raised no objection to the reception of the heathen. . . . He too, perhaps, once believed and said, that many would come from the east and from the west. . . . But words such as these were only occasional utterances, which bore witness to a heart free from all prejudice and full of love. They were not intended as indications for a definite organized work" (p. 221). Paul again goes beyond Jesus in clearly seeing and teaching that Christianity was independent of Judaism. Weinel says that "the consequences of His position in relation to the law remained completely concealed from Jesus" although He was opposed to ceremonial holiness (p. 219). Wernle believes that the statement in the Sermon on the Mount: "I am not come to destroy but to fulfil", belongs in its present form to the age after St. Paul. It cannot be ascribed to Jesus, for "its form betrays a theologian for

whom the question 'destruction or fulfilment of the law' implied a problem to be solved. For Jesus there was no such question, no question at all regarding the law in the strict sense of the word, for He was a layman and was in any case but moderately acquainted with the law—had perchance never studied it at all" (I. p. 88). Emerson has said that the human mind stands in perplexity, "demanding intellect, demanding sanctity, impatient equally with each without the other". To form the plan of a universal religion and to think out its true relation to Judaism, there was needed the mental grasp, learning and foresight of a Paul.

If Paul was the founder of universal Christianity, the popular estimate of his place in religious history must, it appears, be revised in two respects: First, he affected the religion of Jesus profoundly for the worse; and second, he saved it from oblivion and made it one of the great religions of the world. The name of Jesus, says Wernle, stands, it is true, in the centre of Paul's preaching, but he asks, "Is it not another Jesus?" (I. p. 167). Paul united the gospel of Jesus with a cosmology and a theology which "was bound to be welcomed by the decaying ancient world on account of its pessimism, its new myths, its ideal, its doctrine of hope" (I. p. 289). "Paul fought for the universalism of Christianity and the substitution of the religion of love for that of legalism: what he really attained was the establishment of the Christian Church with the new legalism of faith and the creed, with the return of all the Jewish sins of narrowness, fanaticism and the restricted conception of God" (I. p. 309). In similar vein Weinel says that "Paul was the first to intellectualize and thereby to narrow the original gospel" (p. 99). "The orthodox theories of the atonement can rightly appeal to St. Paul as their authority. . . . But we reject all such theories as to the death of Jesus . . . above all because they contain an unchristian, a less than Christian, conception of God and His relation to man" (pp. 311f.). Wrede is even bolder than Wernle in applying the expres-

sion "myth" to the Pauline conception of the incarnation, death and resurrection of Jesus (p. 103).

On the other hand, Paul's place in religious history as the founder of the world-religion becomes more important than ever, and his services to the cause of true religion are freely recognized. In his power of impressing his thought and his type of personal piety upon succeeding times he stands almost without a rival. Wernle says that by means of his experience Paul "was able to look into the depths of religion as no previous thinker had done. In so far as his propositions merely reproduce this experience, they are the foundation stones of every theory of religion" (I. pp. 301f). "Few men in all antiquity had a profounder knowledge of human nature", says Weinel (p. 364). His letter to the Philippians "contains the pattern of the perfect Christian gentleman" (p. 373). His teaching, says Wrede, "has given to millions of hearts the best that they possess". Without it, "a Luther, Paul Gerhard and John Sebastian Bach could not have been what they were", and it still fills with joy thousands and tens of thousands of good and earnest men (pp. 103f.). Even so pronounced an opponent of Pauline doctrine as the writer in the *Jewish Encyclopedia* is constrained to say that though both philosophers and Jews will differ from him, "both will admit that he is a mighty battler for truth, and that his view of life, of man, and of God is a profoundly serious one. The entire conception of religion has certainly been deepened by him" (Art. "Saul of Tarsus," p. 80).

This curious intermingling of praise and blame, often met with in the same paragraph or even sentence, is a necessary result, as becomes increasingly apparent, of the fundamental assumption of the later critics, namely, that Paul in propagating the gospel of Christ essentially modified its original content. Their volumes thus have to bear the singular aspect of being at the same time a eulogy of Paul and an anti-Pauline polemic.¹ The Apostle as they describe

¹ Wrede is the most outspoken in his criticisms, while with Wernle praise and blame are about evenly balanced. Weinel's sympathetic esti-

him was at once the leading exponent and missionary of Christianity and yet by implication its arch-heretic. His influence as a religious teacher has been so salutary and far reaching that it is due to him that any of us are Christians to-day, and yet he has so corrupted the message of the Master that the cry "Back to Jesus" means "Away from Paul and his doctrines". He "has impressed forever a whole series of fundamental ideas . . . upon the thought of the Western world" (Weinel, p. 8), and before his greatness as a thinker "one stands in silent amazement" (Wernle, I. p. 340), yet he was profoundly mistaken about the central point in his thinking, his relation to Jesus and His gospel. He combined in himself in short the greatest knowledge of human nature and the greatest self-deception and his work was both the greatest service and the greatest disservice that has ever been done to Christianity.

The most obvious criticism that can be made on this theory is that it is lacking in inner harmony. One must either love Paul or hate him, it has been said;² but this new theory requires of its advocates an unstable equilibrium between love and hate, between admiration and reprobation. The Paul described unites in himself qualities so diverse that, though he is offered in the place of Jesus as the explanation of world-wide Christianity, yet he himself becomes if not the miracle at least the riddle of history. It may be interesting to follow the new criticism as it seeks to explain Paul and to account for his conversion, his consciousness of apostleship, his mission to the Gentiles and his message. We may then ask what is after all the fundamental question: Was the gospel which Paul preached really new?

The reader who, attracted by the title of Wernle's volumes, seeks in them an adequate account of the beginnings of Christianity will be disappointed at not finding any description or discussion of Paul's conversion. We are left in doubt as to whether at Damascus Paul really saw the

mate of Paul's character will be welcomed as a real contribution to our appreciation of the Apostle.

² J. Kaftan, *Jesus und Paulus*, 1906.

risen Christ or not. The possibility of the resurrection is indeed admitted. "Our judgment as to these appearances depends on the credibility which we attach to St. Paul and his informant", that is, Peter. "Purely scientific considerations cannot decide" (I. p. 115). The whole course of the discussion, however, seems to assume that the Christ whom Paul saw, or thought he saw, was not identical with the historic Jesus. This is distinctly stated in the first edition: "By means of his vision St. Paul became the creator of the new Christology, which drew its inspiration, not from history, but from something above it—a mythical being, and which won over the heathen for this very reason" (E. T. Vol. I. p. 250). In the second (German) edition, this passage is omitted, and instead Wernle explains why, in consequence of his vision of the risen Lord, the resurrection must have had for Paul "fundamental significance" and how it inevitably became for him the "basis of Christianity" (*Die Anfänge unserer Religion*,² p. 166).³ The vision at Damascus is constantly used as the key to Paul's subsequent life, thought and activity. Without the apostolic consciousness, which there had its origin, "it is incredible that Paul would have accomplished a tithe of what he did" (I. p. 165). The key to the conquests of Christianity is Paul, the key to Paul's work is the vision at Damascus, but in Wernle's *Beginnings* there is no explanation of the vision itself. It had tremendous consequences, deeply affecting the course of history, but no cause for its occurrence either objective or subjective is suggested.

Both Weinel and Wrede have explanations to offer. The conversion, according to Wrede, was a sudden change of view as to the Messiahship of Jesus without moral or con-

³ The two editions of *Die Anfänge unserer Religion* appeared respectively in 1901 and 1904. Vol. I. of the English translation was made from the first, and Vol. II. from the second German edition. The main difference between the two volumes in English is that in Vol. I. the conception of the sacraments is derived from Paul, while Vol. II. presupposes their existence in the early Christian Church. The quotations in the present article, except as specially noted, are from the English translation where it agrees with the second German edition.

scious psychological preparation, mediated in some way by a pathological cause. From 2 Cor. xii. we see that there was something in Paul's religion, mystical, abnormal, inseparable from self-deception, and all this throws a very special light upon the first vision at Damascus (p. 17). What really occurred? "This much is certain. Jesus could not have stood in bodily form before His enemy. . . . Paul knows no resurrection of the flesh. . . . It could therefore have been no usual 'fleshly', no actual (*wirkliches*) 'seeing'" (p. 9). It is immediately added, however, "probably Paul never doubted that he actually (*wirklich*) had seen Jesus. . . . The vision worked upon him with the full power of an objective fact." The vision must have had a cause, we are told, although we may not be able to indicate it. "An actual view of the processes we can never obtain." The only explanation suggested is the following: "Fanatical opposition can assert itself on the surface, and in the still depths, without a man's understanding it himself, doubt can gnaw and foment and gather revolution around itself, and a new being fight its way out" (p. 10).

Weinel thinks that Paul's conversion was a moral experience, culminating in a hysterical attack which caused him to see a vision. Referring Rom. vii. to the struggle preceding conversion, he says "heavier and heavier did the curse of the law become" (p. 75). The voice which said "Why persecutest thou me?" was the voice of Paul's uneasy conscience" (p. 82). The psychical commotion disorganized his eye-sight, which explains his blindness. He had a vision, he saw, but how? "The answer", Weinell frankly says, "will vary according to a man's conception of the universe . . . meaning nothing about faith or religion. The question has no existence for faith. Faith knows that what happened, happened in any case because God chose to work it then—whether Paul beheld Jesus in the light, or whether it was merely a visionary sight. It is a question of our conception of the universe, in so far as it brings us face to face with the problem: Do we admit the possibility of ap-

pearances of persons from another world to the sensual vision?" (p. 80). Weinel assumes that the question is to be decided in accordance with a ready-made conception of the universe, but the question, if it could be answered on purely historical grounds, is just one of those which might reasonably affect our conception of the universe. It seems to be admitted that, apart from philosophical views, the evidence is sufficient to support the reality of an objective appearance. But the question, says Weinel, has no existence for faith. For Paul, of course, it would have existence, affecting vitally his claims to apostleship, and as part of the general question of the resurrection it would have existence for every believer. Even for Weinel himself we find that it does exist for faith, for he says that Paul's failure to perceive that the vision was purely subjective has had dangerous consequences for religion. It led Paul to regard "faith" as no longer "simply the heartfelt trust in God's mercy, but something besides, the fervent acceptance of a fact—the Resurrection. . . . Hereby some of that 'belief in facts' has crept into Christianity which so easily destroys the true, the inmost conception of faith. The outward occurrence and the inner psychological process were identical for Paul. His failure to distinguish the two has forever burdened Christianity with the danger of this twofold conception of faith" (pp. 99f.).

If Paul were merely a private Christian his experience at conversion would be relatively of little importance. But his conversion cannot be treated out of connection with his work as the apostle of Christ to the Gentiles,—or more than that, as the founder of world-wide Christianity. Why did Paul when converted become a missionary to the heathen? This is a difficult question for the newer criticism. To refer his mission to a personal command from the risen Christ is excluded by hypothesis. If his own explanation of the origin and success of his work is adopted—"God revealed His Son in me that I might preach Him among the Gentiles. Christ wrought through me for the obedience of the Gen-

tiles"—then Paul has indeed the high honor in his mission and his message of being the apostle of Jesus Christ to the Gentiles, but he originated neither the universality nor the content of his gospel. On the other hand, to refer the mission directly to the vision at Damascus, considered as a purely subjective event, is to make that event still more wonderful. Through it Paul was converted not simply to the faith of which he was making havoc, but, it is implied, to a religion quite different from this, and through it he received a commission, so he thought, which he spent the remainder of his life in fulfilling. The heavier the explanatory task imposed upon the conversion, the more inexplicable does this as a merely natural event become.

"Whence", asks Wernle, "came the certainty of the apostolic calling? By far the most beautiful answer is to be found in First Corinthians: 'Necessity is laid upon me; yea, woe is me if I preach not the gospel.' The calling to go forth as missionary is an inner compulsion which Paul cannot at all withstand" (I. p. 165). But why this compulsion? "St. Paul gives us a clear account. He became at once Christian and apostle—such is his answer to the question—through the vision on the road to Damascus." But why was Paul an apostle to the Gentiles? While other considerations are mentioned, which, it is said, contributed to his decision, yet "the really decisive cause was the clearly felt impulse that urged him to go forth from the very moment of his call. He was under a necessity—he had to go to the Gentiles" (I. p. 174). It is said that Paul "draws no distinction between the general calling of an apostle and the special calling of a missionary to the heathen, but shows himself prepared to receive both at God's hands" (I. p. 161). Wernle, it will be seen, has no other account to give of the origin of Paul's mission to the Gentiles than that it was in obedience to an impulse—not a command—felt from the moment of his conversion.

While Weinel, at least nominally, connects the conversion and the missionary call, he finds it difficult to explain the

connection. He asks, "Why does Damascus mean a new vocation to Paul?" and seeks another explanation than the obvious one of a supernatural call. It is natural that out of the fulness of the heart the mouth should speak, yet, he says, "it is difficult to understand just why he became apostle to the Gentiles". Weinell's own explanation, stated with some diffidence, is based upon an interpretation of two passages, Gal. v. 11 and 2 Cor. v. 16. "In these passages we can trace the idea that Paul had once known and preached Christ after the flesh—that is, he had, when he was still Saul, recognized and proclaimed an earthly Jewish Messiah, and that he had already been a teacher, possibly also a missionary. In this case it may have been a pre-existent calling, or at least perhaps an incipient though hidden desire which awoke within in full force in that supreme moment" (p. 154). To add to the difficulty of this exegesis as suggesting a "pre-existent calling" is the fact that Weinell in two other places says that Paul believed that the Messiah was a heavenly being. "Even as a Jew, Saul believed the Messiah to be already in existence. . . . He is living in heaven with God, whence God will send Him forth when the time is fulfilled" (p. 45). So again in explaining the origin of Paul's Christology: "He now knew, from his own experience, that that heavenly being, in whom his people believed, existed as an actual matter of fact. He was identical with Jesus" (p. 314). The reader is obliged to choose between the pre-existent calling as explaining the mission, and the pre-existent Messiah as explaining the Christology.

Wrede, equally with Weinell, is somewhat at a loss to account for Paul's mission to the heathen. Paul himself, he admits, referring to Gal. i. 16 and Rom. xv. 15f., declares that "the moment of the conversion itself had destined him to be not only apostle in general, but apostle to the heathen" (p. 14). Yet it is added that there seems to be a little self-deception here; this sudden call is "psychologically hard to understand. In memory the perspective is easily shortened.

. . . At any rate the recognition of his life's task was an effect of the appearance of Christ; on the other hand, that he had 'seen' Jesus just as those apostles with whom He had lived constituted—for himself as for others—the title to apostolic dignity. The thought that Christ had Himself called him at that time lay not far away" (p. 15). Elsewhere Wrede says that the Jewish propaganda of the Diaspora may have co-operated in making Paul a missionary, but adds, "we are not in a position to trace his development clearly" (p. 42). Significant is the admission: "As to how Paul became a missionary to the heathen we are left with no trustworthy account, as soon as we refuse to place the beginning of the mission in the very hour of his conversion" (p. 29). It may be observed that no one of our authors has succeeded in breaking the organic connection between Paul's conversion and his sense of a divine call to preach the gospel to the Gentiles.

Paul's theology, equally with his call, is referred back to his conversion. The question of its source is doubly important because Paul is regarded as the founder of Christian theology not only without but within the New Testament. The Apocalypse, Wernle thinks, is in its theology a development of the gospel which Paul preached to the Gentiles. Its Christology shows "the unchanging outline of the Pauline Christology. It cannot possibly have originated twice over in different persons, unless indeed there were two appearances on the road to Damascus" (I. p. 386). The commission to evangelize the world is of course antedated when put into the mouth of the risen Christ. Wernle, as we have seen, traces Paulinism even into the imperial utterances of the Sermon on the Mount, and Wrede remarks that the Synoptic Gospels were composed in part under Paul's influence (p. 89). The John of the Gospel and Epistles cannot be appealed to as an independent theologian, for "there is no Johnine theology by the side of and independent of the Pauline. . . . John and Paul are not two theological factors, but one."

(Wernle, II. pp. 274f.). "The significance of the Fourth Gospel consists in the fact that it refers the teaching of St. Paul back to Jesus Himself. This constitutes its value and its worthlessness, its force and its fatality" (II. p. 276). "When the Johannine Christ speaks of how He was with the Father before He became flesh, it is Paul himself that is speaking to us" (Wrede, p. 99). First Peter is "an altogether Pauline letter" (Wernle, II. p. 293). Paul is even said to have been, unintentionally, "the father of the New Testament", since he made the distinction between natural and revealed knowledge (II. p. 245). "Paul is everywhere the starting-point. It is his gospel that now speaks to us out of the words of Jesus and the original apostles" (II. p. 294).⁴

At the base then of the great structure of Christian theology stands the thought of Paul. Paul himself traces his theology to three sources: revelation—in part inseparable from his Christian experience—, Christian tradition and the Old Testament. "God revealed His Son in me." "God shined in our hearts." "I delivered that which I received, how that Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures." Both revelation in the usual sense and Christian tradition are with our critics excluded as sources by the assumption that Paul's gospel was so largely his own creation, but the prime source is found in the new opinions and experiences that date in some way from Damascus. The hour of his conversion, Wrede says, gave him the germ of which his theology is but the development (p. 48). In Wienel's treatment the connection between his theology and his con-

⁴ While the influence of Paul is thus magnified, the extent of his direct authorship is limited. Wernle indeed draws from all the epistles except the Pastorals, but Wienel only uses the six most commonly acknowledged, Romans 1 and 2 Corinthians, Galatians, Philippians and 1 Thessalonians. To these Wrede adds Colossians and Philemon. The extremes of a twofold process of addition and subtraction are found in the *Jewish Encyclopedia* (art. "Saul of Tarsus"), where Paul is called "the actual founder of the Christian Church as opposed to Judaism," and yet even of his main epistles Romans is said to be largely "interpollated" and Galatians to be "spurious".

version is even closer, while Wernle says that "the decisive factor in the genesis of St. Paul's theology was his personal experience, his conversion on the road to Damascus" (I. p. 224). The explanatory burden laid upon this event is thus made heavier but without further explanation of the event itself.

What then were the novel elements in Paul's theology? Wrede gives three particulars: the universalism of his gospel, his Christology through which Christ became in origin and nature a heavenly being, and a new valuation of the death (and resurrection) of Christ (p. 96). The assumption is that the Jesus of Nazareth whom he was persecuting was for the early Christians only the Jewish Messiah. How He became for Paul in the hour of conversion the world's Saviour is left unexplained. There seems to be no very plausible reason for Paul's universalism either in thought or activity, except that he had received from the risen Lord "grace and apostleship unto obedience of faith among all the nations"; but if we accept Paul's own account then his gospel is not new either in its Christology or its universal destination.

Paul was original, Wrede and Weinel hold, in seeing in Jesus a pre-existent heavenly being. If the source of this new conception was an actual revelation of the glorified Lord to the eyes and mind of Paul, his change of view is not hard to account for. "For one who with Paul himself sees in Jesus a supramundane divine being, there is here indeed no problem" (Wrede, p. 84). Wrede, however, seeing in Jesus "what he was, an historical-human personality", must seek some other explanation, and finds it in the idea of a heavenly Messiah held by Paul previously to his conversion and identified through that event with the Jesus whom he was persecuting. "In the moment of his conversion as Jesus stood before him in the bright glory of His resurrection being, then he identified Him with his Christ", and transferred to Him the predicates of pre-existence and creatorship. But why did not the earlier disciples who

equally with Paul might have known the Messiah of the Jewish apocalypses, and had, at least equally with him, seen the glory of the risen Lord, make this identification? The answer is clear: "Intimate disciples could not so easily believe that the man who sat with them at the table at Capernaum or journeyed over the Sea of Galilee, could be the Creator of the world" (p. 86). Wrede does not ask what view of Christ was held by James, distinguished by Paul as "the Lord's brother", and said by him to have seen the Risen Lord. Upon this question Wrede, and with him Wernle and Weinl, are silent. It might further, perhaps, be asked whether Jesus, believing Himself to be the Messiah, was conscious of being the heavenly Being with whom Paul identified Him. The question here would be out of place, for Wrede apparently does not think that Jesus looked upon Himself as the Messiah (see p. 94).⁵

Weinl accepts with Wrede Paul's identification of the pre-existent Messiah foreshadowed in some Jewish apocalypses with the Jesus he was persecuting (p. 313). He does this as we have seen, however, in apparent forgetfulness of his previous suggestion that Paul had, "while still Saul, recognized and proclaimed an earthly Jewish Messiah" (p. 184). In one respect Weinl is a partial antidote to Wrede. Although Paul surrounded the person of Jesus with a heavenly aureole beneath which "His simple and yet all-powerful features threatened to disappear", still, we must not suppose that Paul knew nothing of Jesus. "According to his own words, he became acquainted with the outlines of the life of Jesus from the disciples themselves; and though his religion is everywhere in touch with the risen, living Lord, yet we find clear traces everywhere of his acquaintance with those memoirs of Jesus which afterward assumed a definite shape in our Gospels" (p. 317).⁶ Wernle

⁵ In his earlier works, *Das Messiasgeheimnis in den Evangelien* (1901), Wrede renews the attempt of Bruno Bauer to eliminate the Messianic element altogether from the life of Jesus. See Schweitzer's *Von Reimarus zu Wrede*, 1906, p. 10.

⁶ In Canon Knowling's *Witness of the Epistles*, 1892, and *The Testi-*

thinks that though the Jewish theory was simply that the name of Messiah was hidden with God, yet that "from very early times", much earlier than the composition of our section with Jesus. "The same goal was reached as soon as Jesus' words about His being sent by God were taken literally" (I. p. 147). The idea of pre-existence was not therefore a discovery of Paul's. Wernle contends that it is labor lost to try to trace Paul's ideas before his conversion. "In fact, we are completely ignorant as to what ideas he had exactly at that time. . . . The apostle had one theology and only one, and that is a Christian one. Each single word of his epistles flows from his Christian consciousness" (I. p. 225). Since Paul had no knowledge of the living Jesus, only of the heavenly Christ, he could form his Christology, Wernle says, only by extracting from the current titles of Christ, such as Messiah, Son of God, Son of Man, what these seemed to contain. "The knowledge of the titles and of their values compensates for the lack of personal knowledge. How could it be otherwise? If one knows Jesus oneself all titles are inadequate" (I. p. 246).

Paul's theory of the death of Christ, Wernle holds, had its roots in the "Christophany". But the Christophany, he adds, will not account fully for the theory, since all that Paul could properly infer from it was that he individually was a sinner and that the Crucified and Risen one had died for his sins. It was in an apologetic interest, that is in defense of Christianity as a universal religion, that Paul made the theoretical extension of his experience and constructed the dogmas,—All men are sinners: Christ died for the sins of all men. Herein Paul went beyond the idea of the early Church that Christ as Messiah died for the sins of the Jewish nation, and still further beyond the thought of Jesus Himself that "some good end must surely be intended by His death. It must be fraught with blessing for many among the people who as yet believed not in Him" (I. p. 111). How or why,

mony of St. Paul to Christ, 1905, the witness of Paul to the facts of the Gospel history is fully discussed.

in virtue of the Christophany, the passage was first made from the personal or the national to the universal does not appear. Wrede leaves it doubtful whether the early Christians brought the death of Christ into connection with sin at all, remarking that Paul's reception from tradition of the fact that He "died for our sins", 1 Cor. xv. 3, "is only demanded by a very literal construction of his words" (p. 112). It should be observed in general that the Christophany at Damascus is treated by implication as if it were not in any real sense an appearance of the risen Christ, yet it is made the primary source of the theology which permeates the New Testament and has for centuries dominated Christian thought.

It remains to speak of Paul's doctrine of justification. With this Weinel, at least, has the warmest sympathy. It was by Paul's antagonism to legalism that he became "the saviour of Christianity" (p. 101). He sees that the doctrine is the formulated expression of a deep religious experience, and calls his theology at this point "the defense of his holiest, his most cherished possession" (p. 101). The doctrine of justification by faith was "the core and centre of his theology" (p. 289). Wernle sees in it the result of a profound experience dating from Damascus, but thinks that Paul's apologetic interests have here, to an unusual extent "injured the expression of his thoughts" (I. p. 302). According to Wrede the doctrine of justification sprang neither from Paul's experience nor from Jewish presuppositions, but solely from the "needs of his heathen mission" (p. 84). It was a controversial weapon (*Kampfeslehre*), forged in order to keep the heathen converts from the yoke of Jewish custom and to assure the superiority of Christianity. Paul did not preach it at first and, we are led to infer, would never have preached it but for the Jews and Judaizers. The result of the controversy was that Christianity was made to appear as something entirely new, as a religion with a distinctive principle. We are left in doubt as to the content of his earliest preaching. Unless, it

may be remarked, he had seen in Christianity an opposition in principle to Judaism, he would not before his conversion have persecuted the new faith, nor have himself been persecuted as soon as he became its preacher. Weinell's insight is here truer than Wrede's. The doctrine of justification by faith was indeed a controversial weapon and was effective, as Wrede says, in emancipating Christianity from Judaism. But it was wielded by Paul so effectively because he had something to contend for, the reality of his own experience of salvation. It was a powerful weapon in the hands both of Paul and of Luther because in both cases it was forged in the heat of their own religious experience.

Could Paul, it is proper to ask, have become the man that he was apart from his theology—his views of sin, of justification, of faith, and of Jesus as the Crucified Saviour and glorified Son of God? It is not hinted by any one of our writers that this would have been possible. "His theology is his religion", Wrede admits (p. 48), and intimates that his theological writings have fed the religious life of Christian leaders from John to Luther. Wernle again scarcely believes that Paul could have been led to sainthood by any other than the theological road. The simple scheme of earlier Christianity, "Do God's will as Jesus taught it, and attach yourself to those who expect Jesus as their Lord", was, he says, for Paul "entirely inadequate". "Christianity was entirely a religion of redemption for him. He knew what that meant—to wish to do God's will and not be able to do it" (I. p. 76). The older form of religion would not, it is likewise intimated, have been adequate for the majority of Paul's hearers or been able to make headway among them. These, "belonging as they did to the classes that were morally degraded, were only too ready to accept the atoning death of Jesus which promised them remission of their punishment" (I. p. 188). But is the religion whose watchword is "Jesus as lawgiver", not "Jesus as redeemer", adequate to meet the religious needs of to-day? Into the answer to this question personal experience will largely enter. Such

a religion will not be adequate for those who, with the Apostle, know what it is to wish to do God's will and not be able to do it, nor for those who have found peace of conscience, moral strength and "joy in the Holy Ghost" in believing in the Christ whom Paul preached. Paul's theology and Paul's religion go together. His doctrines of grace will not be felt as a burden by those who share his experience of redemption, and with Paul call upon the name of the Lord Jesus Christ—his Lord and theirs.

But the religion of Jesus Himself, it is insisted, was something very different. He knew nothing of Paul's struggle and his antithesis of grace and the law. "That which Paul only learnt through the shipwreck of his old life, Jesus possessed from the very first as an original endowment" (I. p. 302). Why the absence of this antithesis in the case of Jesus? A sentence from Weinel, as we reflect upon it, may suggest the answer. "As a man increases in moral strength of character, so his conscience becomes more sensitive; he realizes more keenly the distance that separates him from the ideal, and hence the weight of the feeling of guiltiness oppresses him ever more heavily" (p. 92). We are not told why the best and holiest of men was an exception to this rule? The favorite text of the new criticism—"Why callest thou me good?"—is said to prove that Jesus places Himself entirely on the side of humanity. Yet our critics, while slow in dogmatic assertions of sinlessness, are equally so in suggesting any flaw in the character of Jesus. Weinel even says that Paul's dogmatic assertion that Jesus knew no sin, rests "indubitably upon the impression which the person of Jesus made upon the disciples" (p. 318). But the words of Jesus in the passage referred to imply that goodness is an attribute of Deity alone. The text may prove a double-edged sword in the hands of those who would exalt the character, but deny the divinity of Christ.⁷

⁷ Prof. N. Schmidt in "*The Prophet of Nazareth*", 1905, thus comments upon the passage in question: "When he humbly deprecates the title 'Good Master!' on the ground that none is good but one, namely, God, a majesty invests his figure such as no self-assertion could have

The apostle Paul as he is described in the Acts and Epistles is a wonderful man. About his figure lingers something of the mysterious glory which shone round him at Damascus. He was converted in a way which he himself regarded as without analogy in Christian experience. The choice of himself to be the herald of the good tidings to the Gentiles was something which excited his own wonder. Nobody could have imagined that the "chosen vessel" would be, not one of the Twelve who were disciples and followers of Jesus, but one who was His active and bitter enemy. Stranger even than the New Testament account of Paul is that which requires us to believe that he made havoc of the faith both before and after his conversion. He was the foremost champion of Christianity but in a sense its evil genius. He conquered heathenism, but only by preaching a new myth to the myth-loving Greeks. He freed Christianity from Judaism, but bound it fast with the fetters of dogma. Except for his work none of us would be Christians to-day, but our religion would now be better and purer if emancipated from his influence. He was the founder of the Church, but the Church must now, in sorrow or in anger, turn away from its creator.⁸

Are we then compelled by the facts to believe in this union of opposites? Was the Gospel which conquered the Roman world essentially new as compared with that of Jesus Himself and the original apostles? The evidence is to be found beside the Epistles only in the Gospels and the Acts. In the case of both of these we are at a disadvantage in using

lent it" (p. 380). Why "a majesty", the reader may ask, unless He could rightly claim the title, and if so, what then?

⁸ The new criticism is not friendly to the Pauline doctrine of the Fall, but it sees in Paul's doctrinal teaching something similar to this, a falling away from the purity of the primitive gospel which for centuries has to that extent corrupted the whole Church. The late Pastor Kalthoff, who knew no Christ after the flesh, denying His historical existence, criticized the new views from this standpoint, remarking that modern theology, in assuming "an immediate perversion and falling away from a pure original principle" has placed itself "outside the method of general historical science". (See Schweitzer: *Von Reimarus zu Wrede*, p. 312.)

the evidence, because of the alleged strong Pauline influence in both. If it is shown that the words of Jesus about Himself in the Gospels and the utterances of the apostles in the Acts are in harmony with the teaching of Paul, we are told that it is really Paul who is speaking to us out of the words of Jesus and His apostles. The evidence of Paul's own writings is, however, sufficient to show that there was no essential difference between the faith which Paul persecuted and that which he afterward preached. "Whether it be I or they", he said, about a point vitally affecting his Christology and his doctrine—that Christ died and rose again for our sins,—“so we preach, and so ye believed” (1 Cor. xv. 11). His written gospel in Galatians is said to be the same as was his oral gospel, and this, by implication, in the view of the churches of Judea which were in Christ, to have been the same as the faith of which he once made havoc (Gal. i.). The matter of discussion between himself and the other apostles was in relation to the Jewish law, and, however personal relations may at times have been strained, it is agreed both in Acts and the Epistles that here Paul's orthodoxy was completely recognized. In Paul's bitter contest with the Judaizers, neither party charged the other with different views of the person of Christ. The Jews persecuted equally Paul and “the churches of God which are in Judea in Christ Jesus” (1 Thes. ii.). Writing to the church at Rome where he had never been and claimed as yet no direct “fruit”, Paul describes his religion in words (“Christ in you, etc.”) which Weinel says are in accordance with the experience of all Christians of that time (p. 95). For some years he worked with Barnabas, a leader in the early church, and there is no trace of any difference of opinion except about John Mark, and the question of circumcision. Later his companion was Silas, a delegate from the Jerusalem Church. Why is it that upon the essential questions, “Who was Jesus?” “Did He die for our sins?” and “Did He rise again from the dead?” there is no trace in the New Testament of any disagreement between Paul and the earlier

apostles? It is significant that this question is not discussed by any of our authors. The only hint that we have observed toward an explanation of this singular agreement of the New Testament records is found in a single sentence of Wernle's second German edition (p. 177). It is said that while Paul makes of Jesus "an almost new creation", he yet uses the same titles as the apostles. This is a virtual confession that the difference in Christology so emphasized by the modern historian was not noticed by Paul himself or by the Jerusalem leaders. Even in the case of James, with whom according to the new theory the difference was most irreconcilable, the records give proof of essential agreement. This is shown by the title which Paul employs, "the Lord's brother," and by the fact, witnessed by both Acts and Epistles, of his laborious collection of alms for the Jerusalem Church.

When, further, we examine the contrast between the Christ of Paul and the Jesus of the Synoptics we find that it is not so sharp as is sometimes assumed. It is weakened, first, by admitted elements in the Gospels which may be harmonized with Paul, or were even introduced under Pauline influence, and, second, by the alleged fact that the Gospel miracles have almost hopelessly obscured the true portrait of Jesus. "Certain expressions and verses in St. Mark which were intended in anything rather than a Pauline sense suggested to it [a later age] quite naturally Pauline thoughts of the Son of God, of the atoning death of Jesus, of universal salvation, of the necessity of faith. Before the Gospel of John was written the Synoptists were read in a Johannine, that is, a Pauline sense." (Wernle II, pp. 251f.). Again it is said that "even in St. Mark the stories of the miracles, inserted because of apologetic interests, have produced a bizarre and fantastical picture" (II, p. 256). Wrede thinks that there are in Mark only remnants of a true view of the actual life of Jesus. This is overlaid by a superhistorical faith-construction and "the Gospel of Mark belongs in this sense to

the history of dogma" (quoted in Schweitzer, p. 336). From Mark then may be derived a Pauline Jesus, who equally with the Jesus of the Epistles is to be rejected, or else a Jesus discerned in shadowy outline underneath the Paulinism and the miracle. In the dilemma which Wrede proposes, "Jesus or Paul," the disjunction is hardly complete, for if we reject Paul and his teaching the Jesus of all four of our Gospels must really be rejected also. We must give up too, according to Wernle, much of the teaching of Jesus which still remains when the Pauline and miraculous elements have been removed. We must give up not only His own "fantastic and erroneous conception of His return" (I, p. 150) but even the Messianic idea which though accepted by Jesus (controlling according to the Gospels His whole thought) was yet foreign to Him, and accepted only under compulsion (I, p. 52). The contrast, we perceive, is not between the Christianity of Paul and the Christianity of the Gospels but between the Jesus of Paul and a Jesus in whose portrait, it may reasonably be claimed, essential features are lacking.

When finally we look in the Acts for traces of doctrinal disagreement between Paul and the other apostles, we are again disappointed. This is because both Paul and the other apostles are here (unconsciously, it is said) described not as they were but as a later age thought they should have been. It should be noticed that all our records fail us when we try to discover any radical difference between Paul and original Christianity. With Wernle's remark that in the account of the apostles in Acts, we "are concerned with dogma rather than with historical recollections" (II, p. 291) should be compared the conclusions of Harnack's recent monograph, *Lukas der Arzt*, (Leipzig, 1906). As the result of a patient investigation of the style of Acts and the verbal usage he comes to the conclusion that on the question of authorship "the critique is wrong and tradition right." With special reference to two English writers, Hobart and Hawkins, he examines anew the traces of medical phrase-

ology, and the stylistic agreement between the "we" passages and the rest of Acts and the Third Gospel, and is forced to the conclusion that both books in their entirety are the work of Paul's intimate companion, "Luke the beloved physician." Harnack does not believe that everything that Acts contains is true, but he contends that in Acts we are dealing with an author most advantageously situated to find out the facts, and not with conceptions of a later age. Harnack says: "If Luke and not some later and unknown compiler is the author of the great historical work, then the psychological and historical problem which is given us is extraordinarily great" (p. iv). Increasingly difficult does the rejection of Acts become, when it is tested not by a preconceived theory but with Ramsay, for instance, by the results of archaeological investigation. The picture of Paul's preaching in the Acts is moreover in perfect harmony with that derived from the Epistles. At Damascus he preaches Jesus as the Son of God, and at Antioch tells of a justification by faith not to be obtained through the law of Moses. The Acts ascribes to Paul just what the Epistles give us, not a new but a more developed theology.

An important result of the admitted Lucan authorship of the Third Gospel is that the Synoptic picture of Jesus, though portrayed here by a close friend of Paul, remains in its contents practically uninfluenced by Pauline thought. For example, Luke's story of the infancy is not, it is asserted, known to Paul, while the miracles which Luke narrates so freely in common with Matthew-Mark are not mentioned in the Epistles. Harnack indeed finds, in support of the conclusion that Luke wrote the Third Gospel, that Luke has more Pauline words than Matthew or Mark. Matthew has 29 words used by Paul but not found in the other Gospels, Mark has 20 such words in common with Paul, John 17 words, and Luke (Gospel) 84 words, 49 of which are verbs (p. 14). But these words, as will be found on examination of Harnack's list, are not theological terms. The technical terms of Paul's theology, such as "the righteousness of

God," "the righteousness of faith," "promise" (except in xxiv. 49), "grace" as opposed to works, "hope" and "sin" (in the singular) are lacking in the Third Gospel. As Dr. Fairbairn has said in a recent lecture in this country, "the words of Jesus as presented in the Gospels remain unaffected by Pauline writings." The Lucan authorship of the Gospel and Acts being established, we have a guarantee, first, that the evangelical tradition not only was not but could not be altered by the strongest Pauline influence, and, second, that in the opinion of one of the Synoptic writers, himself a companion of Paul, there was no essential novelty in Paul's Christianity. If the Lucan authorship of the Gospel and Acts be admitted, the theory that Paul was the founder of universal Christianity or of the Christian Church falls to the ground.

Socrates and Plato, says Emerson, form a double star which the most powerful telescope will not entirely separate. Jesus and His great apostle can be separated only by imagining another Jesus than the Jesus of the Gospels, and another Paul than the Paul of the Epistles or the Acts. The resulting construction, however brilliantly presented, is necessarily logically unstable and so improbable historically that the reader cannot but feel, in examining it, that he is dealing with "dogma" of a modern kind rather than with history: Herein perhaps, to borrow a phrase from Wernle, lies "its value and its worthlessness, its force and its fatality."

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THE PRIESTHOOD OF CHRIST IN THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS.

The Epistle to the Hebrews deals mainly with the two great offices of Christ as Revealer and as Priest. It is clear that the author consciously coördinates the two. In the opening verses which serve as a prelude to the entire Epistle we have side by side: "God spake in a Son" and "Having made purification of sins He sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high". But especially Chap. iii. 1, is interesting from this point of view. Here the Saviour is called "Apostle and Highpriest of our confession". The article, put only once, binds the two conceptions most closely together: He is Apostle and Highpriest in one, and His chief value for the believer consists in His being the two jointly; hence He forms as such the content of the confession and the readers are exhorted carefully "to consider" Him in this twofold capacity.

While the Epistle has in common with the other New Testament writings the representation of Christ as Revealer, it stands practically alone in explicitly naming Him a Priest. It were rash to infer from this that the conception was first created by our author. The sacrificial character of the death of Christ was a common article of faith long before. This was held in connection with Is. liii. Now it is precisely in Is. liii that the Servant of Jehova figures not merely as the passive lamb of sacrifice, but also as He who actively and freely pours out his soul unto death (verse 12) or even, according to the rendering, made his soul an offering for sin (verse 10). The CXth Psalm had been interpreted Messianically by Jesus Himself: His followers cannot have forgotten, that thereby He ascribed to His own Person the character of a Priest-King. Also the prophecy of Zach. vi, 12, 13, might easily have led to the same con-

ception, although there seems to be no positive evidence to this effect. According to Paul Christ is not merely the sacrifice, but also the one who brought the sacrifice, Eph. v. 2, and throughout the Apostle emphasizes the fact that He gave Himself up to death freely. How easily the idea of a mediatorial position between God and man closely approaching that of the priesthood might associate itself with this appears from 1 Tim. iii. 5: "For there is one God, one Mediator also between God and men, Himself man, who gives Himself a ransom for all." Closely related is the further thought that Christ makes intercession for believers in heaven, Rom. viii. 34. This again leads on to the conception of the *παράκλητος* in the Gospel and Epistles of John, especially in 1 John ii. 1. Further the Apocalypse represents believers as made by Christ "kings and priests to God", or "priests of God and of Christ", i. 6; v. 10; xx. 6; inasmuch as Christ's Kingship is prior to that of believers, indeed the source of the latter, it is likely that the writer on the same principle derives the priesthood of believers from a priesthood of Christ. A similar representation is found in 1 Pet. ii. 5: Christians are "a holy priesthood to offer up spiritual sacrifices, acceptable to God, through Jesus Christ". It ought not to be overlooked, however, that these last analogies differ in one essential point from the teaching of Hebrews: they speak of believers being priests jointly with Christ, whereas according to our Epistle the Saviour's priesthood is something unique and incommunicable (cf., however, Chap. xiii. 15, "Through Him then let us offer up a sacrifice of praise to God continually, that is the fruit of lips which make confession to his name").

In Jewish literature analogies are not lacking. In places of the Talmud, where the heavenly sanctuary is spoken of, Michael or the Metathron appears as the officiating high priest.¹ The thought is likewise expressed that the Messiah

¹ The passages are given by Schöttgen, *Horae hebraicae et talmudicae in universum N. T.*, pp. 1212-1222, from Sohar, and by Röth, *Epistolam Vulgo*, etc., p. 17, and Tholuck in his comment on chap. viii. 1, from the tract Chagiga.

is dearer to God than the high priest Aaron.² In a Targum-passage, the Messiah is represented in connection with Is. liii. as making intercession for the sins of the people and bearing their sins.³ Philo speaks much of his Logos as high priest; he calls him *μέγας*, depicts him as sinless, emphasizes his mildness and benevolence, makes Melchizedek his type, ascribes to him the work of intercession. He even speaks of the Logos as having the twofold office of representing sinful man with God and of being God's messenger to man. But a great difference exists between Philo's conception and the doctrine of our Epistle. It concerns the total absence in Philo of the soteriological, expiatory element. Philo's main interest lies in cosmical speculation and spiritualizing, and this controls his treatment of the Old Testament institutions as well as of other things. The antitypical sanctuary is the kosmos or the soul. In these the Logos is high priest. He stands metaphysically between God and the world. He is pledge to God that the world will not sink back into chaos, pledge to man that God will always retain interest in his creation, and thus he is the herald of peace from God to man. He represents not humanity alone, but the physical world and its elements, for which he makes prayers and offers thanksgiving. It is true Philo speaks of the reconciling of man with God as a function of the Logos. But even for this no real expiation is required. In the ethical sphere his task is simply to separate the good from the evil, to stand between the people of God and their pursuers. From the ritual sacrifices Philo does not rise to a truly expiatory sacrifice of a higher order, but simply to the spiritual sacrifice of the heart.

In the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs* occurs a remarkable passage (*Test. Levi*, 18), being a prediction about a priest-king, also compared to a prophet, who will perform various eschatological acts. There are several features in this passage which render it analogous to the

² *Aboth*, R. Nathan, chap. xxxiii.

³ Quoted by Schöttgen, *Horae hebraicae et talmudicae in theologiam Judaeorum*, p. 653.

representation in Hebrews. It is probably based on the CXth Psalm. The priest-king is brought into connection with Abraham. It is said that he will have no successor in eternity. At the time of his priesthood all sin disappears, the wicked cease doing evil, he opens the gates of paradise, removes the sword that threatened Adam, and gives the saints to eat of the tree of life. He binds Beliar and gives to his own children power to tread on the evil spirits. On the other hand, it should be observed that this Messianic priest is here derived from the tribe of Levi and no reference is made to any expiatory function.

The question why in the Epistle to the Hebrews, among all New Testament writings, the conception of Christ as Priest and Sacrifice, the whole expression of the gospel in terms of the ritual, plays such a prominent part still presses for an answer as much at the present day as ever before. It is true on the old view, which up to R  th (1836) held undisputed sway, and according to which the Epistle is addressed to Jewish-Christians living in Palestine and personally interested in the temple-service, the answer appeared obvious. But this view seems of late to have been losing ground, especially after the searching criticism to which it was subjected by von Soden in 1884. Even Zahn abandons it. The new view is not, however, necessarily distinguished from the old in that it affirms the Gentile-Christian character of the readers. It may do this, as is the case with von Soden, but it need not. Zahn, while absolutely detaching the Epistle from the local Jewish environment of Palestine and the temple-worship, yet advocates the Jewish nationality of the Christian readers, whom he seeks in Rome. Harnack is unjust in accusing Zahn of having only partially emancipated himself from the old tradition, simply because he continues to affirm that the readers were Christians from the Jews. This is unjust, we say, because the grounds on which Zahn affirms the latter are altogether independent of the old view, have in fact nothing whatever to do with the ritual content of the Epistle, and therefore, if sound, demand

recognition, wherever the readers may be located, and whatever interpretation may be placed upon the teaching of the Epistle. The specific difference of the new and spreading opinion is rather exclusively this, that it holds the ritual character of the content of the Epistle should not be explained from any direct personal concern of the readers with the Jewish ceremonial; and that it upholds this negative even where on other grounds the Jewish nationality of the readers is still maintained.⁴ No matter whether the readers were Christians from the Jews or the Gentiles, some other explanation is sought for the prominence of the ideas of priesthood and sacrifice. Now this modern view, it must be acknowledged, is able to present a respectable array of evidence in its favor. It is hard to acquit Bruce of rashness when he simply brushes it aside as "a brilliant paradox". But Bruce was quite right in his perception, that what was the strong point of the old view, constitutes the weak point of the new view, viz., its manner of dealing with the pronounced ritual character of the Epistle. The old view accounted for this with ease and naturalness; of the new theory the same can hardly be said. Of course, if the Epistle

⁴ The detachment of the Epistle from the circle of Jewish-Christians in Palestine does not necessarily involve that the readers could have no practical personal interest in the temple-worship. Not even the dating of the Epistle after 70 A. D. would necessarily involve this. Among the Jews of the dispersion a lively interest in the temple and its service was kept up. After the destruction of the city and temple, the religious interest of the diaspora still continued to a certain extent to revolve around them. The Jews could not know and did not believe that the destruction would be permanent. In the Epistle of Barnabas the Jews are accused of still placing their confidence in the temple. Holtzmann has shown that the present tenses used where the Epistle to the Hebrews speaks of the Old Testament ceremonial, occur also in Josephus, 1 Clement, Ep. ad Diognetum, all writings from after the year 70. (*Z. f. Wiss. Theol.* 1867, pp. 9 seq. Cf. also Friedmann and Grätz in *Theol. Jahrb.* 1848, pp. 338 seq.) It might be argued that if such an attachment persisted among the diaspora-Jews, it might likewise have continued among the Jewish-Christians of the dispersion. Still how an attachment of this kind could, in the case of Christians, give rise to any serious religious danger, is hard to conceive, and, as a matter of fact, not much use has been made of the above possibility in more recent attempts to solve the riddle of Hebrews.

be not a true letter, but a theological homily, as among others Reuss, Deissmann, and quite recently the late Wrede,⁵ have asserted, there is no further explanation required for this peculiarity than the individual taste or preference of the author. We hardly believe, however, that this view, even after Wrede's skillful advocacy, will gain wide acceptance. The epistolary conclusion of the document is against it, and to declare this the product of an afterthought of the writer is a critical *tour de force*.

But, if we are dealing with a true letter, then the reason for the prominence and pervasiveness of the ritual element must be sought with the readers, not with the author in the first place. And here the new view has certainly made too light of the problem in hand. Von Soden held, and it has been extensively repeated after him, that the whole comparison between the two covenants and the two rituals serves no other than a mere theoretical purpose; it is simply the most convenient argument by means of which the writer seeks to convince the readers of the ideal character of Christianity as the perfect religion. The aim is nowhere to depreciate the old covenant, but exclusively to exalt the new. The Old Testament was the only Scripture to which the author could resort in theological argument, hence what more natural than that he should make extensive use of it? But is this really an adequate explanation? The problem is not why the writer operates so largely with the Old Testament, nor even why he so insistently places the new dispensation above the old, but, far more specifically, why he proceeds in both respects in such a peculiar way as to concentrate his argument almost exclusively upon the question of priesthood and sacrifice. By a mere dependence on the Old Testament this can scarcely be accounted for. There are after all many other important things in the Old Testament besides the ritual. We find it impossible to believe that the purport of the entire comparison is purely theoretical, that its concrete character does not stand in any connection whatever with

⁵ *Das literarische Rätsel des Hebräerbriefts*, 1906.

the practical difficulty of the readers. Let us grant that the modern view has succeeded in overthrowing the notion of a threatened relapse into Judaism and an argument aimed at preventing this is, after all, no more than a negative conclusion; as to the positive problem what the whole discussion of priesthood and ritual is for, we are left in the dark. So far as we know the only serious attempt to throw light upon this subject is that made by Kögel in his treatise, "*The Hidden Character of Jesus as the Messiah, the Problem of the Epistle to the Hebrews*", 1899,⁶ a treatise which in our opinion has not received the attention it deserves. Kögel's trend of thought is as follows. The author addresses himself to readers who were in a deplorable spiritual condition due to religious externalism. What he offers them is intended as an antidote against this fundamental defect. More particularly the externalism of the readers had assumed a Christological form, whence the writer immediately places the figure of the Son in the foreground. There was a lack of appreciation of the true spiritual value of Christ's Person and work. In the second chapter it appears to what cause this was specifically due. From the fifth verse onward the writer is occupied with demonstrating the reasonableness and necessity of the humiliation, the sufferings and death of Christ. The readers evidently had shrunk from the idea of the Saviour's humiliation, and they shrank from this because of the thought of extreme glory they associated with the conception of Messiahship. Already in the second chapter the subject of the priesthood of Christ is lightly touched upon (vss. 17, 18), and that for the purpose of convincing the readers of the necessity of Christ's earthly humiliation and weakness. This renders it probable that in the sequel also the elaborate presentation of the same theme will be in some way intended to meet the same difficulty. The first reference to a topic which lay uppermost in a writer's mind would almost inevitably reflect the point of

⁶ Cf. also, by the same author, *Der Sohn und die Söhne, eine exegetische Studie zu Hebräer*, ii, 5-18, 1904, reviewed in this REVIEW, July 1905.

view from which he had been mainly considering it. As a matter of fact, the author does handle the theme of the priesthood of Christ in the sequel so as to make it meet an objection arising from the externalistic prepossessions of the readers. As they took exception to the humiliation, so they took exception to the exaltation of the Saviour, not of course as such, but because it involved His absence, invisibleness, the unostentatious character of his ministry in a remote sphere. On earth the Messiah's glory was veiled by His lowliness, in heaven it is withdrawn from sight through His exaltation. But the disposition which finds fault with both is in each case in principle the same: it is the desire to see, to have near, to touch, in a word, religious externalism. Now in order to meet this, the writer follows the same method he had followed in the second chapter. He explains that the very point of objection constitutes the source of value and efficacy in the Saviour's career. The invisibleness, the remoteness of the present activity of Jesus, far from interfering with its efficacious character, is precisely the ground of the latter. And for the purpose of doing this no better plan could possibly have been pursued than to represent Christ's work under the aspect of a ministration in the heavenly sanctuary. The whole discussion of the priesthood serves primarily the end of justifying the necessity of Christ's heavenly state of existence and heavenly mode of ministry. It is intended to bring out the superiority of the spiritual, invisible, as over against the sensual, and visible. Because he desired to work out this contrast, and for no other reason, the author has drawn the elaborate comparison with the Old Testament ritual within the scope of his argument. The Old Covenant, through the very externality and visible-ness and earthliness and temporalness of its institutions, furnished an admirable foil to exhibit the glories of the spiritual, invisible, heavenly, eternal aspect of the work of Christ. It was a mistake to infer from the historical comparison which the Epistle draws that the difficulty of the readers lay likewise in the historical sphere. Closely looked

at the whole historical comparison appears to be subservient to the setting forth of the theological contrast between the sensual and the spiritual worlds, and it is in connection with this latter antithesis that we must look for the writer's diagnosis of the evil he seeks to correct. The readers were not at fault in showing any preference for the forms of the Old Testament cult in the concrete, theirs was a spirit of externalism, which virtually reproduced the Old Testament standpoint, even though it involved no craving for the ceremonies of the Old Covenant religion.

It is interesting to observe that this view of Kögel follows closely along the lines of the view of Riehm in his well-known work on the *Teaching of Hebrews*. Riehm already recognized the main fault in the readers to which the Epistle addresses itself as religious externalism. He likewise perceived that this fault did not concern exclusively the question of ceremonial, but bore also a Christological and eschatological aspect. But with Riehm all this was still coupled with the old opinion that the readers were Jewish-Christians of Palestine, and that their externalism assumed the specific form of reliance on the sacrificial cult, still in existence at the time of writing. Dr. Kögel entirely dispenses with this, and besides, both in the thoroughness and in the originality with which the principle is carried out, advances far beyond Riehm. The nationality of the readers becomes entirely immaterial on his view. While in point of fact, over against the modern proposal to make them Gentile Christians, Dr. Kögel adheres to the old theory that they were Christians from the Jews, this has nothing to do with his main argument. He does not base this conviction on the prominence which the ritual conceptions of priesthood and sacrifice obtain in the Epistle, but on other grounds. Acceptance of his view by no means carries with it assent to this specific opinion. Religious externalism, while a typical fault of Judaism, was certainly not a fault to which Gentile Christians were immune.

The view just presented throws an interesting light on

the fact that the Epistle by preference calls Jesus high priest. It is true both priest and high priest are used. But the two are not used indiscriminately. Wherever priest is found there is a special reason for its appearance. High priest is the normal designation. In the quotations from the CXth Psalm it was necessary to use "priest" because the Messiah is there so designated in dependence on the title given to Melchizedek in Genesis. The only exception is Chap. v. 10, where the quotation, however, is somewhat free. Wherever the contrast is between the Melchizedek order and the Levitical order of priesthood, "priest" was, of course, specially in place (Cf. Chap. vii, up till verse 22, also viii. 4.) In Chap. x. 21 we would expect "high priest", but here probably the addition of the adjective μέγας made the prefix ἀρχι appear superfluous. But as a rule the author reveals a special interest in representing the Saviour as high priest, not merely as priest in general. The explanation for this will suggest itself on observing that the one transaction in the Old Testament ritual on which the Epistle dwells more than on any other feature and the act to which it makes the central act of Christ's priestly ministry correspond, is the entrance of the high priest into the holy of holies on the day of atonement. The Saviour is a high priest because in the discharge of his ministry He enters into heaven. This is of the very essence of his priestly work, whence also in Chap. vii. 26 the "made higher than the heavens" is placed, as one of the two great requisites, side by side with "separated from sinners", Cf. further iv. 14; vi. 20; viii. 1, 4; ix. 11; x. 25. But, if the subject of the priesthood is pointedly treated in such a way as to make it in its central aspect identical with entrance into heaven, then the inference lies near, that the whole discussion of this subject ultimately serves the purpose of showing the necessity of the exaltation, of the heavenly state of existence of the Saviour. There is reason, as has been shown, to believe that the readers took offense at this, because it clashed with their externalistic conception of Christ and his

work and with their practical desire for a visible, present Saviour. In answer to this the author emphasizes that the Saviour is a high priest and that as such the only place where He can properly dwell and effectually minister is the heavenly sanctuary.

The first and most general element entering into the author's conception of a priest is that of leadership based on identification with those who are led. A priest is one who stands at the head of others and thus mediates their approach unto God. Thus the movement of the priestly function is in a direction opposite to that of the prophetic function. The prophet officiates from God to man, represents God with man; the priest officiates from man to God, represents man with God. In the passage v. 1-10, which sets forth the qualifications of a high priest, this is expressed by the words: "Every high priest is appointed on behalf of men in things pertaining to God" (*τὰ πρὸς τὸν θεόν*, cf. ii. 17). Priesthood, however, is not leadership in general; it is distinctly leadership based on and involving identification of nature and experience. The rendering of the term *ἀρχηγός* in ii. 10 and xii. 2 by either "author" or "captain" is inadequate precisely for this reason, that it leaves the element of identification in experience unexpressed. While *ἀρχηγός* etymologically and according to usage may mean both "author" and "captain", the writer in the two passages cited attaches to it a more specific sense. The *ἀρχηγὸς τῆς σωτηρίας* is one who leads others unto salvation by himself treading the path of salvation before (cf. v. 7); the *ἀρχηγὸς τῆς πίστεως* is one who leads others to faith by himself exercising faith in an ideal manner. Similarly the *ἀρχηγὸς τῆς ζωῆς* in Peter's speech, Acts iii. 15, is not merely the Ruler of life, but the one who first entered into life for his own person and now dispenses life unto others. That the author of Hebrews uses the term with this specific connotation appears from the fact that elsewhere, where the content requires no reference to it, he contents himself with employing the quite general term

αἴτιος, v. 9, "author of salvation". The word πρόδρομος in vi. so shares with ἀρχηγός this reference to identification in experience, the "forerunner" being one who not merely leads and opens access, but also anticipates in himself the enjoyment of the access he mediates to others. Back, however, of the identification in experience lies the more fundamental identification of nature. The priestly leadership is such that it cannot be performed by one who stands outside of the circle in whose interests he serves. The author accordingly emphasizes in the definition of v. 1 *seqq.* that a high priest must be λαμβανόμενος ἐξ ἀνθρώπων "taken from among men". The force of the participle present should be noticed: "one who is constantly, in each case, taken from among men", the permanent force of the requirement thus being brought out, as Westcott has strikingly observed. In this respect the priesthood differs from the prophetic and in general the revealing office. Angels can be and have been revealing agents. In connection with the revealing work of Christ the author nowhere reflects upon the fact, of which the modern Christian consciousness is so apt to make overmuch, viz., that in order to perform this work properly Christ needed to be man. On the contrary, here all the emphasis is thrown upon the thought that the Son's unique greatness, his difference from, his exaltation above man constitutes his chief qualification for the revealership. As a revealer He represents not man but God, therefore the nearer He stands to God the better He is qualified. As a priest, on the other hand, He represents man and his qualification is measured by his nearness to man. It is of importance to notice this point, because in Judaism a tendency prevailed to place intermediate angelic beings between God and man, because direct contact between God and the world had come to be regarded as derogatory to the divine majesty. This tendency showed its influence not merely with regard to the manward movement of revelation, but likewise with regard to the Godward movement of religious approach, as *e. g.*, when the archangel Michael

is represented as ministering at the altar in the heavenly sanctuary. Our author not merely makes the high priest a man, but insists upon it that the very nature of his office requires him to be a man.

Back of the identification of experience and the identification of nature lies a still deeper one, that of spiritual relation to God. This finds expression in Chap. ii. 11, "He that sanctifies and they that are sanctified are all of One". "To sanctify" is the specific work of a priest, so that we may substitute: "The priest and those whom he serves as priest are all of One." But the "oneness" here spoken of does not relate to physical oneness through descent, as if by the *εἰς* Adam or Abraham were designated. It is a spiritual bond of unity, the One of whom all are is God. They are all sons of God in the religious sense, as appears clearly from the following quotations, by which the author shows that Christ is not ashamed to call them brethren, speaks of them as His children, and trusts in God His Father, as they trust in Him. Only, because they are one in this deeper, spiritual sense, it becomes necessary that they shall be identified in the common possession of flesh and blood. The author therefore adds this by way of inference in the 14th verse: "Since then the children are sharers in flesh and blood, He also in like manner partook of the same." And similarly on the participation in flesh and blood is built the further assimilation in all things, *i. e.*, in all experiences of human life according to verses 16, 17. In this passage, then, the three successive steps through which the priestly identification with the people passes are carefully marked.

To understand the reason for this identification we must first inquire into what the Epistle teaches concerning the connection between the covenant and the priesthood. Briefly this may be formulated to the effect that the priesthood is center and substance of the covenant, that in which the covenant actually subsists. The clearest expression this principle finds is in Chap. vii. 11-25, containing the com-

parison between the Levitical priesthood of the Old Covenant and the Melchizedek priesthood of the New Covenant. The two priesthoods are here compared from the point of view of their efficacy in giving "perfection", *τελείωσις*. The comparison of the priesthood passes over, however, almost imperceptibly, into a comparison of the two covenants, although the word *διαθήκη* is not used until verse 22. In the very first statement, verse 11, the centralization of the whole religious system in the priesthood finds striking expression, viz., through the parenthetical statement: "for the people under it hath received the law". This parenthesis serves to explain how a demand can be made of the priesthood that it shall lead to perfection. Perfection may be expected of every priesthood, because the whole religious system is centered in it; whatever is true of the system is true of the priesthood, and of course the system is a means to perfection. The priesthood was, as it were, the basis on which the entire structure of Old Testament religion had been reared *ἐπ' αὐτῆς ὁ λαὸς νενομοθέτηται*. The same thought finds formal expression in vs. 12, "Where there is a change of priesthood there is made of necessity a change also of law". The very fact that another priest, a priest of different lineage, arose, one not called after Aaron but after Melchizedek, this very fact proved that the organism of the covenant was being changed by God. The new priest was not simply an *ἄλλος* but a *ἕτερος*, something heterogeneous, we might say, to the law of the Old Covenant. The author proves this first in a rather external way, by the descent of Jesus, not from the priestly tribe of Levi, but from Judah. As soon as the priesthood is transferred from the priestly tribe to another tribe this betokens the breaking up of the old system. Then, however, he proceeds to show the same thing in a much broader and more fundamental way in verses 15-17.⁷ That the law changes with

⁷ The words *καὶ περισσότερον ἔτι καταδηλόν* at the beginning of verse 15 refer back to the proposition of verse 12, "where there is a change of priesthood there is made of necessity a change also of law" and *καταδηλόν* stands on a line with *προδηλόν* of vs. 14.

the priesthood is even more evident from the fact that the new priesthood introduced is of a totally different nature, such as the old law could never have produced. Here it is not merely the law of Levitical descent which is said to have been abrogated, but the law of fleshly descent in general, nay the legal character of the dispensation as a whole, because νόμος (notice the anarthrous κατὰ νόμον) is supplanted by δύναμις, verse 16. It is not a change of species within the genus, but a change of the genus itself. The new priest is ἱερεὺς ἕτερος not ἄλλος. With the appointment of Christ as priest after the order of Melchizedek there follows "the disannulling of a foregoing commandment" and this is equivalent to "the introduction of a better hope, through which we draw nigh unto God", *i. e.*, of a totally new religious position and outlook. All this already presupposes that the covenant and the priesthood hang inseparably together. Still it is worked out rather from the point of view that, under the Old Covenant, at least, the system, the law, the covenant created and determined the priesthood. In verse 20, however, the author proceeds beyond this point of view to a representation which makes the covenant depend on the priesthood, so far as the new covenant is concerned. The excellence of the new covenant is in proportion to the excellence of the priesthood as evidenced by the oath which God swore at its introduction.⁸ By so much as the oath lends weight to His priesthood, by so much also has Jesus become surety of a better covenant. It becomes very clear from this passage that in virtue of His priesthood Jesus is the ἑγγυος, "surety", of the new covenant. "Surety" means here the one who guarantees that the covenant shall accomplish what it is designed to accomplish. The idea stands in contrast to the inefficacy

⁸The point of the reference to the oath-swearing is that the new priesthood must be of supreme dignity and power, since God does not swear except in relations of extraordinary importance. The beginning of the Levitical priests lay not in an oath but in a legal ordinance. In their case law determined priesthood, hence the sequence is: oath—priesthood—covenant.

of the Old Covenant, which possessed no such guarantor. What the writer means is that Jesus by His supernatural personality, by His whole character affords the assurance that the covenant administered by Him will be efficacious.⁹ The place taken here by ἑγγυος is taken in Chaps. viii. 6, ix. 15, xii. 24, by μεσίτης "mediator". The μεσίτης is one who stands between parties, especially parties in discord, to bring about a union. But sometimes the word has a more specific sense, in which it approaches ἑγγυος and signifies the one who obligates himself to render the mediation effective. The word μεσέγγυος, which is the classical term for the Hellenistic μεσίτης, expresses by its very form the combination of these two ideas in one. It is not possible to determine with absolute certainty whether our author uses the term in the general or the more specific sense. In the former case Christ's work as μεσίτης might have reference only to the initiating of the covenant at the beginning, being distinct from his work as priest under or in the covenant. In Chap. ix. 19 *seqq.* the mediatorship of Christ is contrasted with the mediatorship of Moses. Now the mediatorship of Moses was something that was confined to the initiation of the covenant and in no wise identified with the priestly λειτουργία under the covenant performed by the Aäronites. Probably, however, the author did not mean to draw a hard and fast distinction between the μεσιτεία and ἱερωσύνη of Christ, whatever might be the case with Moses. The emphasis in Chap. ix. naturally falls on the mediatorship as a work of inauguration, because the covenant is here represented as a testament set in operation by the death of Christ. In Chaps. viii. 6 and xii. 24 the mediatorship certainly includes the continuous priestly ministration. And if the author made the mediatorship coëx-

⁹ The representation is a metaphorical one and should not be pressed so as to make it correspond in concrete detail with the forensic or commercial conception of the modus of the atonement. The old controversy as to whether Jesus became ἑγγυος with God for man, or with man for God, or in both capacities, lies outside of the scope of the passage.

tensive with the priesthood, it becomes probable that he ascribed to it the same assured, infallible character which the priesthood possesses, in other words that he conceived of the *μεσίτης* as a *μεσέγγυος*, as not merely endeavoring to unite but as guaranteeing and effecting the union between God and the people. Even the death of Christ, which set the testament in operation, made it operate with absolute certainty. Both terms, therefore, *μεσίτης* as well as *ἐγγυος*, are expressive of the principle that the priesthood hood is the heart and center of the covenant.

From what has been said it follows that the purpose of the priesthood can be accurately determined only in the light of the purpose of the covenant. Now the covenant is conceived of in the Epistle in a twofold way. On the one hand it is an instrumental institution, a means to an ulterior end, which end is variously described as salvation, rest, inheritance, arrival in the heavenly country or the city with the foundations, receiving of the unshakable kingdom. On the other hand it also appears as constituting in itself the ideal of religion realized, the perfect covenant being the consummate approach and nearness to God. As such it is the highest category of religion itself. On the whole, the Epistle follows the former representation. Back of the covenant lie the promises of God, and it is for the fulfilment of these promises that the covenant serves. Hence it is said that the covenant "is enacted upon better promises", viii. 6. This instrumental character of the covenant further appears from its relation to the idea of *τελειώσις* "perfection". The covenant and the priesthood are for the "perfecting" of men, *cpr.* vii. 19, ix. '9, x. 1. From this point of view they have merely to do with the removal of obstacles that keep man separated from God, and after these obstacles have ceased to exist might be conceived of as passing away, having become unnecessary. But, although this side stands in the foreground, the other side is by no means overlooked by the writer. In the passage he quotes from Jeremiah the reality of the covenant is placed in this, that Jehovah is a

God to Israel and Israel is to Jehovah a people, viii. 8-12. Believers are in virtue of the covenant "a household of God", iii. 6. Their life is essentially a *λατρεία*, a religious service, and this *λατρεία* is nothing else but the outward manifestation of the covenant, ix. 14. The covenant is also designated an "eternal covenant", xiii. 20, which implies that it embodies the religious ideal, since as a mere means to an end it could not be eternal. And what is true of the covenant is true of the priesthood. The priesthood also is viewed as embodying in itself the result of all instrumental processes, the attainment of the goal of all religion. Through the priest the people enter representatively into the sanctuary of perfect communion with God. Thus the priest not merely works in their interest, but also receives and enjoys in their behalf the fruit of his own labors. He dwells with God as the first heir of the blessedness to which his ministry has opened the way. And even after they themselves have attained to the position of the same religious privileges he may still be conceived as retaining the old preëminence and as continuing in this function, because in Him the actual approach to God is concentrated in a single point and made externally visible. Thus, according to Chap. xii. 24, the priesthood has its place among the eternal realities of the heavenly world, it forms part of the abiding things believers have "come unto". And the Saviour is called "a priest forever after the order of Melchizedek" because to his ministration there is no end.

Now, insofar as the priesthood is viewed alongside of the covenant as eternalized, it in a certain sense extends beyond and appears detachable from redemption. Christ will remain a priest even after redemption shall have fully run its course. To this idea, which undoubtedly has a solid basis in the Epistle, an interesting speculation has attached itself, for which the authority of the Epistle can hardly be claimed. If the priesthood extends beyond the redemptive stage, why, it is asked, should it not in the author's conception have preceded, both logically and chronologically, the redemptive

stage? Why not conceive of a head, an ἀρχηγός, a priest of unfallen humanity, furnishing the point of contact between men and God, gathering up in Himself the united concerns of men with God, voicing their religious approach to God in its various forms of expression? May not the author have followed Philo, who in some such general sense invests his Logos with priestly character, although here the redemptive phase is entirely lacking? From more than one side it has been affirmed that the Epistle's teaching on the priesthood actually has this wider background of a representative relation apart from sin. It is especially Westcott who by his advocacy of it has given a certain vogue to this view. According to him in the general scheme of Christ's relation to the world, the atonement is a mere incident, a modification made necessary through the entrance of sin. If sin had not entered, the Son would none the less have become the religious head and leader of the human race, and would just as much have become incarnate to discharge this function as He is now under the redemptive economy. Westcott bases this favorite idea of his on two or three passages and does not allow sufficient weight to the fact that it is rather discountenanced than favored by the general trend of the Epistle's teaching on the priesthood of Christ. From the everlasting and intrinsic significance of the priesthood of Christ we may perhaps infer, that in a world without sin there would be a priest to lead and represent humanity in its approach to God, but that in such a case this priest would be the incarnate Son the Epistle gives us no reason to suppose. So far as the priesthood of Christ is concerned, the author everywhere speaks in soteriological terms. In the definition of Chap. v. 1 it is expressly stated that the high priest is appointed to offer both gifts and sacrifices for sins. If the correct reading here be δῶρά τε καὶ θυσίας ὑπὲρ ἁμαρτιῶν, the "for sins" belongs only to θυσίας and the δῶρα will appear as not directly connected with sins. The unusual sequence, "gifts and sacrifices", instead of "sacrifices and gifts", might seem

to favor this. If, on the other hand, the $\tau\acute{\epsilon}$ be stricken out, both gifts and sacrifices are affirmed to be "for sins".¹⁰ But even on the former view it does not immediately follow that, because the gifts are not gifts for sins, the need of a high priest for offering them, has nothing to do with the presence of sin. Non-atoning gifts require a priest, not, perhaps, because a priest is absolutely and under all circumstances necessary, in every human approach to God, but simply, it may be, because sinful man cannot directly bring any gift, not even a non-atoning offering, without a priestly mediator. Westcott's conclusion, therefore, as if the passage taught that "man needs an appointed mediator even to bring his gifts to God", is not warranted. Only when for "man" we substitute "sinful man" can we be certain that we do not go beyond the intent of the author. In Chap. ii. 17 "the things pertaining to God" are likewise more closely defined by the following clause: "to make propitiation for the sins of the people". In Chap. vii. 25 the effect of the unchangeable priesthood of Christ is placed in this, that He can save to the uttermost. The main act of Christ's high-priestly work was the entering in, once for all, into the heavenly holy place, and by this He obtained eternal redemption, ix. 12. The purpose of his priesthood is to cleanse the heavenly things by sacrifice, ix. 23. And all that is said in Chaps. ix. and x. about the sacrificial work of Christ presupposes that it has reference to sin.

Westcott appeals to Chap. i. 2, God made the Son "heir of all things". This heirship, he thinks, must be an heirship of the world as such and under all circumstances, not merely an heirship contingent on and determined by redemption, because it corresponds to the mediatorial activity of the Son in creation: "Whom He made heir of all things, through whom He also (*i. e.*, in correspondence with the part assigned to Him in the consummation of the world) made the worlds". As to this last point it might well be

¹⁰ In chap. viii. 3, where the same phrase occurs with the $\tau\acute{\epsilon}$, the reading does not vary.

urged that the correspondence expressed by the "also" is fully preserved when the inheritance of the world on the part of the Son is understood as a redemptive inheritance. As God made the Son the mediator of creation, so He made Him the heir of redemption. The parallelism does not require, that the world shall be inherited by Christ as a purely-created, *i. e.*, natural, world, as distinguished from redemption. But, altogether apart from this, we must make the two strictures that heirship is not equivalent to priesthood and that heirship, if kept separate from redemption, does not involve incarnation. The Son could become heir of the (sinless) world without becoming man; He could not be priest of even such a world without being man. The context does not speak of the Son as incarnate Son exclusively; some of the predicates given Him obviously go back to the state of preëxistence, so that, if the thought of hypothetical heirship of the world under all conditions be found here, there is no need to join with it the thought of incarnation under all circumstances. The passage, therefore, teaches nothing of a priesthood of the Son which He would have discharged in the flesh as the incarnate head of an unfallen race. Nor is such an idea found in another passage quoted by Westcott in support of his view, *viz.*, Chap. ii. 5-10. Here, we are told, the inheritance of the world to come which the exalted Christ receives appears as the realization of the destiny set before the human race at creation according to the words of the VIIIth Psalm. Therefore, the reasoning is, even before the fall in the creation-design of the world it was contemplated that the race should reach its destiny through the incarnation of the Son of God. On this we would comment as follows: If the words of the Psalm on "the Son of Man" were taken by the author of Hebrews as a direct reference to Christ the Messianic Son of Man, a view actually held by not a few commentators, then the passage would actually lend support to Westcott's contention. For in that case it would affirm, that in setting the destiny of the world at creation, God had assigned the

sovereignty over the world to his Son, and that as Son of Man, *i. e.*, as incarnate Son. In other words, provision would have been made from the outset for the incarnation. Even then, however, the question might be raised, whether we had anything more here than a sort of supralapsarian representation, in which creation appears as subordinated to redemption, and therefore subordinated to redemptive heirship, not to non-redemptive heirship. But, as a matter of fact, this personal Christological interpretation of the phrase "Son of Man" is almost certainly incorrect. Westcott himself does not follow it. He assumes, and in our opinion quite correctly, that the writer of Hebrews interprets the "Son of Man" of the Psalm as referring to humanity generically. What the writer therefore affirms on the basis of the Psalm is that at the creation sovereignty over the world was destined to the human race. Up to verse 9 the "Man" and "Son of Man" of which he speaks is not an individual, not Christ, but mankind. Then in the 9th verse he makes the affirmation, that the fulfilment of this promise given to mankind originally, can be in principle beheld in the exalted Christ. But this is entirely an *à-posteriori* statement. The author by no means affirms that, contingently speaking, if sin had not entered, the form of fulfilment of the promise given to the race, would have been the same as it is now. This was a purely speculative question, which he hardly put to himself. It is quite true, God must have known from the very first, when He instituted the order of creation with its implied promise to the race, what would be the concrete form it was to assume in its realization. But God also knew from the very first, that sin would come into the world. Beyond the common supralapsarian representation this does not carry us; it does not demonstrate, that there was a divine purpose or promise to make the Son the human heir of humanity's destiny apart from sin and redemption. And even, though all this were to be overlooked, it would still have to be remembered that not the priesthood of Christ, but rather his royal office, his lordship over the world to come, is here spoken of. Application of the principle ex-

pressed to the priesthood would have to rest on inference.

Leaving, then, this speculation to one side and keeping ourselves within the limits set by the explicit statements of the Epistle itself, we are now prepared to answer the question why the priest must be identified with the people in the manner indicated above. Both for the absolute and for the instrumental significance of his office this is necessary. If He is to express in His own Person the nearness of men to God, then He must obviously partake of human nature, since otherwise no direct contact between God and man could be established. A priest who was not man would make a separation between the two parties in the covenant, just as a revealer who was not "the Son" would fall short of bringing the ideal direct speech of God to mankind. Whatever such a priest might do for the covenant in other directions, he could not realize in himself the consummation of the covenant in which God and man directly meet without any intervening agent of a different nature. This is the meaning of Christ's being ἀρχηγός and πρόδρομος. As He fulfills the destiny of the race in His lordship over the world to come, so He fulfills its destiny in entering upon the closest contact with God. He is within the veil. If we draw nigh to God it is through the fresh and living way He Himself has dedicated. Hence also it is not human nature in the abstract that is demanded for Jesus, but human nature placed in that specific spiritual relation to God which is expressed by the ideas of Sonship and faith, as the quotations in Chap. ii. 11-13 prove.

Most of the statements of the Epistle, however, bring the necessity of the identification of Jesus with human nature and human experience into connection with the instrumental aspect of His priesthood. The possession of human nature was necessary for the great act of sacrifice which consisted in His death. In a subsequent article we intend to discuss the much-mooted question, whether the writer represents Jesus as acting with reference to his death in the capacity of a priest or rather makes the priesthood begin with the entrance into heaven, so that the death would be excluded

from it. It is not necessary to prejudge this question here, because, even in case the answer were given in favor of the latter opinion, still the death would remain the necessary basis of the subsequent priestly ministration in heaven, and what is indispensable for the act of dying is indispensable for the priesthood resting thereon. In two passages at least Christ's partaking of human nature is treated from this point of view that it created the possibility for His death and through it the possibility for His subsequent priestly work. These passages are Chap. ii. 14 and Chap. x. 5-7. The former teaches that the Son became partaker of flesh and blood, that through death He might bring the devil to nought. The latter declares that a body was prepared for the Messiah in order that thus He might be enabled to execute the will of God concerning his sacrificial death. Still this by no means exhausts what the Epistle teaches under this head. For to the *προσφέρειν* "offering" belongs more than the self-surrender in death; its culminating part is the self-presentation in heaven. It is not merely necessary that a sacrifice be slain; it is equally necessary that the sacrifice be brought into the immediate presence of God as He dwells in the heavenly tabernacle. The sacrifice is not completed until this is done. This is not a result of the sacrifice; it is an integral part of the sacrificial transaction itself. And that this must be done by man, by a priest who is man, follows from the intimate connection between the two acts of self-surrender and self-presentation. Both together constitute one God-ward movement; what is necessary for the one is necessary for the other. If he who dies the sacrificial death must be a man, then he who presents the sacrifice in heaven must be a man, the latter being but the carrying out of the former. In connection with this aspect of the matter, it is true, the author does not dwell so much on the possession of human nature by Christ in the abstract, but rather on the possession by Him of human nature in a sinless state. But the one presupposes the other. The very point which the Epistle brings out is that no sinner, even if he had an adequate sacrifice of expiation,

could accomplish anything effectual by means of it, because, being a sinner, he would not be able to bring it near to God. The act of presentation being integral to the sacrifice, being required to complete it, could not be allowed to anticipate the effect of the completed sacrifice. And yet such would be the case, if a sinful man could come near to God to present his own expiatory offering. The privilege of drawing near would involve that the sacrifice had been accomplished, while as a matter of fact it was still incomplete. Consequently there must be a sinless one to appear before God in the place of man. While in Chap. iv. 25 the words "without sin" are not added for any specific reason, but simply to guard the perfection of the Person of Christ in general, as a saving clause to the preceding statement, that He was tempted in all things like unto us, in Chap. vii. 26 the Saviour's sinlessness is brought into direct connection with His priesthood and that from the point of view of His presence as a priest in heaven. The predicates here enumerated are not in the first place associated in the writer's mind with Jesus' earthly life under temptation; they rather describe what He is at present in His glorified state as the "become higher than the heavens" at the close indicates.¹¹

It was not, however, for the purpose of becoming capable of death alone that the Son had to assume human nature. There is a much wider range of human experience which constitutes an important preparation for the discharge of the instrumental aspect of His priesthood. This will be the first subject for consideration in a subsequent article.

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¹¹ It might be objected to the foregoing that in Chap. v. 2, 3 the qualification of the Old Testament high priest is in part sought precisely in this, that he is himself also compassed with infirmity and by reason thereof bound to offer for his sins. But the author is led to this statement only by his desire to emphasize the importance of sympathy. What was a relative qualification in the case of the typical priesthood of the Old Covenant becomes a disqualification for the ideal priesthood as realized in Christ. In point of fact, the main reason why the Old Testament priests were not ideal, truly effective priests lies in this, that they stood in need of offering for their own sins. They bore that in themselves which virtually annulled their priestly character, vii. 27, ix. 7.

THOMAS BOSTON.

Exactly two hundred years ago on the first day of May Thomas Boston entered on his Ettrick ministry. The day is memorable in the history of Scotland as that on which the Union between England and Scotland was finally consummated. In his *Memoirs*¹ Boston makes reference to the two events. The Union was regarded with anything but favour by the great majority of the Scottish people though it proved an incalculable blessing to Scotland, and two hundred years after its consummation we are being reminded by able articles in our leading journals of the feelings with which the people of 1706 and 1707 received the proposals for union. But the Scotland of to-day is more inclined to commemorate the event with rejoicings than to regard it as a calamity. Synchronising as has been noticed with this important event was the induction of the Rev. Thomas Boston to the parish of Ettrick. It, too, is an event that claims the attention not only of Scotsmen but of Presbyterians the wide world over. And already steps are being taken to commemorate the bi-centenary of the induction of Boston to the parish which was privileged to enjoy the oversight of one of the most renowned pastors that ever stood in a Scottish pulpit. But renowned as Boston was as a pastor and preacher, his fame as a student and scholar travelled beyond the bounds of his own church and country. Dr.

¹ "On the first day of May I was admitted minister of Ettrick; a day remarkable to after ages as the day in which the Union of Scotland and England commenced, according to the articles thereof agreed upon by the two parliaments. And on that very account I had frequent occasion to remember it; the spirits of the people of that place being embittered on that event against the ministers of the church; which was an occasion of much heaviness to me, though I never was for the Union; but always against it from the beginning unto this day." *Memoirs*, p. 208. The edition of the *Memoirs* quoted is that edited by Rev. G. H. Morrison and published by Oliphant, Anderson, and Ferrier, Edinburgh, 1899.

James Walker, who is a competent judge, has borne eloquent testimony to Boston's scholarship.² And even such a writer as the late Rev. Henry G. Graham in his *Social Life of Scotland in the Eighteenth Century* is constrained to bear testimony to Boston's remarkable influence though he refers to his theology in the flippant style common to writers of his school. "Notwithstanding much that seems extravagant to us," he says, "and melancholy in Mr. Boston, he was a man of ability and of great influence in his day; he was a powerful preacher of the grim school, the representative of a prominent type of thought and feeling; he moved the hearts and expressed the faith of a large proportion of the people throughout the country, who thumbed his *Crook in the Lot* and his *Fourfold State* with endless edification. Peasants and farmers read them by their peat fires, and shepherds on the solitary silent hills; his smaller works were the favourite chapbooks of pedlars, and the twelve portly tomes that contained his theological expositions were found in many a manse library and on the bookshelves of every Seceding minister long after the century was closed." (Vol. II, p. 80.) This may be regarded as a fitting time and place to make some reference to his place among Scottish preachers and theologians and to the part he played in some of the great controversies that agitated the Church of Scotland during his day.

² "At Simprin he had mastered the French language that he might have an entrance into French theological literature; but he seems to have been yet unacquainted with Hebrew. At the time he came to Ettrick, he tells us he borrowed a 'piece of the Hebrew Bible containing the books of Samuel and Kings' and with that set himself to the study of the 'Holy Tongue'. After a while he bought for himself the whole Hebrew Scriptures. 'This', he says, 'was the happy year wherein I was first master of a Hebrew Bible'. And now he 'plied the Hebrew original close and with great delight'. I need not tell at length how he ran the course of Hebrew scholarship till he became an enthusiast on the subject of Hebrew accentuation and wanted to publish it . . . He was the best Hebrew scholar in Scotland as he was the freshest and most powerful of Scottish living theologians. And I have been told by the most competent scholar of our country that he regards Boston's work as one of sterling value and not yet out of date." Walker's *Scottish Theology and Theologians*,² p. 321.

At the outset some reference must be made to his remarkable *Memoirs*, for, after all, it is here we find Boston as he was. Scottish religious literature is by no means barren in autobiography. The *Autobiography and Diary* of James Melvill is invaluable to the student of Scottish ecclesiastical history for the period which it covers and the *Memoirs* of the Rev. James Fraser of Brea is a rich storehouse of spiritual experience, fragrant still with the sweet incense of prayer. But it may be said that Boston's *Memoirs* combines in a remarkable degree the distinguishing features of Melvill's *Autobiography* and Fraser's *Memoirs*. The graphic pen pictures of persons, the happy descriptions of events in which Melvill was such a master are all characteristic of Boston's *Memoirs*, while on the other hand the deep religious experience of Fraser of Brea combined as it is with rare power in spiritual analysis and sane outlook on the remarkable phenomena of the spiritual life will be met with in Boston's autobiography. The *Memoirs* was published in 1776, forty-four years after his death. It has been said the *Memoirs* was probably edited by his son, Thomas Boston, who succeeded his father at Ettrick and was latterly minister of the Relief Church at Jedburgh. But, as the Rev. George D. Low has pointed out, this could scarcely be the case, as Boston the younger died in 1767. In all likelihood it was the grandson of the elder Boston, Michael, who prepared the *Memoirs* for the press.³ In the "Address to his Children", which is prefixed to the *Memoirs*, Boston tells us that he left two autobiographic manuscripts.⁴ The one was entitled *Passages of my Life* and the other *General Account of my Life*. The first was begun shortly after his settlement at Ettrick, and additions were made to it from

³ See a very interesting article in *British Weekly*, Nov. 28, 1906, entitled "Thomas Boston: His Memoirs—Original Manuscripts," by Rev. Geo. D. Low, M.A., Edinburgh. A full account of the manuscripts of the *Memoirs* is given in this article, to which we are much indebted for the above. Mr. Low has decided to publish the *General Account of My Life*, and in all likelihood it will appear in the autumn of this year.

⁴ Morrison ed. of *Memoirs*, p. 1.

time to time during his ministry till it was completed in October in 1730. In this he incorporated passages from a diary and other incidents he had previously taken note of. The second manuscript, the *General Account*, was begun in December, 1729, and completed in October, 1730. To both of these Boston added some passages afterwards. In the first edition of the *Memoirs* (1776) Michael Boston states in a note, "in preparing this work for the press, it was judged absolutely necessary, in order to prevent repetition, and references from the one volume to the other, to reduce both into one continued narrative or history, taking care all along to insert the *Passage of His Life* in the *General Account* in their proper places, according to their respective dates and years and as the nature of the subjects treated of required." The manuscripts of these two works were to remain in Boston's family—"the property thereof to be vested from time to time, in such an one of them, if any such there shall be, as shall addict himself to the holy ministry." In accordance with this wish, the manuscripts passed to his son Thomas and from him to Michael Boston, who died in 1785. Brown of Whitburn had evidently perused one of the manuscripts, and from the materials gathered by him it is now known that it was the *General Account* he had seen. But from 1785 nothing was known of what had become of this manuscript. The Rev. George Low, already referred to, having heard that the manuscript was still in existence, took steps to procure it, and was successful in his search. A number of changes, not improvements in all cases at least, were made by the editor in the first edition.⁵ A number of editions of the *Memoirs* has appeared since. They constitute the twelfth volume of his collected works published in 1854.

⁵ Boston wrote *dovering*, his grandson substituted *slumbering*; *river* becomes *tear*; *allanerly*, *solely*; *coupling over*, *falling down*; *moyen*, *interests*; *din*, *noise*; *spunk*, *spark*; *bent sail*, *bent*; *feckless mints* to *duty*, *silly essays* at *duty*. Of the errors of the first edition perpetuated in the subsequent editions one instance may be given "*convened in the mass*," whereas Boston wrote "*convened in the manse*." Other interesting omissions are given in the *British Weekly* in the article already referred to.

Probably the best edition is that edited by Rev. G. H. Morrison and published in 1899.⁶ The *Memoirs* is addressed to his children, and in the address, as originally written, there are a few sentences that do not appear in the printed editions. "Let not my recording the lowness of my beginning offend you," he says; "for the lower I perceive the same to have been, it affords me the greater joy and rejoicing in that God, who hath done all things for me . . . As to what you may find recorded concerning any of ourselves; that ye would not wish; they were steps of providence to me, and may be useful to you through grace. The manuscripts, you will easily perceive, are not design'd for public view; and they are left in your own power. Moreover you would consider me writing them, as leaving this world, to have no more a portion in what is done under the sun, and as going into the other world, where many things here reckoned considerable, are of no weight nor value at all."

Thomas Boston was born in the little town of Duns which has the honour of being the birthplace of men renowned in the ecclesiastical world. Tradition says John Duns Scotus was a native of the parish; it is also the birthplace of Thomas MacCrie, the well known biographer of Knox. It was in 1676 that Boston first saw the light. While still a boy his father was cast into prison for nonconformity, and Thomas spent a night with him; the memory of which often haunted him in after years. He was early sent to school, "and having a capacity for learning and being of a towardly disposition," was kindly treated by the good dame who taught him first to master the mysteries of the alphabet. At the age of seven he tells us he read his Bible and had delight in reading it.⁷ In 1684 or 1685 he went to the grammar school of his native town and while at this school he was a

⁶ *Memoirs of the Life, Time, and Writings of the Reverend and Learned Thomas Boston, A.M.*, sometime minister at Simprin, afterwards at Ettrick. New Edition with Introduction and Notes by the Rev. George H. Morrison, M.A., Dundee. Edinburgh, and London: Oliphant, Anderson, and Ferrier, 1899.

⁷ "Meanwhile I know nothing induced me to it, but the natural vanity of my mind: and curiosity as about some scripture histories. However,

diligent attender at public worship and gave what attention would be expected from a boy to the ministrations of the Episcopal incumbent. In 1687 he was taken by his father to a Presbyterian meeting in the Newton of Whitsome. The preacher was the Rev. Henry Erskine, the father of Ebenezer and Ralph, the two famous Secession preachers, and Boston heard for the first time a voice that called him to the consideration of eternal realities.⁸ The sermons that most impressed him were preached from the texts "O generation of vipers who hath warned you to flee from the wrath to come?" and "Behold the Lamb of God who taketh away the sin of the world". After this he regularly attended Henry Erskine's ministry at Revelaw, which was about four miles from Duns. "In the summer time", he says, "company could hardly be missed; and with them something to be heard, especially in the returning, that was for edification, to which I listened; but in the winter, sometimes it was my lot to go alone, without so much as the benefit of a horse to carry me through Blackadder water, the wading whereof in sharp frosty weather I very well remember. But such things were then easy, for the benefit of the word, which came with power." In the maturer experience of after years he looks back and reviews the fervent feelings of these early days and found that he was "raw and unexperienced, had much weakness and ignorance, and much of a legal disposition and way, then, and for a good time after, undiscerned", but yet he could honestly say that he "was in good earnest concerned for a saving interest in Jesus Christ". It may be interesting at this place to quote Boston as to the progress he had made at the grammar school and the subjects that were taught in such schools in Boston's time. "I learned the Latin rudi-

I am thankful, that it was at all made my choice early; and that it hath been the study of my ripest years, with which I would fain close my life if it were His will." *Memoirs*, p. 7.

⁸ Years afterwards in referring to this event he says: "Little wast thou thinking, O my soul, on Christ or thyself when thou went to the Newton of Whitsome to hear a preaching. When Christ first dealt with thee; there thou got an unexpected cast." *Soliloquy of Man Fishing*. Works V., p. 11.

ments, Despauter's grammar, and all the authors, in verse or prose, then usually read in schools; and profited above the rest of my own class, by means of whom my progress was more slow. And before I left the school, I, generally, saw no Roman author, but what I found myself in some capacity to turn into English: but we were not put to be careful about proper English. Toward the end of that time, I was also taught Vossius's *Elements of Rhetoric* and 15th May 1689 began the Greek, learned some parts of the New Testament, to wit, some part of John, of Luke, and of the Acts of the Apostles."⁹ Boston was at this time only between thirteen and fourteen years of age, so that it will be admitted that he had made fair progress in education. Young Boston's mind was now set on the ministry, but his father not having sufficient means to give him a university education, the door seemed shut in his face. But neither father nor son gave up hope altogether. Sometimes the way looked so dark that Boston thought of turning to a trade, but his father would not hear of it. At length after two years the way was opened and Boston entered Edinburgh University in 1691. Of his life at the University we know little, except that he applied himself with diligence in the pursuit of knowledge and practised economy to such an extent that at the end of his Arts course his expenses only amounted to £11. The result of this rigid economy bore fruit in after years in the weakly constitution that made life a heavy burden to him many a day. In 1694 he graduated in arts and in the same year he received the bursary of the Presbytery of Duns. In the following year he began his theological course and spent one session at the university. It was allowable in his time for a student who had attended the theological classes for one session and who desired to support himself by teaching to complete his studies under the superintendence of the Presbytery. Boston determined on this course and after one month's experience of teaching in Glencairn he was appointed tutor in 1696 to the stepson of

⁹ *Memoirs*, p. 12.

Lieutenant-Colonel Bruce of Kennet, at the salary of a hundred marks per annum. The Bruces of Kennet were the ancestors of the present Lord Balfour of Burleigh, the distinguished Scottish statesman. While at Kennet Boston did not hide his light under a bushel. The master and mistress being away from home he thought it his duty to keep family worship with the members of the household, while he catechised the servants, pressed the careless to secret prayer and reproved and warned against sinful practices. He reported the conduct of two servants to the lady, and as they were guilty of cursing and swearing after repeated admonitions he advised her that it was her duty to reform them, and if they still refused, to dismiss them from her service. This she promised to do, but when the term day came she dismissed the only two servants who had any show of religion, retaining the other two. Needless to say Boston felt this to be "very grievous", but it did not keep him from acting as a faithful monitor to the domestics at Kennet House, for he tells us that one Saturday night the servants had set a fire in the hall for drying their clothes, which they had been washing and which were to remain there until the Sabbath was over. "Grieved with this profanation of the Lord's Day", he says, "I spoke to the gentlewoman: who insinuating, that she had not done without orders what she had done, refused to remove them: whereupon I spoke to the lady, who soon caused remove the clothes and dispose them otherwise."¹⁰ He also took good care that his pupil would not neglect attendance at church; hearing one day that he was not going to the means of grace, Boston made inquiries about the matter, with the result "both the mother and son went to church that day". But Kennet was one of Boston's Ebenezers, where his Lord abundantly blessed him. Writing of this period of his life in his *Memoirs* he says: "The time I was at Kennet, continues to be unto me a remarkable time among the days of my life. Once I fainted there, being on my knees at evening

¹⁰ *Memoirs*, p. 26.

secret-prayer. . . . It was a time of much trouble to me, yet in the main a thriving time for my soul." He left Kennet in February 1697 and in June of the same year he was licensed by the Presbytery of Duns and Chirnside. For two years Boston remained without a call; heritors who did not understand the spiritual teaching of the young preacher and who by no means relished faithful preaching in the pulpit did their best to keep the people from having the man of their choice. At last in 1699 he received a call from the parish of Simprin, and on the 21st September of that year he was ordained to the office of the ministry. A minister could scarcely have entered on a more forbidding sphere of labour. The people were grossly ignorant, and as a result there was a chilling indifference to the exercises of the sanctuary. Nothing daunted, the young minister accepted the call, and as a keynote to his ministerial labours preached his first sermon from the text—"For they watch for your souls as they that must give account". And from that day there was a watching for souls that hallowed forever Simprin in his memory. He devoted his time to pastoral visitation, studying, praying with and for his people. He instituted prayer meetings and catechisings and gradually the blighting frosts of a long and dreary spiritual winter began to show signs of passing away. To use the Scriptural figure, "instead of the thorn there had come up the fir tree, and instead of the briar there had come up the myrtle". When he came to Simprin there was no family worship held in the place, but ere he left it worship was kept morning and evening in every home. Those earnest pleadings in secret were not unanswered, and the memory of those days drew from him in after years the acknowledgment: "Simprin was a field which the Lord had blessed; Simprin! O blessed be He for His kindness at Simprin." But diligent as Boston was as a pastor, he was no less diligent as a student. He read the *De Oeconomia Fæderum* of Witsius, and it is not too much to say that it left its impress on his theology. Another book that greatly influenced him was the first part

of the *Marrow of Modern Divinity*, to which reference will be made afterwards. His library was not princely in its treasures, but what he lacked in books he made up for in good, honest, original thinking. Booklovers will understand the following from his *Memoirs*: "The first parcel of books I got added to my small library was in the year 1702. The which year, in August, Mr. Simson aforesaid being in my closet, and looking at my book-press, smiled: the which from whatever principle he did it, touched me to the quick, being conscious of my want of a tolerable quantity. Among these were Zanchy's works, and Luther on Galatians, which I was much taken with: and Providence also laid to my hand, about that time, Beza's Confession of Faith. Most of the books mentioned in the 2nd, 3rd and 4th pages of my catalogue yet *in retentis* whose prices are set down with them, were purchased in that year, and the following 1703."¹¹ It was while at Simprin that he set to acquire a knowledge of French from a paper of rules given by a neighbour. He went through the book of Psalms in Hebrew and from the pulpit he delivered those remarkable sermons that were in after years to be used as the substance of the *Fourfold State*. In the quiet of his study he faced some of the deepest questions of theology, and we have his answers in his remarkable *Miscellaneous Questions and Tracts*.¹² It was while at Simprin he took to himself a wife. "Whenever I saw her," he says, "a thought struck through my heart about her being my wife." It was a married life in which love of husband and wife burned with a beautiful flame, but it was a life which was likewise checkered with sore sorrow. Five children were born to them at Simprin, and two of these were soon laid in the churchyard. In 1706 he received a call from Ettrick, and after serious consideration accepted it. The wrench from Simprin was painful in the extreme, and as he beheld the deep grief of his beloved and attached people, his tears mingled with theirs. "How could my eyes fail", he

¹¹ *Memoirs*, p. 169.

¹² *Works*, Vol. VI.

said, "to trickle down with tears." He bade farewell to them in those impressive words of his Master so suggestive of passing opportunity, "In the last day, that great day of the feast, Jesus stood and cried saying, If any man thirst, let him come unto me, and drink".

On May 1, 1707, Boston began his ministerial labours at Ettrick. He now set his face to a sea of troubles, and as one sees the timid student facing his difficulties one might well wonder from whence came the strong resolution that never faltered until the difficulties vanished or were completely conquered, and the only answer that suits the circumstances is that Boston had learned that "prayer moves the Hand which governs the world". There now began a ministry memorable in the annals of the Scottish pulpit. Through years of strenuous toil, beset with trials of no ordinary kind, the faithful pastor went out and in among his people, breaking to them the bread of life, comforting the sorrowing, chiding their wanderings, but relieving their pain. Boston soon learned that Ettrick was not Simprin. He felt, to use his own words, that he was now from home and that he was but beginning to be a minister of a parish. The people of his new charge, generally speaking, were "naturally smart, and of an uncommon assurance; self-conceited and censorious to a pitch, using an indecent freedom with church and state". Opposition came to him from three sources. First, there were the followers of Rev. John MacMillan, the minister of the United Societies (now represented by the Reformed Presbyterians)—these he regarded as a dead weight on his ministry, though in its closing years the opposition was not so marked; the second source of opposition was a heritor supported by two elders, all of whom forsook attendance on the means of grace, though the heritor appears to have relented after Boston had received the call to Closeburn; the third source of trouble was the congregation, which was open to the influences brought to bear on it by the foregoing parties. It is almost needless to add, in view of the above account, that the Sabbath sermons were coldly

received, "but remarkable", says Boston, "was the pricking up of ears when anything relative to the public fell in; which was a wounding observe to me". But after years of strenuous toil the faithful pastor could bear testimony to the remarkable change that had come over the people: "They are by far more polished", he says, "in their manners than at that time and much more tractable and easy to me; and fewer scandals fall out among them. The old dissenters continue immovable; but their increasing is ceased". When it is remembered that Boston was "naturally timorous and diffident", the task before him at Ettrick seems too Herculean for a man of his disposition to face, but being a man whose life was steeped in prayer and "eager in pursuit when once engaged", he set his face to the high mountains that lay between him and the fruitful plains of his ardent hopes, and for him, like Napoleon, there were no Alps.

The parish to which Boston was called is a rural one in Selkirkshire. It is a place full of interesting traditions; to students of English literature it recalls James Hogg, "the Ettrick Shepherd". But to the student of ecclesiastical history it will be always linked with the name of Thomas Boston. During the time of the persecutions many conventicles were held among the mountains of Ettrick. Peden and Renwick preached at Birkenhope, Dobb's Linn and Talla Linn, and in this way a leaven of godliness was introduced. So that some of the families who had known the truth as it is in Jesus relished the preaching of Boston and did their best to protect him from the malice of his enemies. In the midst of all his trials Boston did not relinquish his studies, for we find the following entry in his *Memoirs* for the year 1711: "This was the happy year wherein I was first master of a Hebrew Bible and began the study of it." And all along it continued to be his "darling study". In the following year, 1712, the Church of Scotland found herself face to face with a new controversy over the Abjuration Oath. Scotland had now lost her Parliament through the Union of 1707, and the English Parliament—or perhaps

more correctly the British Parliament—passed an Act in 1712 imposing the Oath of Abjuration upon all ministers. The intention of the Oath was to safeguard the Queen and secure the Protestant succession to the crown. But if this were all none would have been more willing to take the oath than the Scottish ministers. It so happened, however, that the Oath was based upon two Acts passed by the English Parliament before the Union, in which it was expressly stipulated that the reigning sovereign should belong to the Church of England. Apart altogether from the excusable hatred of the more orthodox Presbyterians to “black pre-lacy”, the oath was inconsistent with the Treaty and Articles of Union. The matter came up before the General Assembly. It was at this time, under the leadership of William Carstares, a wise statesman, but one who was more governed by the principles of worldly-wise policy than by the simplicity that is in Christ. Boston gives an account of the discussion in the Assembly: “The lawfulness of the Abjuration Oath was debated *pro* and *con* in a committee of the whole house, betwixt the Scruplers and the Clear brethren. All I had thereby was, that the principles on which the answers to the objections were founded, seemed to me of such latitude, that by them almost any oath might pass. The parties were, at that time as I think, at the very point of splitting; till Mr. Carstairs, principal of the college of Edinburgh and clear for the oath, interposed and prevented the rupture; for the which cause I did always thereafter honour him in my heart. For all that I heard advanced to clear the difficulties about it, I still continued a Scrupler; and therefore a little before I came away home, the Act imposing the oath being printed and offered to me at the door of the assembly-house I bought it, on purpose to know exactly the penalty I was like to underlie. Being come home, I did this day spend some time in prayer for light from the Lord about that oath. And thereafter entering on to read the prints I had on it, in order to form a judgment about it, I immediately fell on the act, whereby it was first of all framed and

imposed; and finding thereby the declared intent of the oath to be, to preserve the act inviolable on which the security of the Church of England depends, I was surprised and astonished; and upon that shocking discovery, my heart was turned to loathe that oath which I had before scrupled." The penalty for refusing to take the oath was £500 more money, says Boston, than ever he had received as salary, but his mind was made up as to his course. The sorely tried pastor "being wrestled out of breath with the parish" looked forward to the impending banishment or whatever punishment the Government would inflict with equanimity as a relief out of his present distresses. At last the fateful day came, December 1,¹³ the last day for taking the oath, but the Government found so many Scruplers that they wisely refrained from exacting their fine. So passed away another dark cloud from the Ettrick pastor's firmament and Boston continued a Non-jurer till the day of his death.

It was in 1712 that Boston commenced the writing of the *Fourfold State*, and it is scarcely needful to say that it is as the author of this book that he is most widely known. Probably no theological book ever exercised such a mighty influence on the religious life of Scotland, and the sphere of its influence was not confined to Scotland alone, as Dr. Andrew Thomson in his *Thomas Boston of Ettrick: His Life and Times* informs us. "In a paper", he says, "of much ability and interest on 'Religious Thought in Wales', which was not long since read by Principal Edwards at a great meeting of the Presbyterian Alliance in London, it was stated that if you entered the house of a rustic elder or leader of the private societies fifty years ago, you would uniformly find that he had a small and very select library. Among other books you would be sure to lay your hand on translations into Welsh of Boston's *Fourfold State*, Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*, Owen's *Person of Christ* and *Mortification of Sin in Believers* and others. It is also true that in our British colonies at the present day, especially where the Scot-

¹³ *Memoirs*, pp. 263, 264.

tish element abounds in the population, the *Fourfold State* continues to be sought after and read, and we have received testimony from natives that it is extensively sold and circulated on the misty coasts of Labrador." The *Fourfold State* has passed through many editions, and it is interesting to observe that the London Religious Tract Society still issues the work. It was in 1711 his friend Dr. Trotter proposed to his beloved pastor that he should print some of his sermons. Boston received the proposal at first with astonishment, but after some consideration he shewed the notes of a certain series of sermons dealing with man's fourfold state to his friend. Dr. Trotter was greatly pleased with them. Boston now went with the matter to his great Counsellor. "I spent most of this day (January 16)", he says, "in prayer and meditation for light in this matter: and after all I found that I had rational grounds to oblige me to make an essay; but could not find such a lively sense of the call of God thereto as I desired. I observed, that the papers being kept up so long after I was made to wait for their return, was of a piece with the Lord's ordinary way with me, to bring matters first very low before they rise. One told me she observed that these sermons had more influence on the people of their neighborhood, than any before or since. I found myself this night convinced, that they might be useful to many in regard of the room the Lord has given me in people's affections; and this went nearest to the raising in my heart such a lively sense of the command or call of God, as might help me to believe, that He would be with me in the work; which is the thing I want."¹⁴ This was only one of many such appeals for guidance in this matter. Boston was earnestly seeking God's glory, and he could honestly say, "I can appeal to God that it is not a name for myself I seek. The Lord knows that I could be content to lose name or credit amongst men, so that the sermons are useful to poor souls." The work was actually begun on January 29, 1712, when, "after prayer and getting

¹⁴ *Memoirs*, p. 256.

my heart composed", he says, "to a dependence on the Lord, I began to write out my sermons". The book was finished on the 9th March, 1713, but was not printed until 1720. It was well nigh strangled in its birth, for one of the civic dignitaries of Edinburgh, who had assisted in the negotiations for procuring a publisher, offered his services as proof-reader. But when the proofs reached the author at Ettrick he found that not only were printer's errors corrected, but important changes were made in the body of the work. This vexatious delay, however, was at last overcome and the book went forth to the world entitled *Human Nature in its Four-fold State of Primitive Integrity, Entire Depravity, Begun Recovery, and Consummate Happiness or Misery*. The work consists of sermons preached at Simprin, which were recast in 1708 and 1709 and preached again at Ettrick. The book immediately found a public. It had the qualification of a book that was to last—it made no appeal to a passing fancy, but dealt with those mighty problems that must ever have an interest for men and women who realise the momentousness of life. Its theology is the theology of the Bible as interpreted by the great Dutch divines and the Marrowmen. The ring of the federal theology and the full and free offer of Christ so much in evidence in the Marrow theology may all be traced in this religious classic. Its teaching has been beautifully described by one when he says: "Boston took the bewildered child of trespass familiarly by the hand and descending to the level of his untutored capacity gave him a clear and consecutive view of the innocence from which he had fallen, the misery in which he was involved, the economy of restoration under which he was situated, and the hope which, by submitting to that economy, he might warrantably entertain. His eye as he wrote was upon the unawakened sinner, that he might arouse him from his dangerous lethargy; upon the anxious inquirer, that he might guide his steps into the right way; and upon the young convert, that he might guard him against devious paths and perilous delays. He never failed to show the bearing of

Christian doctrine upon the conscience, the affections and the life and to mingle with the light of systematic arrangement beseeching tenderness and practical appeal."

In the spring of 1713 he borrowed a copy of Cross's *Taghmical Art* from a neighbour, and "had I known then", he says, "what was in the womb of that step of Providence, I had surely marked the day of my borrowing that book as one of the happiest days of my life". This book set him to the study of the Hebrew accents, and it may be safely said that no Scottish minister ever studied this intricate subject with greater zeal and with more abounding prayer. In his *Memoirs* he tells us the story of his struggles and how he failed to get his work on the accents published. To him it was the great work of his life. His enthusiasm brought him into correspondence with some of the great continental scholars of the day. Among those who took a friendly interest in his work were Sir Robert Ellys and the Dutch scholars Schultens, Gronovius and Loftus. Boston translated his essay into Latin, but he died without seeing his hopes realized in its publication. In 1738—six years after his death—it was published at Amsterdam with the title *Tractatus Stigmologicus*. The main contention of the essay was to prove the divine authority of the accents. "It is something to know", says Mr. Morrison in his introduction to the *Memoirs*, "and it is worthy of remembrance that the evangelical minister of Ettrick, whose works were treasured by the cottar and the herd, was welcomed as an equal by the finest Hebrew scholars in the world."¹⁵

In 1714 the famous Simson case began to agitate the peace of the church. Simson was professor of divinity at Glasgow. He was charged with teaching Arminianism, but the Assembly, after inquiring into the charges, allowed him to escape with a gentle reprimand. Boston was ill at ease with the Laodicean methods of the Assembly, and predicted further trouble from the same source. Nine years later Boston's fears were realized, for now Simson was charged with

¹⁵ *Memoirs*, p. 34.

Arianism. The charges, it is true, were difficult to prove, but they were sufficiently well substantiated to move the Assembly to pass sentence of perpetual suspension. Boston felt this to be trifling with a great issue, so he rose in his place in the Assembly "with an air of great majesty", says an eye witness, "that I shall never forget", and, addressing the Moderator: "Moderator! I cannot help thinking that the cause of Jesus Christ as to the great and essential point of His supreme Deity is at the bar of the Assembly requiring justice; and as I am shortly to answer at His bar for all that I say or do, I cannot give my assent to the decision of this act. On the contrary, I find myself obliged to offer a protest against it. And therefore, in my own name, and in the name of all that shall adhere to me, and if none here will for myself alone, I crave leave to enter my dissent against the decision of this act." "Sir," said the Moderator, a very grave, solemn man, "will you tear out the bowels of your mother?" "If that were the tendency of this", was Boston's reply, "rather would I take and tear it into a thousand pieces." Boston did not persist in recording his protest, so the Simson case came to an end.

In 1716 a call came to him from Closeburn, and the event is memorable for the remarkable effect it had on the people of Ettrick. All of a sudden they seemed to have realized that a prophet had been among them all these years, and to show their anxiety at the prospect of losing their pastor a fast day was appointed in which they might plead with the Head of the Church not to remove His servant from them. It was the beginning of better days. A remarkable change came over the people and the seed that was sown with tears was now beginning to bear fruit.

The next great controversy in which Boston took a part was that which raged round the *Marrow of Modern Divinity*. The subject has already been dealt with in these pages,¹⁶ and only a few sentences are necessary to refer to Boston's connection with it. It was during his Simprin

¹⁶ THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, July, 1906.

pastorate that he came across a copy of the first part of the *Marrow of Modern Divinity*. It was the means of clearing up some difficulties he had in preaching the gospel. Nothing was heard of the book for years until, while the Assembly was discussing the Auchterarder Creed, as it was called—"I believe it is not orthodox and sound to teach that we forsake sin in order to our coming to Christ." Boston communicated to a fellow member of Assembly the great help he had received through reading the *Marrow*. Ultimately the book came into the hands of James Hog of Carnock, who published it. It was severely attacked by Principal Hadow of St. Andrew's; so began the Marrow Controversy. Boston was condemned along with the other Marrowmen by the Assembly. In 1721 Boston's two friends, Gabriel Wilson and Henry Davidson, suggested that he should write notes on the *Marrow of Modern Divinity*. These were finished in the following spring, but, owing to his respect for church authority, they were not published until 1726. They went forth to the world under the name of Philalethes Irenaeus, and had in view the confutation of Hadow's *Antinomianism of the Marrow Detected*. Boston has left on record that he was much addicted to peace and averse to controversy, but once engaged therein he was "set to go through with it". It must have cost his sensitive spirit a great deal of pain those bitter contentions in the church courts.

Boston was now turning his face towards the setting sun, and he was not without warnings his course would soon be over. In the last decade he preached to his people a series of sermons on Affliction. These were subsequently published under the title "*The Crook in the Lot*", being mainly founded on Eccles. vii. 13: "Consider the work of the Lord: for who can make that straight which he hath made crooked?" Many a sorrowing pilgrim has read these precious pages and felt the burden that was so heavy to bear lifted off the shoulders. Boston was a true son of consolation. The angel of death often visited his home and the tender-hearted father bowed his head in submission when the dread mes-

senger entered in. How tender a heart he had may be gathered from the following incident narrated in his *Memoirs*: "When the child was laid in the coffin, his mother kissed his dust. I only lifted the cloth off his face, looked on it, and covered it again, in confidence of seeing that body rise a glorious body. When the nails were driving, I was moved, for I had not kissed that precious dust which I believe was united to Jesus Christ, as if I had despised it. I would fain have caused draw the nail again, but because of one that was present I resented and violented myself." During the closing years of his life he had another great trial through the mental weakness of his wife. With eagerness the devoted husband watched for any returning gleam that might tell that the night was past. "Now we were", he says, "with our broken ship within sight of the shore and I was like one stretching out his hand and crying, Help forward! Help forward! But behold in a little after the storm arose anew and the ship was beaten into the main ocean out of sight of land again." But if the latter years of her life were thus darkened Boston recalled the years when she was the joy and light of his home and he has left on record as fine a tribute as ever a husband paid to a wife. This is how he describes her: "A woman of great worth, whom I therefore passionately loved and inwardly honoured. A stately, beautiful and comely personage, truly pious, and fearing the Lord; of an evenly temper, patient in our common tribulations and under her personal distresses. A woman of bright natural parts, an uncommon stock of prudence; of a quick and lively apprehension in things she applied herself to; great presence of mind in surprising incidents; sagacious and acute in discerning the qualities of persons, and therefore not easily imposed upon; modest and grave in her deportment but naturally cheerful; wise and affable in conversation, having a good faculty at speaking, and expressing herself with assurance; endowed with singular dexterity in dictating letters; being a pattern of frugality, and wise management of household affairs; therefore entirely committed

to her; well fitted for, and careful of, the virtuous education of her children; remarkably useful to the country side, both in the Merse and in the Forest through her skill in physic and surgery which in many cases, a peculiar blessing appeared to be commanded upon from heaven; and finally a crown to me in my public station and appearances. During the time we have lived together hitherto, we have passed through a sea of trouble, as yet not seeing the shore but afar off. I have sometimes been likely to be removed from her; she having little continued health, except the first six weeks, her death had oftentimes stared us in the face and hundreds of arrows had pierced my heart on that score; and sometimes I have gone with a trembling heart to the pulpit, laying my account with being called out of it, to see her expire. And now for the third part of the time we have lived together, namely ten years complete, she has been under a particular racking distress; and for several of these years, fixed to her bed; in the which furnace the grace of God in her hath been brightened, her parts continued to a wonder and her beauty which formerly was wont, upon her recoveries, to leave no vestige of the illness she had been under, doth as yet now and then show some vestiges of itself."¹⁷

Boston's labours were now nearing an end. Weakly in body and haunted often by melancholy he persevered in the pursuit of his duties. When one looks over the record of that life so full of noble purpose persisted in to the end, seeking the highest interests of the people committed to him, the words "Well done, good and faithful servant" come involuntarily to the lips.

Many of Boston's works were published posthumously, and though not so popular as the *Fourfold State* and the *Crook in the Lot*, yet there is a freshness in the treatment of the subjects that make Boston's sermons readable to the present day. An edition of his collected works was published in 1854 under the editorial care of Rev. Samuel Mac-

¹⁷ *Memoirs*, p. 157.

Millan. This edition, which consists of twelve volumes, does not contain what Boston himself regarded as his *magnum opus*, the *Tractatus Stigmologicus*.

Boston did not live to see the Secession of 1733, having passed away peacefully on May 20, 1732. It is difficult to estimate Boston's place as a theologian, his fame as a preacher and pastor seems to have obscured to a certain extent what belongs to him in other departments. But it is not claiming too much for him when we say that he was the Turretine of Scottish Theology. Not that his system was modelled after that of Turretine, for he was more under the influence of Witsius, but the same clear sententious treatment of doctrines characteristic of Turretine was also characteristic of Boston. In his *Memoirs*¹⁸ he gives a pen picture of himself remarkable for its fidelity. In it he tells us: "I was not of quick apprehension; but had a gift of application; and things being once discovered I was no more wavering in them. . . . My talent lay in doing things by a close application, with pains and labour." Boston was only 56 years when he finished his course, and, reviewing his life two years before his death, he sums up his impressions in the concluding sentences of his *Memoirs*: "Upon the whole, I bless my God in Jesus Christ, that ever He made me a Christian, and took an early dealing with my soul; that ever He made me a minister of the Gospel, and gave me some insight into the doctrine of His grace; that ever He gave me the blessed Bible, and brought me acquainted with the originals and especially with the Hebrew text. The world hath all along been a step-dame to me; and wheresoever I would have attempted to nestle in it, there was a thorn of uneasiness laid for me. Man is born crying, lives complaining and dies disappointed from that quarter. 'All is vanity and vexation of spirit—I have waited for thy salvation, O Lord'." Such is the language of a pilgrim journeying on to a better country with the pearly gates of the New Jerusalem already in

¹⁸ *Memoirs*, p. 474, 5.

sight, and as we read the expressions of gratitude ending with the mournful plaint our thoughts turn to that life of noble endeavour, checkered as it was with so many sorrows, and feel constrained, in the words of Carlyle,¹⁹ to say:

"Here is a Life-battle right nobly done. Seest thou not,
The storm is changed into a calm,
At His command and will;
So that the waves which raged before
Now quiet are and still!
Then are they glad,—because at rest
And quiet now they be;
So to the haven He them brings
Which they desire to see.

We part now with one of the most intensely human and lovable Scottish pastors of the eighteenth century and pay our tribute of respect in the halting rhyme but noble appreciation of Ralph Erskine.

The great, the grave, judicious Boston's gone
Who once like Athanasius bold, stood, firm, alone.
Whose golden pen to future times will bear
His name till in the clouds his Lord appear.

Wick, Scotland.

D. BEATON.

¹⁹ *Oliver Cromwell* V, p. 155. London, 1894.

REVIEWS

RECENT LITERATURE

PHILOSOPHY.

TIME AND REALITY. A "Monograph Supplement" from *The Psychological Review*, Vol. VI, No. 3, October 1904. By JOHN E. BOODIN, Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy, University of Kansas. The Macmillan Company. Paper. Large octavo, pp. 119.

These pages present a keen and able study of a very old and a very difficult question in metaphysics. The author's views, he tells us, were developed largely under the influence of the Harvard School. James, Royce and Münsterberg entered in an important way into the process of clearing up his own conception which was known among his philosophical friends as "the Creeping in" concept instead of that of the Serial Character of time. He maintains that Kant does not distinguish between the formal aspect, and the Content of time. The author thinks clearly and writes intelligibly. He holds that time cannot be stated as a series or order concept, because the series and order concepts already presuppose time in their genesis, and, once constituted, involve the coexistence of the terms, within the timeless meaning of the subject" (p. 24). Positively, he would define time "as non-being: not relative non-being merely, which has to do with difference at different points of reality; but absolute or dynamic non-being, as real and ultimate as the habit and structure aspect, which it makes relative and which in time limits and defines it" (p. 28). The pamphlet is, for the most part, a defence of this view and an explication and application of it in the wide areas of philosophical thought; but it was evidently written for select metaphysical aristocrats, and it is pretty certain that to others than such it will never come.

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

THE VOCATION OF MAN. By JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE. Translated by WILLIAM SMITH, LL.D., with Biographical Introduction by E. RITCHIE, Ph.D. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company. 1906. Paper. 8vo.; pp. xii, 178.

This little book gives us, as Dr. Ritchie says in his brief Introduction, much of Fichte's philosophy, but little of his system-building. The author divides his treatise into three parts or "books", having for their

themes, respectively, Doubt, Knowledge and Faith. In the first book, the conclusion reached is that the thought of man is utterly unable to extricate itself from the struggle between the view on the one hand that the I is but the pre-determined product of the World-order and the Consciousness, on the other, of a self-originated volition and will and love which is all my own. The second book, following the Socratic method and making "The Spirit" and the "I" the interlocutors in the conversation, has knowledge for its theme. We are told that knowing a thing is always knowing that we know it. That is, Cognition involves Consciousness, or according to some of the older psychologists, self-consciousness; but how to make the leap safely from the self back again to the not-self is the stiff and stubborn problem. Intuitively, we objectify the subject self, but where is the warrant for so doing? Knowledge is by and bye reduced to illusion, under the searching cross-examination of the "I" and, accordingly, no more in knowledge than in doubt is the rest of the rational soul to be found. "For the whole material world arises only through knowledge and is itself our knowledge; but knowledge is not reality just because it is knowledge" (p. 91). Hence the necessity of Faith; Faith is voluntary acquiescence. "It is not knowledge but a resolution of the will to admit the validity of knowledge" (p. 100). We do not believe this or that because we must, but because we will. Here is the Fichtean principle of the primacy, the supremacy of the will. It is the understanding which we enter into with ourselves to regard as true and to proceed upon it as true, the thing which seems to us as if it were true. We cannot go behind the returns—our knowing is of the phenomenal only. If it seems to me that I ought to do a thing, that is enough; I'll forthwith resolve to do it. All other categories and relations are subordinate. This is "Man's Vocation" to moral activity. "To the question, whether, in deed and in fact, such a world exists as that which I represent to myself, I can give no answer more fundamental, more raised above all doubt, than this: I have most certainly and truly these determinate duties, which announce themselves to me as duties toward certain objects, to be fulfilled by means of certain materials; duties which I cannot otherwise conceive of, and cannot otherwise fulfill, than within such a world as I represent to myself (p. 109). We could easily forget that we were reading the words of the great German idealist and believe that we were reading the pages of S. T. Coleridge when we find this truly Coleridgian dictum "The self-active reason is will" (p. 151). "I know immediately only what I ought to do. This will I do, freely, joyfully, and without cavilling or sophistry, for it is Thy voice that commands me to do it; it is the part assigned to me in the spiritual world-plan; and the power with which I shall perform it is Thy power" (p. 160).

The publication of this essay as one of the "Philosophical Classics" in the Religion of Science Library series is quite in line with much of the thinking of the present time. That there is good truth in Fichte's teaching in this treatise cannot be denied. A sound epistemology must always assign a place to the will in all knowledge, however purely in-

tellectual it may seem to be either in its processes or in its objects. We need not go the length of the agnostic and affirm the illusory character of all knowledge. To disprove the validity of knowledge and then to accept the postulates of faith, at the command or even at the consent of the will, is to throw out the babe with the bath. The difference between the faculties of the soul is a fiction if we mean by it anything more than the different faculties of the one soul. We cannot dissociate their respective activities from each other. We must not discredit the mind's knowing to the end that we may exalt the dignity of its willing. Ritschlianism develops from the philosophy of this essay as the flower from its bud, and while it has much to answer for in its impossible attempt to jettison metaphysics and to throw suspicion upon the validity of knowledge in the sphere of religion, yet it also must be reckoned with as a strong reaction from the haughty attitude of Rationalism and from the barren heights of a frigid Intellectualism.

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY.

THE WITNESS OF SIN. A Theodicy. By Rev. NATHAN ROBINSON WOOD, Medford, Mass. 12mo., pp. 151. New York, Chicago, etc.: Fleming H. Revell Company. [1905]

In this little book we have a sober and sustained attempt to develop a rational theodicy. And it is to be welcomed and admired as all serious attempts to unravel great mysteries are to be welcomed and admired. The reasoning is careful and close; and the author spares no pains to develop his great theme fully. We wish we could add that he has been as successful as painstaking. With all our hearty respect for its sincerity and earnestness, however, we have not been able to find the argument convincing. If we should speak our whole mind about it frankly, in fact, we are afraid we should have to say that it seems to us to have almost as many gaps in it as a paling fence. This, primarily, because of the influence of unwarranted presuppositions; and, secondarily, because of the unwary employment of undistributed middles.

The essence of the theodicy which is here offered in view of sin, is that God could not help it. Sin is in spite of God. The reason why God could not help it is because the possibility of sin is inherent in free-agency. In creating a free-agent God thereby created the possibility of sin. To suppose Him to wish to have a free-agent without the possibility of sin is to suppose Him to desire a contradiction, and that is to deny His wisdom. The creation of free-agents, now, is determined by the Divine goodness. For it is only by the creation of free-agents that holiness can be obtained. The possibility of sin thus underlies the possibility of holiness: holiness requires for its production the possibility of sin. That God may have holiness in His universe He must have free-agents; that He may have free-agents He must have the

possibility of sin. Adduce Redemption as the cure of sin, and the theodicy is complete. "In our souls, made to be holy, but often sinning in spite of God, we truly see Divine good purpose carried out by Divine power. This, with God's creative self-consistency, forms the whole theodicy of defence and of positive witness" (p. 143). Or if we fancy that some responsibility still attaches to God for "creating, even with a holy and loving purpose, a world of souls, the possibility of whose sin, and the foreseen actuality of whose sin, He cannot prevent," the answer lies in Redemption, in which he "makes the only direct prevention of sin possible to Him" (p. 146).

The halting of the argument becomes even painfully apparent so soon as it is stripped of its persuasive padding and presented thus in its skeleton. There is a not only unjustified but wholly unjustifiable doctrine of free-agency lying at the bottom of it. There is pervading it a grave confusion of the metaphysical possibility of sin and the necessary or at least inevitable actualization of sin. There colors it throughout the unwarranted assumption of the moral necessity or at least moral propriety in the premises of the creation of free-agents or of just those free-agents which were created. Is it really true, one is impelled to ask, that "the possibility of sin is inherent in moral freedom?" Is not God free—or is the "possibility" of sin to be posited in His case too? Is it really true that only he who is able to sin is able to be holy; that holiness requires for its production the possibility of sin? How does it happen, then, that all the holiness that has ever been in the world is the product not of the sinning soul, or the soul capable of sinning, but of the creative action of the Sinless One on the soul? Is it really true that the free-agent is beyond the control of its maker, or can be controlled only by "coercion"—an invasion of its inherent rights or even nature as a free-agent? Does brute force exhaust the resources of Infinite Wisdom in the methods of His government? Is it really true that the Creator was under some compulsion, physical or moral, to bring into being agents whom He could not control, and requires to get such comfort out of them as He may under their permission? Such questions, in a word, are raised by this theodicy that it will be hard if it does not arouse more doubts than it stills.

There are three several, if not exactly separate, problems, which are wrapped up in the one great problem of the origin of evil; three problems of, we may say, progressively decreasing inscrutability. We may perhaps for our convenience designate these respectively the ontological, the psychological and the providential (or governmental, or dispensational) problems. How could evil ever emerge in a universe which is the unconditioned product of the absolute Good? How could evil spring up in the will of an agent created good and pronounced by its all-wise Creator "very good"? How could evil enter into a world under the government of a good God with purposes of good to His creatures? It is only the last of these problems of which Mr. Wood's theodicy, like most of those before his, attempts a solution. The solution it offers is so far the common Christian solution that it accounts

for sin by assigning it to the perverse action of the creaturely will. But in its zeal to exhibit God free from all complicity with sin—a zeal in itself wholly praiseworthy—it presses sufficiently beyond the mark to declare baldly that sin has entered into God's world “in spite of God.” This declaration, when taken in its strictness (as it is here intended to be taken), let us say it as baldly, is incredible.

It is incredible, primarily because it dethrones God; and secondarily because it denies God. If sin could enter His world “in spite of Him”, God is no longer Lord of the world. And if He has created agents whom He cannot control, He cannot escape responsibility for their actions by the plea that they are beyond His control. What would we think of a man manufacturing in a great city large quantities of an uncontrollable explosive and then sheltering himself from responsibility for the ruin wrought, by the weak evasion that such explosives are in their very nature uncontrollable? If no other means of preventing sin entering His universe suggested itself to this not very resourceful deity, He might simply have refrained from creating free-agents. He was under no compulsion, physical or moral, to create free-agents at such fearful cost. If it be said that the creation of free-agents was a good so great (for any reason—say, for example, because thus only could the possibility of holiness in God's universe be secured) as to justify the risk of sin involved in it, the answer is manifold. Talk of the “risk” of sin is here a wretched meiosis. Unless we are to deny God in His perfect foreknowledge, it is not a question of the possibility of sin but of its certain emergence. What we are saying, then, is that sin is adopted by God into His all-embracing plan for the sake of the higher ends attained by its occurrence; and this is the ruin of Mr. Wood's theodicy, according to which sin is something God could not prevent, and is acquiesced in on that account; and not something permitted by Him for ends of His own, and chosen by Him for those ends (p. 76 sq.).

And behind all, there rests the unwarranted assumption that creation of free-agents involves the “possibility” (read, “certain emergence”) of sin. Why could not God create free-agents incapable of sin? That free agency and sinning (or the “possibility” of sinning) do not necessarily go together the existence of God Himself makes manifest. Assuredly we will not deny to God either supreme freedom or the absolute *non potest peccare*. Or why could not God have created only those free-agents, capable of sinning, whom He infallibly fore-knew would not use their freedom for sinning? The existence of the unfallen angels is the sufficient proof that such free-agents are possible: why could He not have confined Himself to the creation of just these? Was it essential to His purpose of good with a view to holiness—only to be had by the transcending of the possibility of sinning—that He should create also those free-agents whom He infallibly fore-knew would not achieve holiness, but sink into sin? Or again, why could not God have controlled the acts of free-agents capable of sinning, after their creation, so that they should not use this “capacity” for sinning but overcome it for good? Talk here of the impropriety or impossibility of coercion

of free-agents as if "coercion" were the only way in which the Divine Governor of all things could secure holiness in the creatures of His will is beside the mark. Could God not have preserved His creatures in holiness otherwise than by "coercion"? Could he not, for example, have shielded them from temptation, or from such temptation as should overcome the set of their wills to good? Or could He not have strengthened the set of their wills to good by serious impulses until they should be "capable" of overcoming any possible temptations which could assail them?

In a word, is it not quite clear that if sin arises in God's world—made by Him and made by Him purely according to the counsel of His own will (for who was there in that primal precreative "time" to be His counsellor?)—it must be not "in spite of God" but in accordance with His will? And is it not quite clear that therefore no theodicy is found in the face of the presence of sin in God's universe, until it is made clear that God's goodness and righteousness remain unsullied though He has appointed sin to occur in His universe? That the only possible theodicy in a word turns on the discovery of an end in view great and glorious enough to justify the incidental evils wrought by permitted sin? And is it not probable that it is the general perception of this which accounts for the fact which Mr. Wood thinks strange—the fact, that is, that the generality of reasoners on this great theme assume at the outset that the precise fact to be accounted for is the permission of sin (p. 75)? Of course, it is easy to say that this is merely the Calvinistic solution. It is the Calvinistic solution; and that not only the solution of the later Calvinism or of the extremest Calvinism or of hyper-Calvinism, as Mr. Wood imagines, but of all Calvinism. He will find it enunciated by Calvin himself and by Augustine before Calvin. But the adverb "merely" is wholly unjustified. It is the only possible solution. The simple truth is that Calvinism, as it alone can present a rational optimism, so it alone can offer a reasonable theodicy: or to put it at its true height, that Calvinism *is* the only rational optimism, and Calvinism *is* the sole sufficing theodicy. This is because in Calvinism alone belief in God—God not only with a big G, but with a big O and a big D as well—comes to its rights: and it is only when we see God and see Him as God with all that involves, that we see to the heart of things. The great philosophy of the Decree—in it alone lies the key to the universe.

The trouble with Mr. Wood's theodicy at bottom then is, that it reckons too much without God. It takes its first steps rightly, and says, with full truth, that sin is the product of the perverse action of the creative will. But it stumbles at the second step, which must relate this perverse action to the creative will of God. Mr. Wood tries to keep it unrelated to God: he says it is "in spite of God"; and that all that God has to do with it is to put up with it. And yet it occurs in God's universe, which He made, and which He made by His absolute will, and which therefore must express His pure will in its entirety and in all its interrelation of parts! Nothing is more certain than that

sin occurs in God's universe, not because God could not keep it out, but because it fell in with His plan to have it in. What, then, shall we say? What, but that the end to be attained was great and glorious enough to justify the incidental evil arising from sin? Shall we boggle here and declare that thus we suppose "too much of a Divine doing of evil that good may come, or an apotheosis of the Jesuitical creed that the end justifies the means?" (p. 78). We must at least allow that profound questions like this cannot be argued without some care in distinguishing between things that differ. To suppose that God uses evil to produce good is not the same as to suppose that He does evil that good may come; and though it does leave Him responsible for the occurrence of evil in His universe it does not make Him responsible for the evilness of the evil that occurs in His universe. If we deny God in ascribing evil to Him as its cause, we no less deny Him if we suppose evil to emerge in a universe of His making without His permission, His bounding and limiting, His control, and His utilization of it. It is just this situation indeed which creates the problem of theodicy: if God is in no sense responsible for the presence of sin in His universe, the necessity for a theodicy is superceded. I knew a woman once, a very wise and good woman, who was kept very anxious by the persistent disobedience of her little daughter, who haunted the nursery hearth, although repeatedly forbidden not to go near the fire. I saw this woman one morning deliberately sit quietly in her nursery, sewing, and watch her child, furtively glancing over its shoulder meanwhile to see if it were observed, approach the fire, in flagrant disobedience, and thrust its finger into the blaze to discover what it felt like! I never heard this woman—she was a wise and good woman—deny that she was responsible for the consummation of her little daughter's disobedience in act on this morning: or for the injury to the child's finger wrought by the burn, and the pain that resulted. But I never heard her accuse herself—she was, we repeat, a wise and good woman—of wrong doing on this account. She said she had a good reason for doing what she did—embodied in the maxim that "the burnt child dreads the fire"—and was satisfied with the result. The child did wrong, she said, but she herself did right in permitting the child to do wrong—because, though the child meant evil, she meant it for good. These things are an allegory. And they teach that things evil in themselves God may embrace within His all-embracing plan for good, and that the philosophy of Joseph (Gen. L. 20) lies at the root of God's government of the universe and constitutes its theodicy.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

SPINOZA AND RELIGION. A Study of Spinoza's Metaphysics and of his Particular Utterances in regard to Religion, with a view to Determining the Significance of his Thought for Religion, and, incidentally, His Personal Attitude toward it. By ELMER ELLSWORTH POWELL, A.M., Ph. D., Professor of Philosophy in Miami University. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company. 1906. 8vo.; pp. xiii. 344.

We have in this volume an able and impartial attempt to determine, first, what Spinoza taught and, second, how this teaching relates itself to religion. The author intimates in his preface that no system of thought is more difficult to understand or explain than is that of Spinoza. However, the task which he set for himself is not the explication nor, indeed, the statement of that system. It is rather the valuation or appraisal of it from the point of view of the religious consciousness. The book opens with a brief but informing biographical sketch of Spinoza. Born in 1632, his forty-five years were filled with strenuous though quiet and uneventful toil. He was a poor Jew, a lens-grinder by trade, like Kant simple in his tastes and habits, a helpless sort of old bachelor who lived the life of the cloister and saw only with the abstract vision of the metaphysician and the doctrinaire. Professor Powell has no very honoring estimate of Spinoza's moral qualities. What his admirers have called his noble self-effacement, he regards only as the excessive caution of the coward. He employed, in large measure, the dubious and dangerous policy of "accommodation". The first among his *regulæ vivendi* for the devotees of knowledge runs as follows: "To accommodate our speech to the mind of the multitude and to practice all those things (in vogue) which do not hinder us from attaining an end. For we are able to obtain no little advantage from the multitude, provided we accommodate ourselves as far as possible to the mind of the same. Moreover, as a result of this policy, they will lend friendly ears to the truth". (*De Intellectus Emendatione*, p. 6.) The author believes that we must bear this policy in mind if we are to judge correctly the sincerity and value of many of Spinoza's utterances which sound religious. He believes that he had a double line of expression for his doctrines, the esoteric and the exoteric, and a study of the two does scant honor either to his candor or his courage. There are three counts in the author's indictment, which may be summed up and indicated as follows: 1. Retaining religious terms after they had been consciously emptied of all religious content; 2. Stilted deductions of irrelevant conceptions formally but superficially resembling religious notions; and 3. Now and then saying outright what he did not mean concerning matters which did not affect his philosophy much but which appeared to be very religious. Thus viewed, Spinoza had in him anything else than the stuff out of which martyrs are made. In these three specifications we have the key to Professor Powell's judgment of Spinoza. It is presented plainly and is maintained with great force. He insists that Spinoza should be judged by the principles of his philosophy and not by the pious *obiter dicta* which he sometimes throws in and which are often incongruous with his philosophy, sometimes indeed contradictory to it.

We are given a brief chapter on Spinoza's epistemology; and this is well, for the true clue to the theological valuation of any metaphysical system is often to be found in its presupposed or implied theory of knowledge. Of course, Spinoza's whole system is thoroughly *à priori*. His methods are purely mathematical. He took geometry as his special model, assuming the infallible validity of its conclusions and forgetting

that no other department of human knowledge can be dealt with *more geometrico*. He held that all knowledge involves the knowledge of God. He has defined his starting point when he has defined Substance, which he does thus: "that whose conception needs the conception of no other thing." Of course, that involves self-existence, eternity and infinity. It has an infinite number of attributes, of which, however, the human mind can know only two, namely, thought and extension. This preliminary assumption of agnosticism may be a violent emergency measure, forced by the exigencies of his hard and fast *apriorism*. For it is Agnosticism, pure and simple, seeing that we cannot in any way or sense know the infinite substance lying under the two knowable attributes, nor, indeed, can we know the infinite number of attributes—minus two—which this infinite substance possesses. Everything happens with mathematical certainty and precision, following from the nature of Substance. Logical connections are *ipso facto* actual facts. Thought relations are hypostasized, whence it follows that cause and effect categories are identical with those of premise and conclusion. Possibility spells Actuality. God cannot help doing everything that lies in his power. Final causes are human figments. No moral attribute is predicable of Substance, and his own definition of God is given in these famous words: "*Per Deum intelligo ens absolute infinitum; hoc est, substantiam Constantem infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque aeternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit* (Ethics i. def. 6).

So much for a glance at Spinoza's philosophy, but only to prepare the way for squaring it, if possible, with the elements of the religious consciousness. Having defined one term of the comparison, the author proceeds to define the other, and he does it very satisfactorily, indeed. The three aspects of religion, namely, the doctrinal, the emotional and the practical, are well considered. Whereupon the author ventures a definition of his own, taking care to combine the three elements just discussed. The greatest interest for the present purpose focusses in the word "Personal", which he will not upon any consideration consent to omit or to slur over. This is for him the crux of any definition, and he criticizes both Dr. Caird and Professor James for their sin of omission in this regard. He quotes as supporting his own position the familiar words of the late Professor Romanes when he says "To speak of the Religion of the Unknowable, the Religion of Cosmism, the Religion of Humanity, and so forth, where the Personality of the First Cause is not recognized, is as unmeaning as it would be to speak of the love of a triangle or the rationality of the equator" (Thoughts on Religion, p. 41). It is obvious that if Spinoza's philosophy of the *una et unica Substantia*, that is, of a non-moral, non-personal and (saving the two attributes which are knowable) unknowable Substance, is to be weighed in this balance, it will certainly be found wanting. Spinoza's God is in no possible sense personal; and if it be said that he calls his Substance "perfect", it can easily be made to appear that by this he only intends the attribute of infinitude. The author finally concludes that there is no escape from calling his system Atheism. "We employ

the term with no desire to imply either praise or blame, but only for the sake of clearness. Whether Spinoza's atheism is practically inferior or superior to religion, and whether it is theoretically less true or more true, are questions which we are not called upon to decide; but that it is not religion, is sufficiently clear. So far from being the religious philosopher *par excellence* which he is often supposed to be, he represents the directly opposite spirit and world-view" (p. 241). Having reached this somewhat startling conclusion, the author goes on to consider certain elements of Spinoza's teaching which seem to stand in the way of such an adverse judgment. His famous doctrine of *Amor Dei intellectualis* is subject to discount by reason of Spinoza's lack of candor, and, stripped of its religious associations, means simply this, namely, "not an affection felt for a self-conscious and responsive being, as has sometimes been naively assumed, but only the mental joy experienced in cognitive processes, together with such valuation of the object of knowledge conditioning the joy as is appropriate to that experience; in other words, it is nothing but delight in the intelligible as intelligible" (p. 255). The saying that pleased Goethe so much, "He who loves God cannot presume that God loves him in return", follows *more geometrico*, in this wise: God, as Substance, loves no one, and therefore the wish to be loved by God would be to wish that God were not God. Spinoza's doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul is simply the metaphysical tenet of the eternity of the mind, *ante* as well as *post*. Dogmas must not be true but pious: the religious postulates of Christian ethics are salutary fiction; though it were better, he thinks, that men should swear by the safety and liberties of their country than by God. Miracles are "mere absurdity"; Jesus Christ was merely man, and his resurrection was "spiritual". His philosophy of Determination has no place for sin *qua* sin. It is mere negation. Salvation is for the metaphysicians only, and as Mr. Pollock has characterized it, is "acquiescence in the order of nature, with the delight in knowledge thereby engendered, and living a righteous life at the bidding of reason". All this prepares Professor Powell to believe that there was some truth in the story, which has always been regarded as somewhat apochryphal, but which is ascribed to Phillipus van Limborch, an eyewitness, that at a dinner table, when someone was saying grace, Spinoza busied himself in making certain signs by which he apparently wished to indicate the stupidity of the performance. Our author thinks Spinoza was too prudent and too considerate to have been guilty of such a rudeness; but he thinks that he well might have signified his estimate of the performance to his intimate friends, and that Limborch caught a glimpse of what was going on. He believes Spinoza capable of doing it so far as his real and sincere religious convictions would be concerned.

This is a sharp and severe arraignment of Spinoza's attitude toward religion. Many there be who will stubbornly resent it, and cry out at its injustice. Many have ranked the "God-intoxicated philosopher" among the greatest saints of history. Von Dalberg enthusiastically speaks thus: "Spinoza and Christ, in these two alone is found pure

knowledge of God; in Christ the secret higher way to divinity; in Spinoza the highest peak that reasoning can reach". Hegel characterized his system as "Acosmism", and Lord Tennyson once said that Spinoza is so full of God that he sees him everywhere—so much so that he leaves no room for man".

Who is right let the experts judge. For ourselves we strongly incline to accept Professor Powell's conclusions as supported by facts. Spinoza never advanced beyond the bounds of metaphysics, and a metaphysical foundation or framework falls infinitely short of religious faith or life. Whether he was indeed an atheist or an acosmist is not much more important than a choice between tweedle dee and tweedle dum. If atheism is pancosmic, pantheism is acosmic, and in its implications either is as great an error as the other. Coleridge called pantheism "painted atheism"; and although he was anxious to clear Spinoza of the charge of atheism, he felt bound to admit that he denies all intelligence to the Absolute.

We believe this book is valuable and timely. The swing of thought is to-day toward pantheism and not toward materialism, but pantheism with its necessary elimination of Personality and Will and Love from its theistic conception is only a synonym for atheism itself. How often and how sadly has the wisdom of man been fooled by the high-sounding use of the capitalized adjectives the *Absolute*, the *Infinite*, the *Immutable et hoc omne genus* because it is forgotten that these words are only adjectives and that they can have no possible significance except as they connote attributes of that noun which names that which is "absolute", "infinite", etc., that in which these properties inhere and to which these attributes belong? And it is, moreover, necessary to remember that the highest achievement of science, as well as the deepest insight and profoundest postulate of philosophy, requires that this ultimate Being, Substance, Noumenon or what not, must be conceived under the supreme and final category of Personality.

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

FAITH AND THE FAITH. By T. T. EATON, D.D., LL.D. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 8vo., pp. 78.

An excellent and suggestive treatment, in two chapters, of the two themes designated in the title. The style of both the thought and the language is popular rather than erudite, and, for the purpose of the author, all the more effective on that account. The essay on the subjective "faith" abounds in brief and telling quotations from various writers and the ideas presented are fresh and full of helpful seed-thoughts. The second essay shows the author to be a staunch and courageous champion of the objective "faith once delivered to the Saints". He scorns the new theology and boldly declares that, after reading thousands of pages from its best defenders, he has failed to find a shred of evidence in its support. The three cardinal truths which he

names as being violently assailed and as calling for aggressive defence, are *The Substitutionary Sacrifice of Christ*, *The Authority of Holy Scripture* and *The Guilt of Sin*. The book is vivacious, up to date and strong. To be sure, many will stigmatize it as dogmatic, but in the presence of the charge the author may recall Matthew Arnold's reply when, after accusing Carlyle of dogmatism, and being charged by a friend with being as dogmatic as Carlyle, he said: "That may be true, but you overlook an obvious difference. I am dogmatic and right and Carlyle is dogmatic and wrong."

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

THE SCIENTIFIC CREED OF A THEOLOGIAN. By RUDOLF SCHMID, D.D., late court chaplain. Translated from the second German edition, by J. W. STOUGHTON, B.A. (Camb.). New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1906. Pp. xxiii, 251.

The Theories of Darwin, by the same author, was reviewed by me in 1883; and declared to be the most useful discussion from the philosophical side that I had met with in that particular field. McCosh's publications on the same questions were in truth more satisfactory, but they did not discuss the views of individual writers as Schmid did. On the other hand, Schmid went wrong, as I believe, and is still wrong as to the subject of inspiration. He holds strongly to inspiration of the religious elements of the Bible, but regards himself free to make fables of it on historical or scientific matters; so that his books are like the image whose head was gold and its feet a mixture of iron and clay.

In the Preface to the present work he takes back the view of its predecessor as to the relation of Science to the Biblical Record of Creation. We may remark that meanwhile much light has been cast on the style of the Creation record by the discovery of tablets which must have been known to, and may have been used by the writer. What Schmid, like many others, recognizes is the pure monotheism which is characteristic of the narrative of Genesis. But he repeats what he said in his former work, that the second and two following chapters of Genesis are inconsistent with the first chapter; and as he supposes the second to be older than the first, he defends the first at the expense of the second. In his former work he compared what he calls the two narratives of creation, and concluded that one of them was unhistorical.

In this decision he has had many followers. For our own part, we have never been able to view the second chapter as a repetition of the story of creation. In chap. I, there is a preliminary account of man's creation, as the finish of a long record; in chap. II, there is a touch-and-go reference to the general creation, and then in detail a narrative of the early experiences of man, and his relations to his environment; no room for comparison, either harmonising or its opposite.

At a later stage in the present volume the author reveals the source of his trouble. It is the biblical chronology. As to the age of the earth and its inhabitants he writes (p. 144) that the results of science

are opposed to the real or alleged words of the Bible. "It is, indeed, impossible in face of these results of science to maintain the opposite utterances of the Bible. But the abandonment of this standpoint . . . is for Christianity no loss. For this abandonment limits the character of the revelation of Holy Scripture to what is valuable for religious feeling, and especially to what relates to our redemption through Christ."

We assume that he has never heard of Dr. W. H. Green's demonstration that there is no real primeval Chronology taught in the Bible. Nor is this surprising; for within the last year or two, our American champion of Bible-authority had a plea in favor of Ussher's Chronology without mentioning Dr. Green's proof contra.

The other subjects dealt with, and ably dealt with, by Schmid are the coexistence of natural causation and teleology in the inorganic, and the organic world, and the merits of recent researches as to evolution, and especially as to the creation of man. These he holds to be by a process of descent from other forms, under God's determining and all-ruling will. He refutes the mechanical theories of Haeckel and others as to the origin of the human spirit and consciousness, citing eminent scientific writers, chiefly German, who have led in a reaction in favor of adaptability and design as manifested in the world.

The chief cause of the breach which has sometimes arisen between science and theology is shown to be the overstepping of bounds. Both scientists and theologians have done this, the theologians when they prescribed the method scientists must pursue and the results at which they must arrive. A Christian or Antichristian view of the world is certainly not the result of scientific research, but an act of personal choice.

Princeton University

G. MACLOSKIE.

CHRIST AND SCIENCE. Jesus Christ regarded as the Centre of Science.

The Cole lectures for 1906, delivered before Vanderbilt University.

By FRANCIS HENRY SMITH, Professor in the University of Virginia.

Fleming H. Revell Company: New York, Chicago, etc. Six lectures. 12mo., pp. 240.

This is an Experience-meeting among the Methodists, in which an old man gives us his ideas concerning Science, the Old and the New Testament, Jesus Christ, and Universities and Students, and things in general. You will not be long looking over the book until you find yourself admiring and loving the old man; and, if you make enquiry, you will learn that for long time he has been preëminently the admired and beloved teacher in the grand old University which he has served for nearly all his lifetime.

He is very concise in his style, striking off in a picturesque sentence the result of the observations and meditations of his past years; especially concerning that science of Physics, of which he has been an

ardent student. He is free in acknowledging the fallibility of scientific men and describes their investigating as a sort of hunting after wild game by means of artifice and expedient. The investigator must watch and creep and seek a vantage-ground; and after all in most cases he fails. As the Lecturer goes along in this style, his pages sparkle with illustrations, chiefly from his own department of physics, and most of all from its recent developments concerning electrons and radioactivity. We have felt it very pleasant to take a round-trip with such a man through this wonderland.

Whilst conservative in his scientific as well as his Biblical mentality, he is by no means reactionary; he will not form harmonies where they do not manifestly exist; even between different branches of science he finds apparent contradictions, like those which trouble some minds as between science and faith. And he illustrates, often with freshness and force, the fundamental harmonies that are coming into view between God's works and His word. He heartily enforces the need of faith in scientific work, as well as in religion. Science as well as Scripture requires the perfect man to be humble, simple, true and believing.

When he comes to Christ his style is at its best. Following the Saviour to the fields which Jesus loved and where he watched the birds and the lilies, and the growing corn, he hits off the character of the Saviour in a way that is to us somewhat new and very beautiful.

It is manifest that Professor Smith put to himself the question which must arise with every student of God's handiworks; whether on the whole this study helps or hinders his spiritual growth. And the result in his case is that it was a help. Because of his faith, on the one hand, he has been, and is (long life to him), a better student of science, and more successful in his high office than he could be without his faith. On the other hand, his science helped him to see God everywhere; and when he came to Scripture it helped him to find such harmonies as never were found, and never could be found in the writings of uninspired humanity.

Princeton University.

G. MACLOSKIE.

TO CHRIST THROUGH CRITICISM. By RICHARD W. SEAVER, M.A., B.D., Scholar, and Senior Moderator in Mental and Moral Science: Donnellan Lecturer, Trinity College, Dublin: Rector of St. John's, Malone, Belfast. Containing the Substance of the Donnellan Lectures Delivered before the University of Dublin, 1905-6. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. (Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons.) 1906. 8vo., pp. 211.

These lectures reveal a serious and reverent attempt to show that the heart of the Christian religion has not been destroyed, nor even wounded, by the New Criticism in the sphere of the New Testament. Correctly enough the author regards the Person of Christ as the soul of revealed

Christianity, and, although he is perhaps a little vague as to the meaning he attaches to *divinity*, he is prepared to defend the divinity of Christ; and he is, doubtless, correct in arguing that the Higher Criticism has not "taken away our Lord." He apparently disagrees with that respectable body of contemporary scholars who continue to believe that the Apostle John wrote the Fourth Gospel, and he does not hesitate to test the accuracy of points of the Gospel history by his conceptions of "the Spiritual Christ" (p. 204). But while conservative New Testament scholars may be unprepared to accept various of his leading assumptions, we cannot but admire his irenic aim and spirit. In literary form the lectures attain to a fairly high standard. In the main, their thought is clear and unmistakable.

A brilliant chapter and, to our mind, a quite satisfying piece of writing, is that in which the author discusses "the miraculous element". The following sums up his conclusions relating to the miracles of Jesus: "We are not compelled to think of a break, a discontinuity in nature in the case of the miracles of Jesus. The ordinary laws of inorganic matter are daily being interfered with by life, which has higher laws of its own. We know by experience, that through the exercise of a spiritual power, the will, laws of nature are directed towards our ends. If this be the case with us, spiritually imperfect as we confessedly are, what may we not reasonably expect in the case of one spiritually perfect, as Jesus Christ? If the laws of nature be the expression of the will of God, we may be confident that in no case were they contravened by Him whose whole life was complete fulfilment of the divine obedience" (p. 110). Less satisfactory is the author's discussion of the Atonement, wherein in trying to describe what is evidently intended to be understood as the Calvinistic view of the relation of the death of Christ to the decrees of God he really offers a caricature of the Calvinistic type of thinking (p. 161). To single out one more illustration of the author's conclusions with which we beg to differ, we may refer to his reference to the subject of War, in his concluding chapter. He finds that "at first sight" War, Law and Trade are opposed by the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount; "yet Christian society", he adds, "has long since made up its mind about them, and we all accept them as among the necessities or occupations of human society", etc. So? The present writer, then, must be ruled out of the human family,—for he is not of the "all"—along with the Society of Friends, the members of the Peace societies of England and America and a growing multitude of Christians in general who decidedly do not believe that War is one of the "necessities" of a Christian state, but who, on the contrary, regard it as an illogical and ungodly element in the body of Christian civilization. Would not the author probably have included Slavery and the Duel, if he had been writing seventy-five years ago, as "necessities" of the Christian state?

In purpose and method, however, these lectures are constructive and in temper they are kindly and spiritual.

Cranford, N. J.

GEORGE FRANCIS GREENE.

T'AI-SHANG KAN-YING P'ÏEN. *Treatise of the Exalted One on Repose and Retribution*. Translated from the Chinese by TEITARO SUZUKI and DR. PAUL CARUS. Containing Introduction, Chinese Text, Verbatim Translation, Translation, Explanatory Notes, and Moral Tales. Edited by DR. PAUL CARUS. With Sixteen Plates by Chinese Artists and a Frontispiece by Keichyu Yamada. 8vo., pp. 139. Chicago, Ill.: The Open Court Publishing Co. London: Keegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1906.

YIN CHIH WEN. *The Tract of the Quiet Way with Extracts from the Chinese Commentary*. Translated from the Chinese by TEITARO SUZUKI and DR. PAUL CARUS. Edited by DR. PAUL CARUS. With Frontispiece. 8vo., pp. 48. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co. London Agents: Keegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1906.

These are the two tracts which represent the ethics of Taouism. The form in which they are issued does credit to the translators, to the editor, and to the publisher. Nothing is left undone to render these venerable and interesting booklets intelligible and attractive; and we are glad. We could scarcely be taught more impressively how ineffaceably God has written his law on the human heart: most of those natural virtues which the common conscience of man requires are here enjoined. Moreover, we are shown as impressively the inconsistency and the folly of man when not enlightened and guided by special divine revelation. Thus amid many commendable precepts in these tracts we find others which are merely silly and puerile. For example: "Never destroy paper which is written upon," "Do not spit toward shooting stars," etc. The reason for this is also evident. There are almost no allusions to any duty to a Supreme Being. Hence, as right is grounded in expediency rather than in His eternal and immutable nature, it is vain to look for anything like an ethical system. At best we can have only ethical precepts, some of which are likely to be inconsistent. We may not hope for principles of righteousness. We may not close this brief notice without calling attention to a misleading statement at the opening of the Introduction to the first of the above works. It is this: "The treatise of 'The Exalted One on Repose and Retribution' will probably have to be assigned the first place of all publications on the globe. Its editions exceed even those of the Bible and Shakespeare." This may be, but are the editions anything like as large or the copies sold so numerous as those of the Bible?

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIANITY, being an Examination of the More Important Arguments For and Against Believing in that Religion. Compiled from Various Sources by LT.-COL. W. H. TURTON, D. S. O. Royal Engineers. Fifth Edition. Seventh Thousand. 8vo.; pp. viii., 539. London: Wells, Gardner, Darton & Co., Ltd., 3 Paternoster Buildings, E. C., and 44 Victoria Street, S. W. 1905.

The first edition of this work, published in 1895, was very favorably reviewed in the *Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, No. 44, by the present writer. Since then it has been carefully revised three times, has been somewhat shortened, and in the case of a few of the chapters has been rearranged. These changes have only confirmed the reviewer in his original judgment that, all things considered, Lt.-Col. Turton had given us the ablest discussion of the Christian Evidences in English. The publishers, too, have rendered the book as attractive as he had made it strong.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

A REASONABLE VIEW OF THE OLD TESTAMENT SCRIPTURES. By A. LAYMAN. London: Elliott Stock, 62 Paternoster Row. Pp. 40. Price 1 shilling.

The author makes no claim to originality, but attempts to summarize the results of "Constructive Criticism". He rehearses the more familiar theories of the radical critics, and suggests a reconstruction of the Old Testament history. It is insisted that the only book of the Old Testament which was completed before the exile was the Book of Deuteronomy. This book was the work of priests employed by Josiah in carrying out his religious reform. It was not until after the return that the larger part of the Pentateuch was composed. The elaborate ritual of the sacrifices suggested in Leviticus was not established in the wilderness by divine command, but was borrowed from the customs of the Babylonian idol-worshippers. The Book of Chronicles contains impossible amplifications of the grandeur of King Solomon. "Many of the statements are manifestly self-contradictory, and point to a very low state of morals. It is an anachronism that they should be placed in the hands of the heathen as the inspired Word of God. The compilers of the Books of the Old Testament ascribed to David, to Solomon, and to Moses words they never wrote, but they only acted in accordance with the practice of ancient times". The writer sums up his message in a quotation which begins as follows: "Judaism is a Jewish rendering of the ancient Babylonian, Egyptian, Hindoo, and Zoroastrian religions, blended, modified, improved". How thankful we are for this word "Improved"! It is rather amusing to notice one who is borrowing so freely from the writings of infallible critics, one who is able to correct the statements of inspired writers, declaring that "Jerome translated the Greek Scriptures in the year 500", and that "the years of Melchisedec, and other persons who are stated to have lived to a very considerable old age, were not solar years, but lunar years, or more properly speaking, lunar months". To many persons this will be the first suggestion of the measure of Melchisedec's life. It is doubtful whether these borrowed statements will commend themselves to most readers as "A Reasonable

View of the Old Testament Scriptures" in harmony with "human reason, with morality, with the profoundest philosophy, and with all possible scientific discovery".

Princeton.

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

THE CORRECTED ENGLISH NEW TESTAMENT. A revision of the "Authorized Version" (by Nestle's Resultant Text), prepared with the assistance of eminent scholars, and issued by SAMUEL LLOYD, a life-governor of the British and Foreign Bible Society, as his Memorial of the Society's Centenary, 1904. With Preface by the Bishop of Durham. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1905. 16mo.; pp. xxviii. 516.

Nothing could be more welcome to a lover of the English Bible than the frequent attempts now making to better it. Among these attempts the one now before us has especial interest from its origin, purpose and principles. It has arisen out of an earnest desire to perfect the English form of the Scriptures, with the especial intent of making their contents more accessible to the general reader. It is presented to the British and Foreign Bible Society as a memorial of its centenary and a gentle reminder that its full task is not yet done. And it is ruled by the principle that readableness is as valuable an asset for a popular book as extreme exactness of rendering. What the translators aim at is apparently to combine with the attention to details characteristic of the translators of the Revised Version of 1881, a similar attention to the general effect of clauses and sentences and paragraphs, thus securing, as they hope, a more faithful version because a version which does not so lose itself in niceties that it cannot convey the impression of the whole,—which is after all the main matter.

An appreciative but cautious preface by Bishop Moule expresses his "deliberate concurrence with the idea and programme" of the undertaking—"on the whole". "On the whole"—because he does not approve wholly of the textual basis of Nestle's text; nor go all the way with one of the expedients adopted to give a more harmonious English form to the result—viz., the transposition of words and phrases. But he thinks the Revised Version does lack seriously in "English felicity", and that in "countless instances" the present version succeeds in this where its predecessor failed. We cannot say that a cursory reading of the book has made quite so favorable an impression upon us as its better study has made on Dr. Moule. We thankfully recognize the earnest spirit which has governed its preparation and the considerable measure of success which has crowned its effort. But the book as a whole has failed to commend itself to us, as we read, as more felicitous than even the Revised Version, which, in the New Testament at least, has undeniably sacrificed felicity of phrase in numberless passages to an exactness of rendering which can scarcely escape the reproach of pedantry. Pedantry does not seem to us to be escaped by this rendering either, though it is a pedantry of a different kind; not so much the pedantry of the classical school-room as the pedantry of the purveyor

of "plain English". "Felicitous" is scarcely the term which would have suggested itself to us to describe its English style, which seems to us good, indeed, but lacking in life and sometimes forced. Nor do we think it has gained greatly by the text it has adopted as its basis, good again as it undeniably is—and better in Nestle than here, by so much as in a few rather important cases the translators have deserted Nestle's guidance.

Let us open the book at the beginning—at that exceedingly plain passage of the genealogy of Jesus—and we shall have at once a fair example of what the new translation gives us. Instead of (Mat. i. 1) "the book of the generation of Jesus Christ", it would have us read simply, "the genealogy of Jesus Christ": and this we consider an improvement,—and possibly as good a rendering as could be made—unless indeed we could be more literal at the same time that we are faithful and render: "The genealogical register of Jesus Christ". Then (verses 3 and 5) we are to read instead of "of Tamar, Rahab, Ruth", etc., "by Tamar", etc., and (v. 6) instead of "her that had been the wife of Uriah" simply "by the widow of Uriah". The primary change here seems to be in the interest of current technical language and may be accepted on that ground, while the reduction of the paraphrase in v. 6 is surely an improvement and might be made even better by reading "by Uriah's widow". In verses 11, 12 and 17, the heavy phrase of the older version is resolved into the simpler "the Babylonian captivity", and v. 17 is reduced to the form of an enumeration, and the archaic preposition "unto" changed to "to", but at the same time the tense of the verb is altered. This plain passage is, in other words, plainly dealt with and with excellent effect. When we reach the 18th verse, however, we strike a "transposition" which at first sight at least does not so easily commend itself. For the archaic "on this wise" it is proposed to read the simple "thus", but this "thus" is carried back to the beginning of the sentence and we are asked to accept this form: "Now, thus was the birth of Jesus Christ"—which impresses us as very harsh, far harsher than the purely literal rendering would be: "Now, Jesus Christ's birth was thus". Nor do we like the presentation of the next verse, with its theatrical pause and hyphenated emphasis: "After Mary his mother had been betrothed to Joseph, before they came together she was found to be with child—by the Holy Spirit". In the interests of a really plain English and of care not to overdo the aorist participle, why not say simply: "His mother Mary was betrothed to Joseph, but before they came together she was found with child by the Holy Spirit"? And so it goes on, commending and not commending itself to the reader by turns—now introducing a slightly plainer rendering, now missing an important emphasis (as in v. 21),—and, on the whole, shall we say making an improvement on the Revised Version, or not?

On the whole, we think not. And this becomes clearer when we proceed from narrative passages, which lend themselves to simple treatment, to didactic ones, in which an attempt at simple English may involve confusion of the sense. Take, for example, Rom. 5: 12: "Wherefore,

as through one man sin entered the world, and death through sin, even so death passed upon all men, seeing that all sinned". This is simple enough: but is it what Paul said? Take again, Rom. 5: 18: "Therefore, as the result of one transgression reached unto all men unto condemnation, even so the result of one acquittal reaches unto all men unto a justification giving life". Can that even pretend to represent the Greek? Take again Heb. i. 1: "God, having spoken in the prophets in time past, in many portions and in many ways, to the fathers, hath, at the end of these days, spoken to us by a Son", etc. Can that enter a claim to being even simple and clear—as simple and clear as the Revised Version? And does not the rendering of Heb. i. 6: "And, again, when He bringeth the First-born into the world, He saith . . ." attain its clarity at the expense of its faithfulness? Who would even imagine from that rendering that it is of the *second* coming of Christ that the author is speaking: "But when He shall again have brought in the first-born into the world . . ." On the whole, then, we seem to perceive that the zeal to render the English text clear and simple has pressed too often beyond the mark—sometimes defeating itself, sometimes sacrificing the true sense to plainness of expression, sometimes issuing in sheer confusion. Many times, undoubtedly, it has been more successful, and no one will hesitate to endorse Bishop Moule's verdict that this rendering constitutes "a very important and faithful contribution to the great and necessarily gradual work of providing an ultimate ideal English Bible". Suggestions there are here which future revisers may well take to heart: but as a Bible to be taken as it stands—our conviction is that the old is better. It is excessively hard to make a better English version of the New Testament than that we already have.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

THE PROPHET OF NAZARETH. By Nathaniel Schmidt, Professor of Semitic Languages and Literature in Cornell University, Director of the American School of Archæology in Jerusalem. New York: The Macmillan Company. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1905. Pp. x, 422. Price, \$2.50 net.

Prof. Schmidt's book bears an appropriate title. When he calls Jesus "The Prophet of Nazareth" the negative implication is that the founder of Christianity claimed to be a prophet only, not the Messiah; the positive implication, that the great influence exerted by Him in the past and expected still to proceed from Him in the future is essentially a prophetic influence, the influence of teaching, not that of supernatural power. Towards impressing these two facts upon the reader the whole book is directed. He who would look in it for a detailed and exhaustive discussion of the life of Jesus would be disappointed. Barely two chapters of fourteen are given to this, covering no more than 78 pages out of a total of 422. In part this is due to the negative, agnostic conclusions at which the author arrives in his discussion of the sources: so little certain is known of the history of

Jesus that a brief compass suffices for telling it; consequently, we hear much more about the Gospels and their criticism than about Jesus Himself. But to a larger degree this disproportion is due to the author's consciously-pursued aim of eliminating the Messianic factor from the life and mind of Jesus, which can, of course, be done only through a lengthy critical investigation. Evidently Prof. Schmidt feels, and correctly so, that in the Messianic consciousness lies the root of the whole evil growth of Christology, of all the supernatural, divine attributes the Saviour has borne to the church through the ages: here also lies the fatal hindrance to that clear appreciation of Jesus in his prophetic character, from which he has such high hopes for the future. As long as Jesus continues to figure as the Messiah, He will also loom in the minds of men as that which the early church, on the basis of his Messiahship, made Him, the divine dispenser of supernatural powers. It boots little to reject the Fourth Gospel with its high doctrine of the Lord's preëxistence and divinity, or to eliminate from the Synoptics all analogous testimony to the superhuman character of Jesus; whilst the Messianic element remains, the saving Christ, the divine Christ will ever anew be born in the hearts and heads of mankind. Hence, Prof. Schmidt is not satisfied with the makeshifts that are sometimes resorted to, where it is desired to neutralize this factor without going to the extreme of rejecting it in toto as unhistorical. He will have none of the view that the Messianic idea was the perishable form in which the unique religious and moral consciousness of Jesus clothed itself, nor of the view that the Messiahship was to Jesus a burden rather than a glory and joy, nor of the view that He contemplated Himself rather as one destined to Messiahship in the future, than as one clothed with Messiahship in the present. All these attempts are shallow compromises: the simple truth is that the Messianic idea played no rôle in the mind and experience of Jesus whatever. It is true the author claims to have reached this conclusion against his own wishes and prepossessions, under the sheer compulsion of the evidence. Nevertheless, we here and there discover clear traces of the influence which his idealization of Jesus as a prophet and religious genius has had in making the Messianic consciousness appear to him an *à-priori* impossible thing. In discussing the classical passage Mt. xi. 27 he declares: "Such an utterance is out of harmony with the admittedly genuine sayings of Jesus, and casts an undeserved reflection upon his character. . . . How can the gentle teacher . . . be supposed to have imagined himself possessed of all knowledge and regarded all other men as ignorant of God?" (p. 152). That is to say, it is ultimately the character of Jesus, as the author apprehends it, which protests against his Messiahship.

Prof. Schmidt is careful to undermine the Old Testament basis of the Messianic interpretation of Christ and Christianity. He bestows a great deal of pains upon showing that the traditional exegesis of the prophecies and types is a delusion. In fact, he goes to the trouble of examining all these predictions and types and pointing out how in each

case they can be interpreted with perfect naturalness without aid of the Messianic theology. It might seem as if all this labor were superfluous for the author's own purpose. Whether the Old Testament prophecies contain a Messianic eschatology or not is or ought to be from his standpoint immaterial for the question of the Messianic consciousness of Jesus. The only relevant point to raise would be not what the prophecies contained, but what Jesus found there, how He interpreted them. If Prof. Schmidt, nevertheless, takes the trouble of clearing away from the Old Testament all this Messianic lumber, we feel tempted to believe that he here applies the same principle which led him to declare the Messianic element impossible within the character and mind of Jesus. If in Jesus, the supreme prophet, there is no place for this idea, because it is an idea belonging to a distinctly lower level of religious development, why should there be room for it in the great Hebrew prophets of earlier date?

Hence all so-called Messianic predictions are explained as hopes attaching themselves to contemporaneous historical persons. It was the elevation of Jehojachin from his dungeon and the birth of his son Sheshbazzar that inspired the sublime oracles of Is. ix. and xi. In some of the Psalms living Hasmonæan rulers are referred to and only considerably later were the Psalms Messianically interpreted. "So far as documents give evidence, the expectation of a future deliverer of Israel, designated as the Messiah, seems to have appeared for the first time soon after the conquest of Palestine by Pompey in 63 B. C. It is found in the so-called Psalms of Solomon" (p. 68). And even this Messiah, become an eschatological figure at so late a date, remained for a long time purely political, and the Messianic hope was cherished only by some fractions of the people. The author does not think much of the most recent theory, that the Messianic eschatology was developed under the influence of Persian thought, for the very reason that the Persian Saoshyas were of an unpolitical character. It is no wonder that he refuses to credit Jesus with the application to Himself of a notion of such antecedents and such content. But surely our Lord Himself took a different view of the origin and meaning of the Messianic material in the Old Testament. Nor can we see that the author has done justice to the Apocalyptic literature. He practically ignores the transcendental Messianism that is indubitably present there. The whole recent trend towards recognizing a high Jewish Christology is left out of account. Little is said about the doctrine of the Messiah's preëxistence. Partly this is again due to a late dating of the sources (*e. g.*, the Similitudes of Enoch from the time of Domitian), partly to the assumption of Christian interpolations in the original Jewish documents. The author seems bent upon the persecution of the Messianic concept even here and determined to rout it out of its last refuge in the apocalyptic writings. To be sure, after so little attention has been paid to the transcendental Christology, it is somewhat surprising to read on p. 89: "The reaction against thoughts peculiar to the followers of Jesus had probably removed some of the transcendental aspects of

the Messianic ideal" (*i. e.*, from the thought of post-Christian Judaism). "The Messiah expected even by an Akiba was just the kind of man that Simon was". But from the entire preceding discussion the impression might easily have been gathered that the Messianic ideal had never varied much from the type of Simon.

Coming to the Gospels, we here also find that the author's critical views are well-adjusted to the main thesis he advocates. None of the Gospels were written by apostles or eye-witnesses, or existed at all before some sixty years or more had passed since the death of Jesus. They are late translations of the original Aramaic tradition, suffering from a load of accidental or intentional changes, weighed down with layer after layer of corrections, comments and interpolations. Prof. Schmidt expresses himself so strongly on this point, that one might justly expect the historic existence of Jesus itself to become imperiled by his doubts. He himself feels this and confesses to having faced this problem without fear or prepossessions. But "it was with a deep satisfaction the author found himself borne along by the force of what seemed to him incontrovertible facts to the conviction that Jesus of Nazareth actually existed, that some of the events of his life may be known to us, that some of his words may be recovered, and that his personality, imperfectly as we know it, and widely as it differed from the estimate of the church, is as sublime and potent for good as ever" (p. 233). If we enquire into the critical canons by means of which the salvage of this precious remnant out of the wreck of tradition is effected we find them to be the following: the translatability of a saying into Aramaic is a test of genuineness, especially when translated back it reveals an even more remarkable originality than in the Greek; the Schmiedel-principle, that an utterance which runs contrary to the belief of the later church about Jesus must be authentic, is brought into requisition; the later prevalence of the Messianic dogma especially is worked along this line, on the ground that whatever was least suitable for "the Messianic propaganda made by a group of demagogues and teachers in the interest of the Nazarene" must for that very reason go back to Jesus, *e. g.*, the parables with their constant emphasis on the kingdom of heaven and the Father in heaven. That is to say: incompatibility with the Messianic idea creates a presumption of genuineness. But, if on the basis of such considerations the author is able to save sufficient material out of which to construe his conception of "the prophet of Nazareth", it is obvious that, negatively viewed, his critical canons are admirably adapted for eliminating the Messianic element from the Gospels. Negatively almost anything can be done with a tradition that comes down to us in such a corrupt state. As to further details of Gospel-criticism the author falls in with Wrede in his scepticism about the alleged superiority of Mark from a historical point of view. "The assumption that he comprehended the growth of Jesus' Messianic consciousness and the gradual unfolding of his Messianic programme better than the other evangelists is not well founded" (p. 224). And in general the two-document hypothesis finds no favor in his sight.

The hypothesis of a *Logia Jesu* is unnecessary for the explanation of the synoptic problem, indeed only productive of new difficulties. Even the Greek Matthew is older than Mark.

In arguing from the Gospel-material in favor of his main contention the author makes ample use of the critical freedom he has thus proclaimed for himself. His chief reliance is, of course, the ruling out of all the Son-of-Man-passages, so far as they have Messianic implications. The methods and conclusions on this point are the same as those employed by him in the well-known article in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*. Jesus used it a few times in genuine sayings of man generically. In the original form of the Synoptic Apocalypse (a Jewish work) a man was introduced who was none other than the celestial being of Dan. vii. 13, identified sometimes with the Messiah, sometimes with Enoch, sometimes (as the author himself believes to be the case in the Daniel-passage) with Michael. This Synoptic Apocalypse was translated into Greek; and, because it was concerned with the destruction of Jerusalem, and Jesus was known to have predicted the overthrow of the Jewish state and cult, the Christians in adopting the Apocalypse could not help identifying the Son-of-Man figure with their Messiah. In its literally translated Greek form the phrase *Bar-Nasha* easily assumed the appearance of a title. Then gnostic speculation about "the Macrocosmic man" and "the second man" merged with this idea of the "Son of Man" in Daniel. While these things were floating in the air the translated apocalypse was incorporated in part in the Gospels, and from it, what appeared to be a Messianic usage, was carried over into other passages of the gospel-narrative.

It is to be regretted that the author has not supplemented his negative procedure of eliminating the Messianic element from the life of Jesus by a positive construction of the genesis of the Messianic character of Jesus in the mind of the disciples after Jesus' death. To know how the phrase "Son of Man" became a Messianic title may be of some interest: of incomparably greater interest from the author's point of view is the problem how the prophet of Nazareth came to be considered the Messiah. Why was not the prophetic category sufficient for the veneration of his disciples in the sequel as well as during his life-time? And to this we must add another remark with reference to the negative procedure itself. By a critical or exegetical examination one by one of the passages or groups of evidence in which the Messianic concept occurs the author seeks to convince us that there is no necessity for assuming its presence in the original history or tradition. But even granting (what we are by no means ready to grant) that he has in all these instances made out a plausible case, the number itself of the instances it is necessary thus to get rid of either by excision or interpretation is so great as to hang a heavy load around the neck of the hypothesis. Besides, even with all this mass of evidence neutralized in one way or another, one cannot help feeling that the Messianic spirit is still there in the Gospels, intangible perhaps, but none the less real and persistent. It is a spirit that will not be exorcised by dealing with

individual passages. Even in his prophetic utterances Jesus speaks with an authority greater than that of any prophet. The problem is not to explain away certain Messianic elements in the sources, but to wipe out the pervasive Messianic character of these sources, and that in such a way as to retain of the de-Messianized material something substantial enough out of which to construct a life-like plausible plan of the life and teaching of Jesus. We do not believe that with all his critical acumen, historical grasp and literary skill the author has succeeded in doing this.

Still another point in which we have to find fault with Prof. Schmidt's method concerns the over-assurance of his presentation and exploitation of critical views which are, to say the least, still under debate, as if they were definitely settled and could be henceforth used as so many axioms. Frequently views of this kind are given without so much as an intimation that even in far from conservative circles great diversity of opinion or scepticism on such matters prevails. We mention only two or three instances. The author espouses the view that the virgin-birth was superimposed upon the original form of the gospel-narrative according to which Jesus was the son of Joseph and Mary. But he does not explain what the retouching precisely consisted in, nor make any reference to the serious criticism that has been passed upon every hypothesis so far proposed in this direction. While accepting the theory of the Gentile origin of the virgin-birth conception, he makes no attempt to reconcile it with the palpably Jewish character of the narratives of the nativity. Another instance is his acceptance of Wrede's view with reference to the recognition of the *Messiasgeheimnis* by the demoniacs. Here again we receive no inkling of the objections raised against this view within the critical camp itself. In general one would never infer from the author's smooth representation that the dissensus among critics even on the great dominating problems has increased to such an extent as to threaten chaos for their whole treatment of the life and teaching of Jesus.

Apart from the Messianic problem, the author's sketch of Jesus appears to us one-sided. The religious aspect of His personality and teaching remains altogether too much in the background, whereas the ethical aspect is magnified to the utmost. In fact, the author finds fault with Wellhausen, who, while describing with fine appreciation Jesus' religious message, fails in his view to do equal justice to his ethical teachings. Wellhausen would be quite justified in turning back this charge with the terms reversed upon Prof. Schmidt himself. The religion the latter ascribes to Jesus is largely the indirect religion of ethics.

In the concluding chapters, entitled *The Present Problem* and *The Leadership of Jesus*, the author deals with the relation of Christianity to the practical issues of modern life. We have all respect for the earnestness with which the qualifications of Jesus to meet the needs of humanity at the present-day are upheld as over against all other intellectual or economic panaceas. In describing the pressing nature of the problems and the acute character of the evils of modern life no

one will accuse Prof. Schmidt of undue optimism. But is it not over-sanguine to expect the cure for all this tremendous disease and evil from Jesus as a Prophet and Teacher? The Jesus who in former ages has healed the nations and renewed the fountains of life for humanity was surely far more than this. It is the old delusion of rationalism that the world can be saved by teaching. Even the Prophet of Nazareth as Prof. Schmidt loves to describe Him, must prove sadly unequal to this gigantic task, if He has no other means for its execution than the few ethical and religious apophthegms fished up by the critics, as alone genuine, out of the turbid stream of tradition.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

JESUS UND PAULUS. Eine freundschaftliche Streitschrift gegen die Religionsgeschichtlichen Volksbücher von D. BOUSSET und D. WREDE. Von D. JULIUS KAFTAN. Tübingen 1906. Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Pp. 77.

The value of this little brochure should not be measured by its size. It derives unusual interest from the fact that the Jesus-Paul controversy stands to-day in the forefront of theological discussion, and even more from the fact that one of the best-known representatives of the old Ritschlian guard here throws down the gauntlet to the two most able and conspicuous champions of the "*religionsgeschichtliche Methode*", Drs. Bousset and Wrede. Dr. Kaftan calls his booklet "a friendly controversial treatise", but for all that it is not lacking in candor and incisiveness. If some things are said in it which too clearly reflect the peculiar Ritschlian standpoint of the writer to meet with our unqualified approval, a great many more things are said whose pertinence and convincing character is entirely independent of any dogmatic presuppositions. In a certain sense one might even say that the writer's consistent Ritschlianism has endowed him with a peculiar qualification to expose and castigate the flagrant faults of the method against which his attack is directed. He first of all addresses himself to the principles on which, according to their editor, Schiele, the *religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher* are based. To most of these he takes no exception. There is one, however, which falls under his condemnation: "the principle of the inexorableness of the scientific method, which arranges all spheres of the universe according to their special character and subjects them to the common rules of reason". Dr. Kaftan objects to this, that there is no such thing as "inexorable method"; method is not a matter of "ethics", but of "technique", more subject to change than almost anything else. What really hides itself under this phrase of "the inexorableness of scientific method" is nothing else but the inexorable determination of the advocates of the method under review, that the Christian religion shall have no special standing, but shall in the investigation of its origin and development submit to the same laws of reason which apply to other religions. In other words, the *à-priori* rationalistic principle of the naturalistic character of Christianity finds here expression. This, of course, cannot but provoke the violent dissent of a Ritschlian of the

old type, for whom the tenet still holds, that, ruling out all natural theology, ours is a religion derived entirely through revelation in Jesus Christ. But it is interesting to observe the specific Ritschlian form this protest against rationalism assumes with Dr. Kaftan. He bases it on the positivistic principle of the theoretical unknowableness of the metaphysical background of things, on the relativity of all science. All dogma must be excluded from scientific investigation, not only in the premise, but also in the conclusion. "Shall an exception to this be made", he asks, "in favor of the dogmas of rationalism?" He rightly divines that back of all the talk about method, lies the modern view of the world with its bald negation of the supernatural. But his Ritschlianism shuts him up to a position where he can wield no other weapon against this than the neo-Kantian contention that no theoretical world-view is possible of any kind, rationalistic or otherwise, and that the maxim of "the inexorable method" is a base betrayal of the principle of the relativity of all scientific knowledge. Still, it is of some value to be able to register the judgment (however supported) of a man of Dr. Kaftan's reputation, to the effect, that in the work of the "*religions-geschlichtler*" an *à-prioristic* rationalism voices itself. Precisely, because it is avowedly based, not on theological, but on philosophical grounds, the judgment is above suspicion of prejudice. If one of us conservatives were to offer such criticism the retort would come quickly, that we call rationalism everything that is not in line with our supernaturalism, though it be the pure induction of science. To Dr. Kaftan's criticism no such answer can be made. And the criticism of unscientific *à-priorism* is all the more pertinent in the present case, because the followers of the new method almost weary us with their protestations, that they desire to offer and do offer nothing else but pure distilled science, from which every traditional, dogmatic ingredient has been removed. They make a point of showing us the real Jesus, the real Paul, not the Jesus and Paul as we are accustomed to see them through the colored glasses of our creed. Where such professions are made, it is doubly unpardonable to lay on the colors of the "*moderne Weltanschauung*".

First of all, then, Kaftan takes Bousset to task for the latter's representation of the historical Jesus, or, more strictly speaking, in Bousset he takes issue with the entire modern conception of Jesus. For Bousset is excellently suited to serve as a type of this conception, since he does not stand for any of its abnormal excrescences or exaggerations. Bousset admits that Jesus considered himself the Messiah. He holds to the historicity of the title "Son of Man" as a self-designation on Jesus' part. If there be something fundamentally wrong from the historic point of view in his picture, it may safely be assumed that the same faults belong in far more accentuated form to other less guarded and less sane descriptions. Now the main criticism urged against Bousset's view of Jesus is this, that it does not give due weight to the Messianic element as the central factor in the Saviour's self-consciousness. Bousset first describes Jesus as a prophet, his activity as pro-

phetic activity, and only towards the close comes to speak of the idea of Messiahship. This sequence is characteristic of the relative importance attributed to these two aspects of Jesus' work. The Messianic idea was for him simply a form in which he expressed the content of his inner life, an inadequate form, and not only that, but also a burden under which He had to labor in silence until the close of his life, a conviction which never became a source of true joy to him. Kaftan very properly protests that this is a marvellous way of writing history. Not a particle of proof has been adduced either by Bousset, or by any other of the modern writers, who so glibly talk of a distinction between the religious content of Jesus' life and the clumsy Messianic form, in which it found expression to himself, not a particle of proof has been adduced to show that in Jesus' own consciousness there was any basis for such a distinction or that any reality corresponded to it. The distinction has its sole origin in the aversion of the modern mind to the Messianic concept, an aversion born from the perception that the latter sums up in itself the supernatural, eschatological aspect of Jesus' Person and work. What is offered as the historical picture of Jesus is in reality the profession of faith of a modern Christian, his estimate of what Jesus should be, in order to appeal to our age, not a faithful reproduction of what Jesus was to His own mind and experience. If anything is plain, then it is this, that according to the Gospels Jesus did not feel the Messianic vocation as a burden. Nor was it the mere fringe of His consciousness, it was present to Him at all times, dominated and colored all other aspects of His life and activity. If a large part of His ministry bore prophetic features, this was not because before all else He regarded Himself as a prophet, but simply because He judged such prophetic work essential and subservient to the prosecution of his Messianic calling. In other words, we have in the Gospels not a prophet in the guise of the Messiah, but a Messiah engaged in prophetic work. Because Bousset reverses this and is not able to view the prophetic activity in a Messianic light, he also misinterprets "the enthusiastic features" in the career of Jesus as morbid phenomena of his nervous constitution. Over against this Kaftan places the view, that all the religious and ethical teaching which formed the content of Jesus' prophetic message, appeared to Him in the light of an anticipation, a provisional application and possession of the principles and blessings of the Messianic Kingdom, so that the religion and ethics of the Gospel-sayings should, in order to reproduce the true mind of Jesus, be interpreted, not according to the shallow modern conception, but in their full soteriological value. And the Jesus who thus viewed and felt Himself at every point of his work the Messiah confidently expected from God the authentication of His Messianic dignity in some solemn supernatural act, whereby the new aeon would be actually introduced. This act the disciples believed to have taken place in the resurrection, and therefore dated from it the new order of affairs. From a Jesus thus interpreted and from Him only can we say that there is a direct line of transition to the primitive apostolic preaching. A Jesus-religion,

such as the modern theologians conceive of, has never existed, neither before the death of Jesus in his own mind, nor after his resurrection in the mind of the disciples; and "if it had existed, this would have been in direct opposition to the mind and intent of Jesus Himself. If anybody thinks that the signs of the times point in such a direction, that the further development of Christianity should be held to that course, let him act on that conviction; but let him not appeal in justification of his view to the historical Jesus, for every appeal of this kind is a stupendous self-delusion" (p. 27).

So much for the Jesus of Bousset. Now as to the Paul of Wrede. As is well-known, the latter writer, in his contributions to the series of *Volksbücher*, has placed Paul at the farthest remove from Christ, so as to present him practically as the second and more influential founder of Christianity. At the same time, this view implies a depreciating estimate of the value of Paul's work; the influence of the Apostle was away from the direction marked out by Jesus; it meant the substitution of a religion of redemption for the simple gospel of Christ. This religion of Paul is largely Christological in its origin, and through the Christology, of which it is the offshoot, reaches back into Paul's pre-Christian past, into Judaism. Wrede is inclined, on the other hand, to deny, or at least to minimize, the presence of the Messianic element in the consciousness of Jesus, so that inevitably Jesus and Paul are drawn far apart on this most important point. While thus making much of the element of redemption in Paul's teaching, Wrede relegates to a quite secondary place the doctrine of justification through faith. This was a mere temporary phase of the Apostle's preaching called forth by an apologetic emergency, of purely missionary significance, in no wise the center of his gospel. Redemption meant to him the process of the actual deliverance from the world, from the flesh, sin, the law, death. It takes place wholly in the objective sphere, in Christ, His death, His resurrection; all man has to do with reference to it is to believe, *i. e.*, (according to Wrede's interpretation), to accept the doctrine. Prof. Kaftan not unnaturally thinks that this is as much, if not more, of a perversion of the historical Paul as the Jesus-picture drawn by Bousset is of the true Jesus. But he finds himself in a peculiar quandary when it comes to proving this, because Wrede has from the outset rendered his own position invulnerable by two assertions. The one is that by long intimate acquaintance with the traditional Paul the average theological mind has become utterly disqualified for seeing the Apostle in his true historic character. The other assertion is that the thought of the Apostle moves with entire freedom and carelessness, regardless of logical harmony in the field of doctrinal expression. Consequently, whatever might be gathered from the Pauline documents in refutation of Wrede's construction of the center of Paul's gospel, is sure to be put down to the account of logical inconsistency and not allowed to stand as evidence of a different construction. Under these trying circumstances our author decides that nothing remains for him but to offer a historical and psychological explanation of the genesis of this peculiar

interpretation of Paul, which Wrede would foist upon us, and the demonstration of the un-Pauline character of which he has precluded by his twofold assertion. The explanation is as follows: the whole trouble lies in the unconscious bondage of Wrede to an old, inveterate prejudice, viz., that Paul was a dogmatician, and that, consequently, the interpretation of his thoughts ought to take its point of departure from a doctrinal conception. That is the root of the whole evil. The prejudice dates from the days of the old orthodoxy, but Baur and Holsten have carried it over into the modern historical discussion of Paulinism. And so it lingers and works its havoc in the mind of Wrede. Now, it is not our present purpose to take issue with Kaftan as to the sense and extent in which Paul can be said to have been or not to have been a "theologian" or "dogmatician". We are not quite ready to fall in with the present vogue of denying in toto the Apostle's theological bent. It is not necessary to run into extremes here. Paul may have been a theologian to some extent, and yet it need not follow that his whole gospel was the product of theological excogitation. In some respects his theology may have been the fruit of his life-experience and in other respects his life-experience may have been shaped by his theology. Kaftan himself admits that there is an element of theology in the Apostle's teaching, although he assigns this to the periphery rather than to the center. But, leaving all this to one side, we think the writer has skillfully laid bare the source of the radical distortion of Paul's gospel in Wrede's treatise. The gospel of redemption, broadly speaking, was certainly not objective in the sense affirmed by the latter; it was the outcome of a vital religious experience. Paul's theology was a theology based on life, to be sure a life not purely subjective, but supernaturally communicated and authenticated to him, so that its bestowal could be called in the full sense of the word a revelation. And this applies likewise to his teaching on justification by faith, which Wrede would separate from the redemption-theology. Both are at bottom equally experiential, equally vital, and both belong together. The definition of faith as a bare acceptance of the redemption-doctrine, is a caricature of the true Pauline conception of faith. Besides this undue emphasis on the dogmatic element, there are two other features of Wrede's interpretation of the Apostle to which Kaftan vigorously objects. The one is what he calls "an exaggerated striving after historical objectivity". By this is meant that Wrede almost proceeds on the principle: nothing is genuinely Pauline if a modern mind is able sympathetically to understand it. The more unintelligible and bizarre the thoughts appear to us, the more certain it is that Paul actually conceived them. This is illustrated from Wrede's treatment of Rom. vii. and reduces it *ad absurdum* by quoting his statement, that the picture of redemption drawn by Paul is absolutely "cold and impersonal"; that is to say, not to Paul, but to the modern mind. Undoubtedly this is true of the picture as drawn by Wrede. Whether the pretended reproduction be faithful to the original is another question. The second objection Kaftan makes is to the tendency evinced by the

new method of emphasizing in Christianity all those features in which it presents points of contact, analogy with other religions and obliterating those features wherein consists its uniqueness and distinction. Others, especially Von Dobschütz, have urged this criticism before, but Kaftan presses it home with peculiar cogency. The "*religionsgeschichtler*" make everything of what he calls the "Stoffe", and overlook the spirit within. With a sort of horror he receives Wrede's declaration, that New Testament science stands as yet only at the beginning of this line of research, and asks in despair, whether it is absolutely unavoidable that we should enter upon this "wilderness-journey". In a later passage, in a more hopeful frame of mind, he expresses his confidence, that within fifty years all these "infant-diseases" of the period of "*Religionsgeschichte*" will have been left far behind.

After having thus rescued both Jesus and Paul from misrepresentation, Dr. Kaftan easily reaches the conclusion, that the two do not stand apart, far less are in conflict with each other. Jesus more Messianically and soteriologically interpreted and Paul less dogmatically interpreted are seen to move along the same line and to agree in the substance of their gospel. Indeed, Paul is the one who, humanly speaking, has saved primitive Christianity from degenerating and losing itself in phantastic apocalyptic expectations. He has done this by emphasizing the spiritual essence of the eschatological hope as already accessible in the present life, both on its side of forgiveness and of redemption from the world, binding these two to the Person of Christ and insisting upon it that the latter shall issue not into ascetic avoidance but into healthy Christian activity upon the world as the only means of truly entering into the life of God.

A concluding chapter is devoted to the triad Jesus-Paul-John. Dr. Kaftan finds it necessary to speak of this, because it is really in the Fourth Gospel he finds the beginning of the cleavage which separates the Catholic Church from the Apostolic age. Only the beginning; for what he refers to concerns not the kernel and substance of this gospel, only its Hellenistic frame. As to the main substance, he believes John to be in thorough accord with Jesus and Paul. In fact the Johannine discourses of Jesus, while not historical as such, are but the translation into gospel-form of the common apostolic conception of Christ as *κύριος*, a conception the apostolic church developed in true harmony with the mind of Jesus. But, if retrospectively conceived, the Fourth Gospel is absolutely true to the original spirit of Christianity, at the same time, considered prospectively, by reason of its Hellenistic setting, it prepares the way for the subsequent intellectualisation of Christianity in the Hellenistic world. And to a certain extent there are traceable the faint beginnings of this process even in Paul. Only it is insisted upon, that both in Paul and in John, whatever there is of this nature lies on the periphery, not in the center. It becomes significant and influential only in view of the subsequent development, not within the sphere of the Pauline or Johannine teaching itself. These are the ideas with which we have long been familiar from Harnack, and we can forego

criticizing them here. Dr. Kaftan is strong on the point of the distinctness of the New Testament writings from all other primitive Christian literature. He is not ashamed to profess himself still a believer in what has been scornfully called "the dogma of the New Testament". While this position, with its Ritschlian implications, may not, in our opinion, meet all the necessities of the case, yet we gladly take note of the author's tribute to the uniqueness of the New Testament, so far as it goes. As over against men like Bousset and Wrede, he is on our side.

We conclude our review with quoting a sentence from one of the last pages, because it gives in a few words the gist of the whole matter and is offered by the writer as such: "The modern theologians attempt to shove the idea of redemption aside into the periphery, whereas in reality it constitutes the center of all living, spiritual religion, in particular of Christianity. What we need and must strive after is that in all matters of faith this idea shall be recognized as the prime moving element."

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

THE GOSPEL HISTORY AND ITS TRANSMISSION. By F. CRAWFORD BURKITT, M.A., F.B.A., Norrissian Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge. T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh. 1906. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. Pp. viii. 360. Price, \$2.00 net.

This volume is composed of ten lectures delivered at the Passmore Edwards Settlement in London as the Jowett Lectures for 1906 and repeated as an inaugural course at Cambridge. Mr. Burkitt recognizes that the question of historical truthfulness or trustworthiness constitutes the fundamental problem in the study of the Gospels. The problem is not a simple one, to be answered offhand. Many elements enter into the complex array of evidence upon which any adequate answer must be based. Linguistic evidence, textual evidence, and literary evidence, however much these may serve primarily their own ends, contribute materially toward the solution of the historical problem. Moreover, the point of view of the person passing judgment on the historical trustworthiness of the Gospels, his presuppositions or ideas, whether philosophic, religious or historical,—the whole subjective element which enters with the investigator into the investigation of the problem, can not be neglected. Mr. Burkitt states in the Preface the ideas he holds as the result of his investigations. "It is sometimes supposed that the result of modern historical criticism is to diminish the historical value of the Gospels. My own researches have made me believe that there is a much larger element of genuine history in the Canonical Gospels, than a general view of the tendencies which influenced Christendom during the first century and a half of its existence might have led one to anticipate" (p. v). Every generation must reconstruct its picture of the past, its conception of Jesus, and to do this it must have recourse to the historical documents. "It is not to get new ideas of religion or of philosophy that we need a minute and searching historical criticism; rather do we need to test the ideas we already have by the historical facts, and

we cannot get at the facts without the criticism" (p. 30f.). The reciprocal relation of ideas and facts is thus mediated by historical criticism. If our ideas of the past and of Jesus are to be tested by the facts and the facts are to be determined by historical criticism, it is evidently of great importance that the canons of historical criticism be commensurate with the subject of investigation.

Mr. Burkitt does not conceal the difficulties which confront the literary analysis of the Gospels in the attempt to ascertain their sources. He illustrates this strikingly from the Diatessaron and from Mt. xii. 3-8 and Lk. vi. 3-5, pointing out how difficult it would be to reconstruct the separate Gospels from the former or Mk. ii. 25-28 from the latter had the common sources or source been lost. Mr. Burkitt is confident, however, that the main source of the Synoptic Gospels is a single written document and that this document can be identified with the Gospel of Mark, since the phenomena presented by the passages in which Matthew and Luke agree against Mark do not require the hypothesis of an *Ur-Marcus*. Thus Mr. Burkitt concurs with Wellhausen in maintaining the literary originality of Mark. Only in one instance does he discover evidence of a written source, an eschatological fly-leaf, used by Mark (xiii. 3-37). But if in addition to literary originality the Gospel of Mark possess historical trustworthiness it will stand certain tests. It will be generally consistent; it will fit in with the known political and social history of the time; and it will not lend itself easily to attempts which seek to explain the Gospel as a work designed to set forth particular doctrines or theories about Jesus or the Church (p. 66). The Gospel of Mark satisfies these tests; but it must also reasonably answer some of the main questions which lie at the very root of the Gospel history. These questions are: How does the story of Jesus Christ fit into general history? How did the Christian Society come into being? What did Jesus Christ teach? How did Jesus of Nazareth become what He was? (p. 76). Two of these are answered in the Gospel of Mark; the third is also adequately answered; but the fourth is in Mr. Burkitt's opinion insoluble.

The Third Gospel and Acts were written by Luke in old age after the appearance of the Antiquities of Josephus, probably between 95 and 105. The Gospel of Matthew cannot be dated with certainty (probably near the close of the first century, cf. p. 199); and although the name of the compiler cannot be ascertained, we can learn something about the sources he used and the ideas in which he moved. Beside Mark another document composed principally of the sayings of the Lord was used in common by Matthew and Luke. The character of this document and its contents may be ascertained from a comparison of the matter common to Matthew and Luke but not found in Mark. In order to prepare the way for inferences in regard to this common source, called Q, Mr. Burkitt examines the use made by Matthew and Luke of the sources which are not lost, *i. e.*, the Old Testament and Mark. Luke uses the LXX. Matthew, however, while using the LXX in some instances, reveals knowledge of the Hebrew text and probably

made use of some collection of Old Testament passages or *Testamonia*, primarily Messianic. This collection may have been made by Matthew the publican in Hebrew—(the famous *Logia* mentioned by Papias. Cf. Euseb. *h. e.* iii. 39), and its use by the compiler of the First Gospel would explain the title “according to Matthew”. This all points to a Palestinian origin for the stories peculiar to the First Gospel. Matthew and Luke differ in their use of Mark. Matthew shortens the Markan narrative, suppresses the human emotions of Jesus, transposes earlier parts of the story, interpolates long discourses and stories of questionable historicity (although of Palestinian origin), follows Mark in the passion narrative, and omits very little of the material furnished by Mark. Luke, however, omits freely, departs from Mark in the passion narrative, shortens Mark but keeps his order, and inserts fresh incidents separately. From these facts it may be inferred that Luke has preserved the order of Q better than Matthew. The surest criterion of the content of Q is the agreement of Matthew and Luke, but in view of the parallel of Lk. xxii. 24-30 in Mt. xix. 28 it is probable that Q did not close with Mt. xxv. 31-46 but contained an account of the passion.

Since Jesus wrote nothing and our knowledge of His teaching rests ultimately on the memory of His disciples, some external test is needed to assure us that a saying attributed to Him really comes from Him. Such a test, not for completeness but as indicating the main impression of His teaching, is found in the double attestation of Mark and Q. After giving a list of the sayings thus attested Mr. Burkitt dwells among other things on Jesus’ conflict with the Scribes and Pharisees and the eschatological element in His teaching. This latter can not be allegorized away, although “the hope of the Second Coming of the Son of Man has faded with us into an unsubstantial dream”. “The true way is to accept the Coming of the Messiah upon the clouds of heaven to gather together His elect from every quarter as the natural picture, the natural way of expressing faith and hope in the triumph of good over evil, all that people mean nowadays by the vague word Progress” (p. 179).

Mr. Burkitt discusses in a chapter entitled *The Gospel in Matthew and Luke* the characteristic features of these Gospels. The point of view of the First Gospel is determined by the interests of the Jewish Christian readers; and Mr. Burkitt points out the striking features in Matthew’s style and ordering of his material. In partial agreement with Wellhausen he thinks that Matthew’s record of the sayings of Jesus reflects and has been colored by the conditions and ideas of the Jewish Christian Church. He confesses indeed that the problem of determining how far the sayings of Jesus recorded in this Gospel are historical is a delicate one, but he is confident that the explanation of the parable of the Tares is distinctively the handiwork of the Evangelist, although the parable itself comes from Jesus. The Gospel of Luke is characterized by a tendency toward a voluntary poverty and toward asceticism.

The chapter on the Fourth Gospel is perhaps the most unsatisfactory.

The historicity of the Fourth Gospel is surrendered on the ground of the discrepancy between it and Mark and also because this Gospel is held to be ideal history. The resurrection of Lazarus could not have happened because Mark is silent about it, showing that he did not know of it. Again, the silence of the Fourth Gospel about the Eucharist can only be regarded as deliberate, and the transference of the Eucharist teaching of Jesus from the last supper to the earlier Galilean miracle is an equally deliberate sacrificing of historical truth. A similar judgment is passed on the teaching of the Fourth Gospel about Baptism and the Ministry of Jesus. In its account of Jesus' discussion with the Jews "there is an argumentativeness, a tendency to mystification, about the utterances of the Johannine Christ which, taken as the report of actual words spoken, is positively repellent" (p. 227). "The only possible explanation is that the work is not history, but something else cast in an historical form" (p. 228). The Church, however, accepted this Gospel because it expressed the belief of the Church about the person of Christ. "The Christ of the Fourth Gospel is not the Christ of history, but the Christ of experience" seen *sub specie aeternitatis* (p. 230). Nevertheless, the emphasis placed on the real incarnation, death and resurrection of Jesus separates the Jesus of the Fourth Gospel from the Jesus of Gnostic speculation. Moreover, the disputes of Jesus with the Jews contain historical elements. But the real object of the Evangelist was "the deliberate substitution of other ideals for the expected coming of the Messiah on the clouds of heaven" (p. 243). Mr. Burkitt connects the Gospel with a Jew of Jerusalem, either directly or indirectly, and on the evidence of the de Boor fragment and the Syriac Martyrology favors the distinction between the John of Ephesus and the Apostle John. "The Fourth Gospel is written to prove the reality of Jesus Christ. But the Evangelist was no historian: ideas, not events, were to him the true realities, and if we go to his work to learn the course of events we shall only be disappointed in our search" (p. 256.)

The remaining chapters are devoted to, the Gospel Canon; Marcion or Christianity without a History; and the Rivals of the Canonical Gospels. Mr. Burkitt conceives of the Four Gospels as attaining to canonicity because they satisfied the Church's requirements. Marcion was the first to canonize the New Testament (p. 319). Mr. Burkitt's conception of the origin of the New Testament Canon depends much on the argument from silence and neglects the evidence of the New Testament itself.

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

PAULINE AND OTHER STUDIES IN EARLY CHRISTIAN HISTORY. By W. M. RAMSAY, Hon.D.C.L., etc., Professor of Humanity in the University of Aberdeen. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 3 and 5 West Eighteenth St. 1906. \$3.00 net.

Professor Ramsay is best known to New Testament students as the sturdy defender of the historical character of the Acts and the

brilliant protagonist of the South-Galatian theory. He appears in both of these roles in the interesting essays now collected under the title of *Pauline and other Studies*. It is refreshing to hear from a layman, who is at the same time a trained geographer and historian, that "the practical man, and the scholar who studies antiquities for their own sake, will always find Acts a first-hand and luminous authority". The main topics treated are the conversion, personality and statesmanship of Paul; the influence of paganism upon the Church in Asia Minor; and the authorship, trustworthiness and chronology of Acts. Incidentally, Professor Ramsay defends Paul's philosophy of religion in Romans i, and tells the curious story of a vision by an uneducated German woman of the house near Ephesus where the Virgin Mary had lived, and the discovery some fifty years later (in 1891) by a priest of Smyrna of a house corresponding almost exactly in appearance and location, to the one described.

The first chapter, "Shall We Hear Evidence or Not?" is a strong plea for an open-minded examination of the evidence for an appearance to Paul of the living Lord. A vigorous protest is made against the tendency to assume at the outset that Paul's vision was due to some kind of mental unsoundness. Paul not only convinced those who heard him that he was sane and spoke the truth, but "he has moved the world, changed the whole course of history, and made us what we are. Is the world moved at the word of a lunatic? To think so would be to abandon all belief in the existence of order and unity in the world and in history".

Professor Ramsay reminds us several times that he could never accept the Acts as reliable history till he came to see that it could be interpreted in accordance with the South-Galatian theory. He plainly intimates that the historicity of Acts and the South-Galatian theory must stand or fall together, and warns us that we must accept the latter, together with the identification of the visits of Gal. ii. and Acts xi., under pain of being thrown into the arms of the Tübingen critics. We are by no means convinced that the general question of the reliability of Acts and the special question of the direction of Paul's journeys are necessarily bound up together as closely as the development of Ramsay's opinion might suggest. He himself has shown so broadly that "Paul and Luke stand together", and by his splendid appreciation of the Apostle and his testing of Luke at so many points he has made us recognize so "absolutely and irresistibly and forever that Luke had known the man, had been his friend and confidant and coadjutor", that the weight of his testimony will be felt even by those who cannot accept favorite theories.

The longest essay in the book is that on the statesmanship of Paul. The main thesis is that Paul's declaration before the council, "I am a Pharisee, son of Pharisees", was meant by the speaker to emphasize the political and not the religious points of agreement between himself and the Pharisaic party. Thus interpreted the words "stand forth as the sharpest and most comprehensive statement that has come down

to us from him about his work and his plans". He meant that his supreme purpose was the spiritual conquest of the Roman Empire, as over against the Sadducean policy of compromise and accommodation. If Paul was asserting his religious agreement with the Pharisees, it is said that he was adopting a device not consistent with perfect straightforwardness of character. If he had a political policy in mind, however, "he was asserting the continuity of his mental development from first to last". Professor Ramsay admits that Luke's account ("of the hope and resurrection of the dead, etc.") is "so expressed as to lend itself readily to the commonly accepted view"; and he even allows that Luke himself, who was a Jew and did not understand the Jews, may possibly have so interpreted Paul's words; but he is not deterred thereby from a confident defense of his own interpretation. The essay is valuable for its wealth of learning, its dialectical skill and the light which it sheds upon Paul's farseeing missionary policy; but when we turn again to Paul's own words, Acts xxiii. 6, and his repetition of them, xxiv. 21 ("I cried among them, Touching the resurrection of the dead, etc."), it is so evident that Paul was thinking of the religious doctrine of the Pharisees and not of their attitude toward the Roman state, that with reference to our author's thesis we are tempted to exclaim, "Much learning has made thee mad".

It is safe to say that Professor Ramsay has done more than any other living writer to stimulate interest in the Acts and to strengthen confidence in its historical accuracy. That a brilliant historical student, a layman, and an admirer of the Tübingen views, should come by the way of purely historical investigation to recognize in Luke an historian of the first rank, is in itself an argument whose force can be felt by those who are unable to enter into the subtleties of critical discussion. The views which such a scholar holds cannot be laughed out of court. Interesting here is what Professor Ramsay says of Lightfoot: "The quality in Lightfoot's work that most impressed me was his transparent honesty, his obvious straining to understand and represent every person's opinion with scrupulous fairness. In him I was for the first time conscious of coming in contact with a mind that was educated, thoughtful, trained in scholarship, perfectly straight and honest, and yet able to accept simply the New Testament in the old-fashioned way. . . . The combination had previously seemed to me impossible in our age, though possible at an earlier time; and its occurrence in Lightfoot set me to rethinking the grounds of my own position."

The volume is handsomely printed and bound, with a map of the Pauline world and numerous illustrations.

Lincoln University, Pa.

WILLIAM HALLOCK JOHNSON.

THE CREED OF CHRIST. A Study in the Gospels. By RICHARD VENABLE LANCASTER. Richmond, Va. The Presbyterian Committee of Publication. 1905. 12 mo. pp. 206.

This is as unpretentious a little volume as it is an excellent one. Mr. Lancaster makes no pretense of having discovered a new Christ; or any-

thing startlingly new about the Christ already known. He has simply asked what the body of beliefs were which Christ held and which—humanly speaking—determined, (may we say, moulded?) His life. And having drawn them out in an orderly manner, he sets them up in the sight of others, that they too may look and see and be refreshed.

The topics dealt with comprise our Lord's conception of the Scriptures, God, Satan, Sin, Punishment, Himself, Redeemed Men, the Kingdom, the Kingdom in the world, the Holy Spirit, the Home-going, the Second Coming, the Final Glory. Taken together they make a little System of Theology: and a very good, sound and uplifting system, which, if a man make it his system, may inspire and bless the life.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

Quellenschriften zur Geschichte des Protestantismus, herausgegeben von Joh. Kunze und C. Stange. Drittes Heft: DER HEIDELBERGER KATECHISMUS UND VIER VERWANDTE KATECHISMEN (Leo Jud's und Micron's kleine Katechismen, sowie die zwei Vorarbeiten Ursins) mit einer historisch-theologischen Einleitung, herausgegeben von Lic. A. LANG. Leipzig: A. Diechert'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung. 1907. 8vo.; pp. civ, 218.

The first impression received on opening this book is that "The Grammarian's Funeral" ought to be paraphrased and made to serve as the author's epitaph, so great an amount of patient and minute comparison does his work reveal. His purpose is to supplement, and in some points to correct, the great work of Gooszen: *De Heidelbergische Catechismus*, 1890. In the preface it is pointed out that Gooszen's method, which was to quote after each question of the Heidelberg Catechism the related statements from the earlier Lasky, Zurich, Geneva and Ursinus groups of catechisms, several of which were inaccessible, prevents the formation of a fair judgment of each source in itself, and hence of its relation to the great Heidelberg work. Some of these documents have since been published by Cohrs in his *Die evangelischen Katechismusversuche vor Luthers Enchiridion* (Berlin, 1900-'02), and by Reu in his *Quellen zur Geschichte des kirchlichen Unterrichts*, etc. (Gütersloh 1904). These new collections contain also the Strassburg Catechism and several other South German catechisms, unknown to Gooszen. Making use of these, together with all the catechisms cited by Gooszen, Lang attacks anew the problems of the sources, the originality and the theological character of the Heidelberg Catechism.

For his readers' benefit he publishes the original text both of the Heidelberg Catechism itself and of the four others named in the title. Of these Leo Juda's and Micronius' were not accessible in any modern edition. The latter belongs to the Lasky group, and was written in 1552

by Martin Micronius, pastor of the refugees' church in London, largely as an abridgement of John Lasky's first East Friesland catechism of 1546.

The introduction, filling one-third of the book, is crowded with details of comparison and conjecture, and not only contains much that is valuable to the student of Reformed doctrine, but suggests much that our modern Reformed churches stand in danger of forgetting.

The first chapter deals with the Reformed catechisms before the Heidelberg. A preliminary section describes various "catechetical attempts" before 1529, some of which were dependent on the Moravian *Kinderfragen*, and all of which show more or less strongly the influence of either Zurich or Strassburg, though none of them exhibits a clearly defined Reformed type of doctrine. None of them were of any special influence upon later catechisms. Lang names thirteen of these (cf. Cohrs), and they furnish a striking proof of the original and essential place which systematic religious instruction took in our Reformed churches. If we would be true to our history, we should certainly give to our most perfect of catechisms a large and ever larger place in the home, the Sabbath-school and the pastor's own teaching.

The two following sections are devoted to the Strassburg catechisms and some others from upper Germany related to these. Each of the three Strassburg leaders was a contributor to this work. Capito's *Kinder Bericht* from 1527 is noteworthy from the circumstance that the characteristic Reformed wording of the Lord's Prayer (with *unser Vater* and *vom Bösen*) is found first in it. It teaches clearly the doctrine of predestination. Two catechisms from Bucer, 1534 and 1537, in their several revisions, reflect the various doctrinal disputes of that period in Strassburg. Bucer's work did much toward settling the proper form and contents of a catechism. Matthew Zell published three catechisms, each incomplete according to the already established outline adopted from Luther,—decatalogue, creed, Lord's Prayer and sacraments. They are marked by religious warmth and by their emphasis on comfort, the keynote of the Heidelberg Catechism. In Lang's later analysis of the Palatinate catechism Bucer's and Zell's are often cited. Meckhart's *Short Christian Instruction*, 1548, used in Augsburg until 1632, is characterized as one of the best of the earlier Reformed productions. It is built upon Bucer's.

Section fourth brings us to Zurich and the three catechisms of Leo Juda. His *Christian Introduction*, 1534, and *Shorter Catechism*, 1535(?), are especially important. Bullinger tells us that he used other similar works freely in their composition. The *Shorter Catechism* was quite widely used in Switzerland and even in East Friesland. By these two catechisms not a little light is thrown on the state of affairs between Zwingli's death and the rise of Calvin. Two of Lang's statements, however, seem to be questionable: first, that this *Shorter Catechism* is marked by the covenant idea; and secondly, that it shows a pronounced Zwinglian type. An examination of the document itself shows nothing of the doctrine of the two covenants, characteristic of developed Cal-

vinism. The word is used in only four or five answers and in a simple biblical way. As to the second point, Lang himself is driven to qualify his statement. There is no trace of the peculiarities of Zwingli's teaching in the doctrine of original sin, while the doctrine of the sacraments is mediating. Predestination is not expressly taught, yet the elect are often spoken of. Thus nothing seems to remain but the Zwinglian emphasis on the idea of God as the fundamental religious motive. The wonder is that there is so little especially suggestive of Zwingli in it; and so much belonging to the more genuine Reformed spirit and teaching, when we remember that this catechism comes from a friend of Zwingli, laboring in Zwingli's city, only four years after Zwingli's death.

Calvin's catechisms are better known. Lang does them justice, and points out several marks of progress observable in them over all former attempts. It is to be remembered that the *Institutio* of 1536 was itself in purpose and outline a catechetical treatise. Specially noteworthy is Calvin's emphasis on the third use of the law. Lang contradicts Gooszen's attempted distinction in the Heidelberg Catechism of a soteriological-biblical tendency coming from Bullinger and a speculative tendency from Calvin, at least so far as the catechisms are witnesses. The one from 1541, when compared with that from 1537, shows just the opposite development in Calvin himself. It is further noted that his great catechism was written just after his return from Strassburg, where he had had an opportunity to learn much about catechism-making.

The Lasky group represents new and to some extent independent Reformed territory. Lang discovers in the Heidelberg Catechism traces of important influence from the Lasky and Micronius catechisms. They are themselves dependent chiefly upon Calvin's, but also upon Leo Juda's, Bucer's and Zell's; and Micronius was very plainly under Bullinger's influence. These productions, says our critic, are better than all their predecessors in catechetical form, in simplicity and in unction.

Bullinger's writings, and especially his *Catechesis* of 1559, stand alone. They are, says Lang, stamped with Zwinglianism and colored by humanism. Much is made of the covenant idea, and in the catechism nothing of predestination. On the whole, Bullinger speaks less to practical edification than the others. But his contribution is important on account of the peculiar historical and theological position of its author, and its very marked influence on the Heidelberg Catechism. All these groups, divergent as they are, yet show an underlying growing unity. They all reflect Luther's leading in the determination of contents. Lasky furnishes a model of catechetical question-form, and Calvin a model of internal unity. In a catechism built out of such materials high perfection might well be expected.

The second half of the introduction brings us to the Heidelberg Catechism itself. Against Heppe's view that it rests on Melancthon, and Gooszen's contention for the predominating influence of Bullinger, Lang holds, and, in our judgment, proves that when we go back of Ursinus and Olevianus, Calvin was its master genius, and after him

Bucer; although it reflects also the minds of many men in many centers, and is therefore fairly entitled to be called the ecumenical expression of the Reformed faith in catechetical form. To establish his position he gives a minute analysis of Ursinus' *Summa*, finding in it traces of influence from each of the groups examined above; outlines and estimates the amount of change in the abridged *Catechesis*, which really embodies Ursinus' direct contribution to the Heidelberg Catechism; and then by another minute analysis shows how far this is reproduced in the finished work, and what other sources or original features appear. His conclusion thoroughly confirms what Sudhoff said fifty years ago,—Calvin is its ruling spirit. Indeed the *Summa* seems more Calvinistic than the Geneva Catechism itself, for the later editions of the *Institutio* have contributed to it.

What of the doctrine of the covenants? It does not appear in the Heidelberg Catechism nor in Ursinus' preliminary draft, although in his *Summa* it was developed more fully than ever before,—the creation-covenant of works being explicitly taught. Ursinus' motive in the development of this mode of statement had been to defend the eternal validity of the law as a rule of conduct. This double-covenant idea Lang traces half to Calvin and half to Melancthon, denying Bullinger's part in it. And he explains its omission in Ursinus' abridgement not by the Elector's desire to conform the document so far as possible to the *Augustana variata*, as Gooszen contends, but by the offence which the doctrine gave, and by the complete change of method necessitated in the double presentation of the law. This is no doubt just as much a conjecture as Gooszen's, but the fact that in the Palatinate Church Ordinances of 1563, which Frederick sanctioned, the doctrine is again brought forward, seems to throw the balance of credibility in Lang's favor.

One other question is important,—the relation of the Heidelberg Catechism to the doctrine of predestination. Lang's contribution to this question consists in setting aside the ill-considered things that others have said about it. The fact is, that the doctrine is sharply formulated by Ursinus, was taught elsewhere by Olevianus, but seems nowhere to be explicitly set down in the Heidelberg Catechism. Was this due to the influence of Boquinus and others in Heidelberg, or to the scruples of Bullinger and Lasky, or to Melancthon's position, or to something else? Lang might have said, but does not, that by 1563 Bullinger had risen very near to Calvin's level (cf. *Conf. Helv. post.*, 1562), and that in the Lasky catechisms there is nothing inconsistent with predestination, and not a little that involves it (e. g., *Emden*, qu. 45). He finds it sufficient to say that the Heidelberg Catechism followed the Reformed precedent in passing this great subject over, and keeping to what comes within practical religious experience—a statement which, however, cannot be taken quite literally; further, that the Heidelberg Catechism is full of references to particular grace, perseverance and election. This fact illustrates at once the uniformity of the Reformed conviction on this topic and the composite, or perhaps we may even say

the compromise, character of the Heidelberg document. Lang finds the great excellence of the Heidelberg Catechism in its comparative freedom from theologizing, and its emphasis on a religion rooted in vital fellowship with Christ.

It seems a pity that the author did not put a climax to his sound and sane work by introducing his German readers to the crown of all Reformed catechetical treatises, in which were gathered and properly set all the jewels from all these earlier works, and which proved at last that theology need not be sacrificed in order that religion may be kept alive,—in a catechism or anywhere else,—but that consistent thinking and fervent devotion belong together and help each the other to reach the end of every catechism, which is a well-rounded edification—"that ye may be perfect and symmetrical, lacking in nothing". And who, by dedicating to our Westminster Standards such painstaking research as Lang's, will bring to American Presbyterians what we still lack and so much need, the well-laid foundations for a better knowledge of the history of which we are the heirs?

Erlangen, Germany.

E. B. WELSH.

JOHN CALVIN, THE ORGANIZER OF REFORMED PROTESTANTISM (1509-1564). By WILLISTON WALKER, Titus Street Professor of Ecclesiastical History in Yale University. G. Putnam's Sons, New York and London. 1906. 12mo.; pp. xviii, 456.

In days when French and German scholarship is doing so much to enrich our knowledge of Calvin and his age it is especially gratifying to welcome an American biography of the celebrated reformer. The volume before us, contributed by Prof. Walker to the series of *Heroes of the Reformation*, presents, with a reasonable degree of completeness, in a straightforward though somewhat listless style, the salient facts in Calvin's life and work. The author has striven hard to preserve a judicial temper in the treatment of the many controverted points, and his book is remarkable, considering its theme, for the absence of all superlatives whether of praise or of blame. He is not indeed devoid of a certain sympathy with his distinguished subject—a thorough study of Doumergue's great work must do at least so much for any one; but, on the other hand, no reader will catch from these pages any of that enthusiastic regard, not to say affectionate reverence, for Calvin, which those of his own day who knew him best seem so freely to have manifested. Least satisfactory of all is the twenty-page characterization of Calvin's theology. We should have preferred a more thorough and accurate exposition of the facts, and less of the author's patronizing comment that insinuates that an abandonment of many Calvinistic principles by the thought of to-day necessarily marks great progress since the first or last edition of the *Institutio* appeared. We cannot at any rate blame Calvin, if with him "as with Augustine" Adam "is a personage of great significance"; for Calvin, whom even the author regards as the prince of exegetes in that age, was probably correct in supposing

that St. Paul had a similarly high estimate of Adam's "fateful" "relation to the race".

Throughout the first half of the book the author has leaned hard, as was inevitable, upon the monumental work of Doumergue—a misfortune, though in no sense a fault, which every biographer of Calvin for many a year to come will have to suffer. But freely as he acknowledges his indebtedness to the professor of Montanban, the author has manifestly spared himself no pains in coming to his own conclusions. He has examined the sources for himself and his independent judgments are worthy of the most earnest consideration. As over against the conclusions of Doumergue the most interesting portion of the book, as also the most valuable portion from the scientific point of view, is the chapter on Calvin's religious development. To be sure, if we scrutinize the positive results of the author's investigations, we might be inclined to say that he has given this phase of his theme a disproportionate treatment. Nevertheless, the discussion will stand upon its own merits as an exceptionally solid piece of historical work. Prof. Walker states the problem of Calvin's conversion with clearness and accuracy and then gives an admirable critical sketch of the attempts that have been made toward its solution. We are satisfied, as we had been before reviewing the evidence as set forth anew by Prof. Walker, that if by Calvin's conversion—which he himself called "sudden"—we are to understand something deeper and more thorough-going than mere intellectual assent to the evangelical principles, this radical change cannot be placed, as it is by Doumergue, so early as 1528. Prof. Walker tries to do justice to the statements of Beza and Colladon according to which the influence of Olivétan upon Calvin must indeed have been exerted at about that time. But, as our author with nice discrimination points out, there is no evidence that Calvin was attracted to distinctively Protestant views by any influence emanating from Olivétan. And so far as the celebrated Greek teacher Wolmar is concerned, it is likewise unsafe to assert more than that, in all probability, he was an ardent Erasmian humanist at that time. It was, according to Prof. Walker's interpretation of the facts, some time between the publication of the *Commentary on Seneca* and the delivery of Rector Cop's Address that the decisive change must have occurred; in other words, late in 1532 or at least before Nov. 1, 1533. We agree, too, with the author in rejecting the artificial antithesis of Lecoultré's celebrated dictum, that the change was "*ni une conversion de l'intelligence, ni une conversion du sentiment, mais une conversion de la volonté*". On the question of Calvin's authorship of Cap's Address Prof. Walker, in harmony with the tendencies of the day, is inclined to favor the negative. As a matter of fact, therefore, the last word on the subject of Calvin's conversion has still to be written. The author's statement in regard to the reformer's religious development is doubtless as good a one as present possibilities permit.

Prof. Walker purposely refrained, in order to save space, from giving a detailed account of the varied contests in Geneva that absorbed so

much of Calvin's strength, but the Servetus episode is fully related and justly characterized. The sojourn in Strassburg (Chap. ix.) brings out in clear outlines Calvin's indebtedness to the German reformers, especially Bucer. As the sub-title indicates, special stress has been laid upon the reformer's achievement as the organizer of Protestantism.

Taken as a whole, the work is fully up to the standards of scholarship and literary skill which this admirable series of biographies has taught us to expect. The volume is adequately indexed. The bibliographical note at the beginning gives a critical resumé of the Calvin literature up to date. The illustrations are not so numerous as in some of the companion volumes, and neither of the two reproductions, one of an engraving and the other of a painting of Calvin, can claim to give us a thoroughly life-like representation of the reformer: even the portrait after the style of Holbein, in the Public Library in Geneva, cannot with certainty be said to have been taken from life.

Philadelphia.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

THE RELIGION OF CHRIST IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1906. Crown 8vo.; pp. vii. 197.

A brightly and persuasively written plea (from the pen, one would imagine, of a hereditary Unitarian,) for the new "humanitarianism" in the conception of the Christian religion—of Christ and His work. There is no "external authority" in religion, no "special revelation",—no "dogmatic authority outside the human heart"; "history and psychology furnish the only safe foundation upon which to build". Building on this foundation, we determine Jesus to have been a mere man, teaching a religion which is "mere theism", theism fired by love. By deifying Jesus, we deprive humanity of its noblest witness that God is with it: for He is the first religious genius who has taught us by word and example that greatest of truths, and they are His faithful followers who—not cry to Him "Lord, Lord," but—, "encouraged by his assurances and example to believe that men are in truth the children of their Father in heaven, set themselves very simply to try and do the will of that Father as declared by His Son Jesus". It is true Jesus was not a perfect man: He shared the popular unphilosophical outlook of His day and environment, falling below some pagan thinkers in some of His teachings. But who among the spiritual leaders of the world have equaled Him in His power of turning the ideal into reality? His power lay, in one word, in His faith: and therefore Christianity is something more than an ethical code—it is a faith,—the faith of Jesus continued in His followers; for it is the religious consciousness of Jesus "transmitted to His followers which is the inspiring and energizing power among them". Entering by the force of our will, "strong and single", into the life He has illustrated—shaking off the spiritual palsy that

would fain be saved rather than save itself—we shall find salvation, not by being conveyed after awhile to an impossible heaven, but by living here in the consciousness of God and in obedience to His will. Of course, Jesus did not mean this when He spoke of “eternal life”—He shared the Pharisees’ belief in a future life with a heaven and a hell. But surely we may learn the essence of life from Him while discarding His natural errors of theory. And this—it may well be it is not “the Christian religion”,—but it surely is “the religion of Christ”: and that is far better. The world has been a long time coming to it: as Lessing tells us, “the Christian religion” has been tried for eighteen centuries,—let “the Religion of Christ” be now tried. Jesus—Luther—Theodore Parker—these names mark the stages up to it: and a Liberal Christianity is announcing it with myriad voices. Shall we not at length enter into our real heritage?

It is in these dulcet tones that the new Christianity would woo us—the Christianity of Bousset and Wernle and Wrede and Heitmüller and the “school of comparative religion”; the Christianity to which Christ has ceased to be the object on which faith rests and become only an outstanding subject in which faith manifests itself,—no longer our Saviour, but only our example. Perhaps the reading of the signs of the times here given us is the true one. Perhaps Theodore Parker has blazed out the path in which the professors of the Christian religion—no, we beg pardon, of the Religion of Christ—are to walk for a season. Who knows into how deep a declension we may sink before we rise again? But that Christianity can rest at this point, no one can possibly believe who believes in Jesus, not only as a good man (of course limited by the conditions of his time and life), but as the Son of God come down from heaven to save the world by His blood and righteousness and now ascended on high as head over all things for His Church, which is the fulness of Him who filleth all things. It is all a question whether we believe in the Jesus of the Gospels or only believe with the Jesus of the anti-supernaturalistic critical reconstruction. For the one, we have all history and our hearts’ deepest needs, yea and also the Holy Spirit working in us faith in His Name—to testify. For the other, we have absolutely no testimony, except this irrefragible certainty—that thus it must needs be if—if man needs no salvation and there is no Almighty arm stretched out from heaven to save him. Supernaturalism and anti-supernaturalism—there is the real hinge of the question: and on the side of supernaturalism stands everything but an anti-supernaturalistic prejudice.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY IN OUTLINE. By WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN, Ph.D., D.D., Roosevelt Professor of Systematic Theology in the Union Theological Seminary, New York; Author of *The Essence of Christianity*. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. 1906. Pp. 468.

In this volume, as the title indicates, Prof. Brown has attempted an outline of Christian doctrine. The book is written in a clear and simple

style, and as one reads its pages he seems to understand the author easily. Nevertheless, after finishing a chapter and asking oneself exactly what the writer's views are on certain definite points, he feels that the position of the author on fundamental questions is not clearly defined after all. This will appear as we proceed to give a brief statement and estimate of Prof. Brown's views on some of the main questions.

The Introduction in two chapters treats of the Idea, Relations, Sources and Method of Christian Theology. It is not easy to determine precisely what is the author's conception of this science. "Christian theology, or dogmatics, as it is technically called," he tells us (p. 1), "is that branch of theological science which aims to give systematic expression to the doctrines of the Christian faith." These doctrines are to be understood as being "the abiding convictions about God, man, and their relations, growing out of God's historic revelation in Christ, and verifying themselves progressively in Christian experience, which together make up the Christian conception of life, and the acceptance of which forms, on the intellectual side, the bond of union between the members of the Christian Church". Certain questions at once arise. Is the subject-matter of Christian theology the Christian faith or God? Is the seat of authority—that which makes theology a normative science—"Christian experience" or "the historic revelation in Christ"? If the latter—then how is this revelation conceived, and what is meant by the statement that these "abiding convictions" "grow out" of the historic revelation?

In regard to the first question, Prof. Brown tells us (p. 8) that the "subject-matter of theology is not the religious experience itself, but the God whom that experience reveals". This is satisfactory. It saves theology a place as a distinct science, and prevents its becoming merely a part of anthropology or psychology. Nevertheless, the author does not seem consistently to have adhered to this idea of theology throughout these introductory chapters. The subject-matter of theology is conceived to be, not so much God, as the Christian faith in both the objective and subjective senses of the term faith. In other words, the subject-matter of theology is conceived of as being either a view of the world or an experience, both of which are the result of the influence of Jesus Christ. This, however, cannot be an ultimate conception of Christian theology as a science. If the subject-matter of theology be Christian experience or faith in the subjective sense, theology is reduced to a branch of psychology. If faith be taken in the objective sense as denoting the Christian revelation, then it is not that revelation but the God whom it reveals, who is the "subject-matter" of Christian theology. It should be said, however, that Prof. Brown does not make Christian experience the subject-matter of theology. The function of Christian experience is to interpret and verify the historic revelation. This brings us to the other questions above stated.

It is still more difficult to determine exactly what Prof. Brown's answer is to the question whether the "historic revelation" or Christian experience is the final authority in religious knowledge. The doctrines

of the Christian faith are said to be "abiding convictions" which "grow out" of God's historic revelation in Christ. But precisely what does this mean? Does Prof. Brown mean to say, with Rothe, that the Scripture doctrines are the result of human reflection upon a series of facts, the chief one being Christ? Or does he mean to say, with Sabatier, that Christian doctrine is the product of Christian life? In other words, whence is the doctrinal statement of Christianity to be derived, and what is the source of the normative character which the author claims for it? Prof. Brown thinks that the Bible, the Creeds of the Church, and the writings of theologians are the "proximate" sources of the statement of Christian doctrine, the "ultimate" source being "the Christian religion itself and the revelation in which it had its rise". In other words, a distinction is made between the Bible and the Christian revelation which it contains. And since Christian doctrines are "abiding convictions", the permanent elements must be separated from those which are only of passing significance and which partake of the limitations of the times in which the doctrines grew up. Thus Christian theology becomes "a normative science whose function it is to discriminate that which is essential and permanent in the Christian faith from that which is accidental and temporary, and to present the common Christian convictions in the form best fitted to give clearness to thought and definiteness to purpose" (p. 6). But how are we to determine what is of permanent value in Christian doctrine, and what after all is the seat of authority? Prof. Brown seeks a synthesis between the internal and external views of authority. To find it in the Christian experience of the individual, he thinks, is too individualistic a procedure. But the view of authority which finds its seat in the individual conscience, he says, is not inconsistent with the acceptance of an objective standard. This standard is found in the fact that man is a social being, so that there is a social sanction or control for the Christian experience of the individual. We should observe, however, that this will give us no authority outside of humanity. Consequently, in this way we can get only a very imperfect and fallible norm by which we are to sift out the abiding elements of Christianity. It is not, however, from the somewhat abstract discussion of "authority" that we really get the author's view of the norm by which we are to determine what is of permanent value in the doctrinal content of Christianity. It is from his discussion of the idea of theology in the opening chapter. We there learn, that theology has to do with religious convictions verifiable in experience; that these convictions have a definite origin in the Christian revelation; that they abide in the midst of change, and consequently need restatement to adapt them to a changing intellectual environment. We may, perhaps, describe this method somewhat as follows: The source of these religious convictions is to be found in the views of God and life which Jesus taught, and in the life which sprang from His influence. The Christian theologian must take this product together with the whole statement of doctrine by the Christian Church, and must sift out the permanent elements by

means of Christian experience, and must then restate the doctrine in the light of and in accordance with contemporary thought and science. Thus (p. 13) in the section entitled "Theology and Contemporary Thought", it is explicitly stated that the theologian "must look to science for the critical apparatus by which to determine what belongs to the essence of Christianity, and to distinguish its experimental content from its changing forms." And it is also said (p. 18) that it is Christian experience which determines the elements of permanent value in the creeds of the Church. Accordingly, in this process of determining what is essential in Christian doctrine the Bible is really subordinated and subjected to Christian experience and contemporary thought; and Prof. Brown does not hesitate, for example, to reject the idea of penalty which he admits to have been taught by Isaiah and Paul. Nor may it be said that it is the revelation in Christ which is the determining factor, since it is not the Christ of the Gospels and the Epistles who is norm of Christian revelation, but a Christ whose deity is stated in terms of contemporary thought, so that when we affirm that Jesus is divine we do not mean "that God is to be found only in Jesus, but that He is everywhere and always like Jesus". The doctrine of the deity of Christ means that "in Christ we have the revelation of the true nature of the ultimate reality who is the source and law of all things" (p. 347). This means simply that the immanence of God in all finite existence has reached its fullest expression in the man Jesus. In the Person of Christ, therefore, there is no supernatural revelation. Nor is the revelation in the teaching of Jesus supernatural in any such sense as would discriminate it as to its mode of delivery, from general or natural revelation, since the mark of a supernatural revelation, according to Prof. Brown, is to be sought simply in the character of its content, not in the mode of its origin. From this it is evident that we have no supernatural revelation in Christ. The determining authority in religious knowledge for Prof. Brown really is a philosophy which he calls contemporary thought. Accordingly, it must follow that there can be no finality attaching to the doctrines of Christianity, but when contemporary thought changes, we will need a reinterpretation of Christian doctrine. Prof. Brown seems to feel this: for he says (p. 50) that the finality of the Christian revelation means that "through all the stages of God's self-manifestation, the Person of Christ remains the controlling factor; that he still keeps his place, and, we believe, will continue to keep it, as the highest realization of the divine ideal, and the most powerful means of realizing that ideal among men". Prof. Brown does well to add the words "we believe" to this statement that Christ will continue to keep his place. For upon the author's premises there is no logical warrant for this belief. If the restatement of the doctrine of the Person of Christ in the light of contemporary thought leaves us with a merely human Christ, why may not contemporary ethics, for example, transcend the so-called historic Jesus altogether? Indeed, some contemporary thought is doing that very thing. The whole question of the finality and permanent validity and value of Christianity and Christian

doctrine resolves itself into the question whether Jesus is really divine in the fullest and metaphysical sense of the term, and whether God has through Christ and his Apostles revealed himself to man in a supernatural manner; or whether Christianity is simply the culmination of God's natural self-manifestation to humanity. The latter is evidently Prof. Brown's idea. The issue and the antithesis is a real and vital one. It cannot be avoided by saying that Christianity is a supernatural revelation because of the supreme value of its content, but not as to the mode of the delivery of its doctrine. We do not, however, feel obliged to give up the Christianity of the New Testament—for we cannot but think that that is what Prof. Brown has done—at the demand of his philosophy which he calls contemporary thought. Some contemporary thought, indeed much contemporary thought, overemphasizes the immanence of God, and minimizes or does away with the supernatural modes of the divine activity. But such a philosophy has been prevalent since the first Christian centuries, and is no truer to-day than it was then. We prefer to judge contemporary thought from the standpoint of the supernaturalism involved in the Christianity of the New Testament writers, and to accept not only its religious content, but also its doctrinal form.

We have, perhaps, dwelt at too great length upon questions of prolegomena, and should give some idea of the author's views on special doctrines. His view of the Person of Christ we have seen to be humanitarian, since by his deity is only meant that he is the fullest revelation and highest expression of the divine immanence. Prof. Brown's doctrine of the Trinity is practically the modalistic. In the chapter on the Trinity we find the view expressed that the Word and Spirit no longer denote to us realities in God which we can picture apart from our experience, but are interpretations of that experience itself" (p. 160). Of course, we cannot "picture" to ourselves the Word and Spirit as realities in the divine nature, and, we may add, neither do they give us any pictorial interpretation of our experience. The question, however, is not whether we can "picture the Word and Spirit as realities in God", but whether or not they are realities in the divine nature, and what is meant by the author's statement that these terms are "interpretations" of Christian experience. His answer to this question can be obtained from the words immediately following those quoted. The terms Word and Spirit are said to lend themselves to-day to the expression of the same conviction to which they gave utterance in the past, the conviction, viz., "that through the historic revelation which culminates in Jesus Christ, as in the inner experience which appropriates him as Lord, we have to do not simply with human ideals, however exalted, or human aspirations, however sincere, but with the great God himself as he is manifesting himself in gracious, fatherly love to his needy children". In other words, God is a "self-imparting" God; he is everywhere revealing himself in and through humanity, and the culmination of this process is in Christ and in the hearts of Christians. But any monarchian could have said this. Monarchianism did not

resolve the doctrine into a "mere analysis of human experience". Prof. Brown sympathizes with those who have been "unwilling to stop with a Trinity of manifestation", because this seems to resolve the doctrine into a "mere analysis of human experience". He too shares "the same longing for communion with the living God". But in the recognition of the truth of the divine immanence, "the antithesis between the Trinity of essence and that of manifestation disappears". The meaning of all this seems to be that there is no "Trinity of essence", but that the term Trinity, nevertheless, expresses a real truth, *i. e.*, one ontologically grounded in God, viz., that he is a self-revealing and self-imparting God. This is simply the doctrine that the terms Word and Spirit are expressive of modes of God's relations *ad extra*. The modalistic conception of the Trinity did not stop with "mere human experience" any more than does Prof. Brown.

The doctrine of the Atonement set forth is the moral influence theory. For after following his usual method of indicating the elements of truth in all the other views, and after pointing out their defects, Prof. Brown says that the Atonement's "saving efficacy consists in its moral influence in arousing repentance and faith" (p. 365). Obviously that which has atoning value is man's repentance and faith. From this we would expect to find a doctrine of sin which would eliminate the ideas of guilt and penalty altogether. We are surprised, therefore, to find them retained and defined in a way which would seem to imply the governmental theory of the Atonement (pp. 285ff.). The subjects coming usually under the Application of Redemption and Eschatology are distributed under other heads, and receive a somewhat scanty treatment.

We believe that Prof. Brown has made an honest and exceedingly painstaking effort to state Christian doctrine in such a way as to do justice to the Christianity of the New Testament and to the statement of Christian doctrine wrought out by the Church of God under the illuminating guidance of the Holy Spirit. But any attempt to state Christianity in the terms of a philosophy which minimizes the supernatural is foredoomed to failure.

At the end of the volume will be found a classified bibliography. This, though not intended to be exhaustive, is nevertheless very full, and will be of great help to the student of theology.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

GOD'S CHOICE OF MEN: A Study of Scripture. By WILLIAM R. RICHARDS, Pastor of the Brick Presbyterian Church, New York City. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1905. 8vo., pp. 231.

The "provoking occasion" of this book, we are told, was a charge of hypocrisy made by the editor of a leading New York newspaper against

an alleged large number of Presbyterian ministers who "remain outwardly faithful to a creed" which they have "inwardly rejected"; who, more particularly, have become convinced that there is no such God as the "God of the Westminster Confession". Accordingly, in this series of sermons, published as the constituent chapters of the book, Dr. Richards essays to give us "a new-fashioned treatment of the old-fashioned doctrine of God's election of men". The material is divided, somewhat arbitrarily, into two parts, the first exhibiting a number of scriptural examples of God's choice of men and various examples of the human responses to this divine election", while the second half deals more narrowly with the "purpose of election, raising the inquiry what God chooses men for."

The sermons as a whole bear the well-known traits of Dr. Richards' pulpit work. They are simple, direct, incisive in style, practical and experimental rather than dogmatic in method, enlivened with many a fine fetch of fancy as well as with many a flash of subtle spiritual discernment, thoroughly biblical at the center, if not along the entire periphery, of their thought. The book is suggestive and stimulating; and in spite of an occasional thrust at the Westminster divines on the one hand, and the opponents of every sort of "election", on the other, there is an overplus of sweeter and stronger notes of religious sincerity and earnestness that give the pages a peaceful import and make them good devotional literature.

But we cannot help feeling that Dr. Richards would have rendered his apologetic service more successfully, if, before finding fault with the statement of our Confession on the subject of the divine decree, he had taken more pains to ascertain just what the much abused document teaches. We lack confidence in any guide who would introduce us to the intricacies of the theology of the Reformation, when we find him repeating the erroneous judgment that Calvin (*Institutio*, III, ch. iii, § 7) referred to the decree of reprobation as a "*decretum quidem horribile*". And our confidence is by no means strengthened when we are told (p. 7) that the "Reformation creeds might have left one to suppose that God sometimes elects His favorites to a sinecure"—an estate of grace, presumably, in which they have no duties or responsibilities. The fact is that Dr. Richards has reduced the teachings of Scripture on his theme to the one great principle that God elects men to service. So eager is the author to write this truth large upon his every page that although, according to his preannounced plan, he was reserving this aspect of the problem for the second part of the volume, he must needs make it the chief burden of the first half of the book also. Now assuredly this is a cardinal biblical truth: it cannot be too strongly put. But does Dr. Richards suppose this is a twentieth century discovery? Was not this the precise conviction of those imperturbable predestinarians of the 16th and 17th centuries whose achievements in behalf of religious and civil liberty we are here so often called upon to admire? And having this assurance of faith that steeled their hearts for heroic endurance, did the creed-makers forget to declare

themselves on this fundamental question? What sort of historical investigation is it that fails to find this "supreme saving truth" in the Westminster Confession, or indeed in any of the more elaborate Protestant symbols? How fully even Melancthon as early as 1530 apprehended the purpose of election may be seen in the Augsburg Confession, Art. xx, and how large Dr. Richards' thesis loomed up in the conception of the Westminster divines he might easily have ascertained by a perusal of the chapters on the divine decree, on sanctification, and on good works.

The truth is that Dr. Richards simply refuses to grapple with the problem of the divine election conceived *sub specie æternitatis*. The biblical examples of election are reduced to simple cases of providential calls in the temporal sphere. With what violence to the plain statements of Scripture this is sometimes accomplished may be seen, *e. g.*, in his sermon on the "election" of Jacob as against Esau, where, in spite of what Paul says about the pretemporal nature of this act of choice, the transaction is regarded simply as a sort of divine recognition of the wily Jacob's desire to have his brother's birthright: election on the basis of a divine foreknowledge; rather, indeed, as a reward of Jacob's meritorious faith! Similarly Jer. xviii. 6, "Behold, as the clay is in the potter's hand, so are ye in mine hand, O house of Israel", is made to mean that we as Christians are called to liberty—an exegetical result that is true enough in the light of other declarations of Scripture, but which can be secured from this passage only in some such arbitrary manner as the author on his own confession has had to employ: "I cannot understand all that the apostle says about it in the ninth chapter of Romans, but it is evident (?) that the figure itself means freedom."

We admire the practical and helpful paragraphs in this book which, so far as they go, place clearly before us one of the most important, as well as one of the most attractive, features of Calvinism. But we are of the opinion that the apostle Paul, and the authors of the Westminster Confession after him, had a much richer conception of the sovereign will and purpose of God in the whole cosmos than Dr. Richards' restricted treatment of *God's Choice of Men* would lead one to suppose.

Philadelphia.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

CHRISTUS IST MEIN LEBEN. Akademische Predigten von Dr. H. Cremer, weil. Prof. d. Theol. in Greifswald. Herausgegeben von Lic. E. Cremer. Pfarrer in Rehme in Westfalen. Gütersloh: Druck und Verlag von C. Bertelsmann. 1906. Pp. 237.

These 27 sermons by the late Prof. Cremer, gathered and issued by his son, were preached to the students of the University of Greifswald. They set forth fully and clearly the way of life as it is in Christ Jesus. Because Germany has been the home of Rationalism, and because here and there a University professor makes himself conspicuous by doubting or denying the Truths of revelation, many have come to the conclusion that the entire German Protestant Church is permeated by unbelief.

Nothing could more effectually refute this assumption than the homiletic literature of Germany, of which the sermons under review, by the author of the well-known *Biblico-Theological Lexicon of the New Testament Greek*, are a fine illustration.

ZWISCHENSPIELE zu den gebräuchlichsten Chorälen der lutherischen Kirche, bearbeitet von J. A. Theiss, Organist an der Bethlehemsgemeinde zu Milwaukee, Wis. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House. 1903.

In many German churches it is still customary for the organist to play interludes between the hymn stanzas. The book before us provides such interludes for all the best known German choral melodies, in each case adapting them to the character of the particular melody. All of them are reverent and dignified, and the book can be heartily commended to organists who feel the need of something of the kind.

LECTURES ON HOMILETICS. By HENRY C. GRAVES, A.M., D.D., Teacher of Homiletics and Biblical Analysis in the Gordon Bible and Missionary Training School, Boston. American Baptist Publication Society. Philadelphia. 1906. Cloth. 156 pages.

These studies have been very carefully prepared by one who has manifestly acquainted himself with the large and increasing literature in the field of Practical Theology. His suggestions in this brief and comprehensive volume indicate a personal experience in class-room work, and in the successful instruction of theological students. The book contains twelve brief lectures. They are all definitely outlined and clearly illustrated. They are replete with suggestions which will be found of great value to every theological student and minister. The book is specially commended to such Christian workers as have been denied the privilege of specific or complete theological courses.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

AMERICAN BAPTIST YEAR BOOK, 1906. American Baptist Publication Society. Philadelphia. Paper. 230 pages. Price 25c.

This excellent compendium of information in reference to the work and organization of the Baptist Church has been most carefully prepared by the editor, the Rev. J. G. Walker, D.D. It contains reports of all the missionary and benevolent societies of the denominations, together with a full account of the various state organizations, giving careful statistics of their membership, growth, and benevolent contributions. This is followed by a complete list of all the ordained ministers in the United States, and all the American missionaries in foreign lands. There is also mention of the ordinations, and the deaths during the year 1905. There is appended a tabulated summary of "The Baptists in the World", together with a statistical table of the religious denominations in the United States. This volume presents an admirable summary

of the strength and the enterprises of this great branch of the Christian Church.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

SPURGEON'S ILLUSTRATIVE ANECDOTES. Selected and Classified by the REV. LOUIS ALBERT BANKS, D.D. New York and London: Funk & Wagnalls Company. 1906. 313 pages. Cloth. Price \$1.20 net.

No one could be better prepared for his task than the compiler of these selections from the sermons of Spurgeon. Dr. Banks is known as one of the most successful illustrative preachers of his time. He fully appreciates the power which Spurgeon manifested, of vivid and clear illustration. In this collection of anecdotes, the author follows the admirable plan of adding to the immediate illustration a sufficient portion of the sermon from which the anecdote is taken, to show its full bearing and significance. The volume will be of great service to those who are seeking for simple and forceful illustration, and its publication is a helpful reminder of the absolute necessity to the successful preacher of careful and striking illustrations.

Princeton.

PAUL MARTIN.

TUXEDO AVENUE TO WATER STREET. By AMOS R. WELLS. Funk & Wagnalls Company. New York and London. 1906. Cloth. 259 pages. Price \$1.00.

This little story by the editor of *The Christian Endeavor World*, is intended to illustrate the power which can be exercised by a strong and wealthy church, located in the poorest section of a great city. As the author declares, "it is the story of a transplanted church", and pictures the experience of a wealthy congregation when its church home is suddenly changed from "Tuxedo Avenue" to "Water Street". The writer significantly suggests the provision of a large endowment, to insure the continued existence and success of the church in its new location. He declares that the book is the "story of an Impossibility; or of what some will consider an impossibility; yet it is also the story of a possibility,—the action of the people; and of an assured certainty—the action of God; but it is a probability; it shows a church going forth, as all churches will some day go forth, to the place where the need is, where the work and the blessedness are."

Princeton.

PAUL MARTIN.

KEYWORDS IN THE TEACHING OF JESUS. By A. T. ROBERTSON, D.D., Professor of New Testament Interpretation in the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society. Cloth. 128 pages.

Dr. Robertson has rendered the Church a distinct service in publishing these seven brief studies in fundamental Christian doctrines. The chapters of this book were delivered as lectures at the Summer Assem-

bly at Jackson Springs, in 1904; but in this permanent form they will reach a much wider circle than would otherwise have been possible.

The subjects treated are: "God the Father", "The Son", "Sin", "The Kingdom", "Righteousness", "The Holy Spirit", "The Future Life". The discussion is clear, Scriptural, illuminating. The volume would be of great service for Bible classes; or as a text book for summer schools. It is deserving of the very widest circulation.

Princeton.

PAUL MARTIN.

THE FOURSQUARE CHRISTIAN; or, The Fourfold Doctrine of the First and Great Commandment. By REV. E. P. WHALLON, Ph.D., D.D. Cincinnati: Monfort & Co. 1905. 8vo., pp. 256.

In brief chapters, under the four divisions of Christian Experience, Christian Worship, Christian Faith, and Christian Service, many aspects of the Christian life are presented practically. The volume would be more attractive if printed in larger type, and the contents more useful if brightened by more variety and freshness of treatment. The matter of the homilies is Scriptural, sane and wholesome.

Princeton.

PAUL MARTIN.

VISION AND TASK. By GEORGE CLARKE PECK. New York: Eaton & Mains. 1905. 8vo., pp. 289.

The sermons contained in this volume are thoughtful and helpful, and are couched in good, easy flowing English. The author is, perhaps, unconsciously to himself since he does so naturally, a biographical preacher. He loves embodied truth. The portrayal of the Bible personages involved in the text, together with incidents from other lives, furnishes the foundation and the illumination of text and theme. As one reads the volume he wonders why more preachers do not learn and practice the art of biographical preaching. Every one is interested in people and will listen to the story of a life. The method secures freshness and variety of treatment and makes themes, in themselves too deep and difficult for the hearer (and sometimes for the preacher himself) interesting and helpfully applicable to our lives when in conditions or under circumstances similar to those of the persons described.

Princeton.

PAUL MARTIN.

LICHT DES LEBENS. Ein Jahrgang von Evangelien-Predigten aus dem Nachlass des seligen D. Carl Ferdinand Wilhelm Walther, gesammelt von C. J. Otto Hauser, Pastor der ersten deutschen ev.-luth. Dreieinigkeits-Gemeinde zu St. Louis, Mo. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House. 1905. Pp. 688.

Dr. Walther (1811-1887), the author of these sermons, was one of the foremost theologians of the Lutheran Church in America, and as preacher, teacher and writer the most potent force in the large and influential Missouri Synod and the Synodical Conference. Besides his many other publications, three volumes of his sermons appeared between 1871 and the year of his death. The volume before us contains 68

sermons preached between the years 1841 and 1886. Like all of Dr. Walther's sermons, these are characterized by eloquence of diction, simplicity of style, and above all by intense evangelistic fervor. They are in every respect models of what sound Gospel sermons ought to be, and afford most edifying and refreshing reading in these days of negation and doubt.

IN MEMORIAM. Dreissig Leichenreden, dargeboten von Pastor C. Gross, Sr. St. Louis, Mo.: Concordia Publishing House. 1905. Pp. 160.

This small collection of funeral sermons likewise comes from a member of the Missouri Synod, pastor of a Lutheran church at Fort Wayne, Ind. What has been said above of the sermons of Dr. Walther applies with almost equal force to these. They are a plain, straightforward presentation of the Word of Life, full of that comfort and instruction which in days of sorrow only the Word can give.

ZWEITER SYNODAL-BERICHT des Brasilianischen Distrikts der Deutschen Ev.-Lutherischen Synode von Missouri, Ohio und andern Staaten. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House. 1906. Pp. 88.

This pamphlet, giving the proceedings of the last meeting of the Brazil District of the German Evangelical Lutheran Synod of Missouri, Ohio and Other States, is devoted chiefly to an elaborate paper by the Rev. H. A. Klein, on "The Doctrine of the Church", which he treats under the following heads: I. What is the Church? II. How is the Church constituted? III. What are the marks of the Church? IV. What are the Church's rights and duties? V. When do we make a right use of the doctrine of the Church?

CLARK'S PEOPLE'S COMMENTARY. HEBREWS, JAMES I. II., PETER. By O. P. EACHES, D.D. American Baptist Publication Society. Philadelphia. Cloth. 368 pages.

This volume offers a careful, comprehensive, and unusually helpful interpretation of these four New Testament epistles. It is as the author suggests, a popular commentary. It will be of great service to the layman, and to every Bible reader; yet it is specially designed for pastors and Sabbath School teachers. Its clearness of statement and apparent simplicity of treatment do not, however, disguise the fact that it is based upon the most careful and scholarly research and investigation. It is, as the writer states, "prepared upon a critical basis"; yet, as is everywhere manifest in the volume, it is eminently practical in its design. In the *Preface*, the writer suggests the burning questions of the present day upon which light is thrown by these epistles; as for instance the following: "Are all Christians priests?" "Can ordinances save?" "Are any sacraments necessary?" "Is there a larger hope for those who die without Christ?" "Did the death of Christ have an objective efficacy?" "Is there value in prayer?" A commentary written with

these questions in mind cannot fail to have definite bearing upon present day problems.

The introduction contains helpful discussions of the subject, outline, authorship, and character of the separate epistles. In addition to this, there occur in the course of the exposition, some fifty "brief discussions" of important matters, or disputed doctrines. Each page of the commentary contains a portion of the text of the Revised Version, beneath which, in large type, is found the interpretation of the verses, and at the end of each chapter the brief discussions to which reference has been made; and then a series of practical remarks which are helpful and illuminating. The doctrinal implications of the commentary are conservative; its character is scholarly, and its tone devotional and spiritual. The volume is to be cordially commended to ministers, and Christian workers, and to all who desire a brief and helpful exposition of these practical New Testament epistles.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

GENERAL LITERATURE.

THE STRUGGLE FOR AMERICA. By R. P. BRORUP. Published by North and South Publication Company. Fitzgerald, Georgia. Paper. 93 pages. Price 25c.

This brief volume contains nine interesting essays on sociological problems. The general scope will be manifest from the following titles: "The Social Question in the United States", "Morality and Marriage", "The Anglo-Saxon Race in the South", "The South and the Negro", "Immigration". No one can read these pages without being impressed anew with the difficult problems which confront the nation, especially in connection with the negro question in the Southern States.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

EARLY DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RUSSIA. By JOHN C. HILDT. (Series XXIV, Nos. 5-6, Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science.) Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1906. 8vo., pp. 194.

The successive negotiations between the two nations from 1776 to 1824 are historically described. The results of the negotiations are briefly summarized at the close. The record is a creditable one for both nations, manifesting the spirit of friendship and fair dealing. The citation of sources and authorities is full and careful.

Princeton.

PAUL MARTIN.

THE FINANCES OF AMERICAN TRADE UNIONS. By A. M. SAKOLSKI, Ph.D. (Series XXIV, Nos. 3-4, Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 1906. 8vo., pp. 152.

The sources of income; the expenditures for strikes, sick and death benefits, and for administration; and the methods of administration of a number of the typical and more important Unions are carefully studied and exhibited.

Princeton.

PAUL MARTIN.

SUPPLEMENTARY EXAMPLES TO BOOK II, STANDARD AMERICAN ARITHMETIC. (The same to Book III.) Compiled by G. H. RUNGE. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House. 12mo., pp. 16.

Lists of examples for practice.

REGELN FÜR DIE DEUTSCHE RECHTSSCHREIBUNG NEBST WÖRTERVERZEICHNIS. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House. 1905. Pp. 47.

A series of easily understood rules, with appropriate examples, governing the use of letters, capitals and foreign words in the German language. A list of the foreign, or borrowed, words in their proper form is appended.

Princeton.

PAUL MARTIN.

